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Quantum computers promise to offer a considerable speed-up in solving certain
problems, compared to the best classical algorithms. In many instances, the gap
between quantum and classical running times is conjectured to be exponential.
While this is great news for those applications where quantum computers would
provide such an advantage, it also raises a significant challenge: how can classical
computers verify the correctness of quantum computations? In attempting to
answer this question, a number of protocols have been developed in which a
classical client (referred to as verifier) can interact with one or more quantum
servers (referred to as provers) in order to certify the correctness of a quantum
computation performed by the server(s). These protocols are of one of two types:
either there are multiple non-communicating provers, sharing entanglement, and
the verifier is completely classical; or, there is a single prover and the classical
verifier has a device for preparing or measuring quantum states. The latter type
of protocols are, arguably, more relevant to near term quantum computers, since
having multiple quantum computers that share a large amount of entanglement
is, from a technological standpoint, extremely challenging.
Before the realisation of practical single-prover protocols, a number of chal-
lenges need to be addressed: how robust are these protocols to noise on the
verifier’s device? Can the protocols be made fault-tolerant without significantly
increasing the requirements of the verifier? How do we know that the verifier’s
device is operating correctly? Could this device be eliminated completely, thus
having a protocol with a fully classical verifier and a single quantum prover? Our
work attempts to provide answers to these questions.
First, we consider a single-prover verification protocol developed by Fitzsi-
mons and Kashefi and show that this protocol is indeed robust with respect to
deviations on the quantum state prepared by the verifier. We show that this
is true even if those deviations are the result of a correlation with the prover’s
system. We then use this result to give a verification protocol which is device-
independent. The protocol consists of a verifier with a measurement device and
a single prover. Device-independence means that the verifier need not trust the
measurement device (nor the prover) which can be assumed to be fully mali-
cious (though not communicating with the prover). A key element in realising
this protocol is a robust technique of Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani for testing,
using non-local correlations, that two untrusted devices share a large number of
entangled states. This technique is referred to as rigidity of non-local correlations.
Our second result is to prove a rigidity result for a type of quantum correlations
known as steering correlations. To do this, we first show that steering correlations
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can be used in order to certify maximally entangled states, in a setting in which
each test is independent of the previous one. We also show that the fidelity with
which we characterise the state, in this specific test, is optimal. We then improve
the previous result by removing the independence assumption. This then leads
to our desired rigidity result. We make use of it, in a similar fashion to the
device-independent case, in order to give a verification protocol that is one-sided
device-independent. The importance of this application is to show how different
trust assumptions affect the efficiency of the protocol.
Next, we describe a protocol for fault-tolerantly verifying quantum compu-
tations, with minimal “quantum requirements” for the verifier. Specifically, the
verifier only requires a device for measuring single-qubit states. Both this device,
and the prover’s operations are assumed to be prone to errors. We show that
under standard assumptions about the error model, it is possible to achieve ver-
ification of quantum computation using fault-tolerant principles. As a proof of
principle, and to better illustrate the inner workings of the protocol, we describe
a toy implementation of the protocol in a quantum simulator, and present the
results we obtained, when running it for a small computation.
Finally, we explore the possibility of having a verification protocol, with a
classical verifier and a single prover, such that the prover is blind with respect
to the verifier’s computation. We give evidence that this is not possible. In fact,
our result is only concerned with blind quantum computation with a classical
client, and uses complexity theoretic results to argue why it is improbable for
such a protocol to exist. We then use these complexity theoretic techniques to
show that a client, with the ability to prepare and send quantum states to a
quantum server, would not be able to delegate arbitrary NP problems to that
server. In other words, even a client with quantum capabilities cannot exploit
those capabilities to delegate the computation of NP problems, while keeping
the input, to that computation, private. This is again true, provided certain






Quantum computation is a new form of computation that exploits the effects
of quantum physics in order to solve certain problems much faster than regular
(classical) computers. It is conjectured that, for some of these problems, even
the most powerful supercomputers available today would take millennia to arrive
at a solution, whereas a quantum computer could do it in mere minutes. This is
great news for the prospect of solving currently intractable problems, and is the
impetus for developing large scale quantum computers, but it also raises a signif-
icant challenge: how can classical computers verify the correctness of quantum
computations? In other words, how can a quantum computer prove to a classical
agent that the solution to a certain problem is correct? While checking the cor-
rect functionality of small quantum devices, such as lasers or photo-detectors, is
relatively easy, the situation is far from trivial when it comes to quantum com-
puters. In attempting to answer this question, a number of so-called quantum
verification protocols have been developed, in which a classical computer, possibly
utilizing small quantum devices, attempts to verify the computations performed
by one or more quantum computers. In this thesis, we study a number of aspects
pertaining to these protocols:
(1) The robustness of these protocols to noise and imperfections in the utilized
quantum devices. To that end, we show that certain protocols are indeed
robust to noise and that verification can be achieved by simply inspect-
ing correlations between the results of these devices and the results of the
quantum computer.
(2) The performance of these protocols under varying assumptions regarding
the aforementioned correlations. Here we show that certain types of corre-
lations lead to improved performance for the verification protocols, making
them better suited for practical implementations. In certain cases we are
also able to show that the improved performance is optimal.
(3) Coping with erroneous results and imperfections. For this, we propose
a simple construction for making verification protocols fault-tolerant (i.e.
having the ability to detect and correct for errors).
(4) Limitations for cryptographic applications. Certain types of verification
protocols have been inspired by cryptographic primitives for performing
computations on encrypted data. We show that there is a trade-off between
the desired security of these protocols and their applicability in settings
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Principal Skinner: There’s nothing more exciting than science.
You get all the fun of sitting still, being quiet, writing down numbers,
paying attention. Science has it all.
— The Simpsons, Season 6, Episode 14
Quantum information theory has radically altered our perspective on quantum
mechanics. Initially, research into quantum mechanics was devoted to explaining
phenomena as they are observed in nature. But recently a new direction has
emerged, having to do with designing and creating quantum systems for compu-
tation, information processing, communication, and cryptography, among many
other tasks [1]. For quantum computation in particular, there was a remark-
able realisation that quantum interference, “the heart of quantum mechanics”, as
Feynman described it [2], could be harnessed in order to solve certain problems
exponentially faster than with the best known classical algorithms. What kinds of
problems? Probably the most well-known example is factoring integers, for which
the fastest classical algorithm requires time which scales sub-exponentially in the
size of the input, whereas Shor’s quantum algorithm requires only polynomial
time [3]. But factoring achieved its notoriety due, in large part, to its importance
in cryptography. After all, cryptographic protocols which rely on the hardness of
this problem, such as RSA, are ubiquitous when performing e-commerce, digital
signatures and essentially any form of secure communication over the Internet.
However, the problems that are, arguably, more natural for quantum computers
to solve efficiently, concern simulating physical systems. Indeed, this was the
original impetus for the development of quantum computing [4]. For instance,
quantum computers could be used to dynamically simulate chemical reactions
and efficiently compute quantities of interest for these reactions (such as thermal
reaction rates) [5,6]. By “efficiently” we mean that the time it takes to solve the
problem scales polynomially in the size of the input.
Let us, for a moment, consider a question that is seemingly unrelated to
quantum computation: do all solvable problems have a recognisable solution?
By recognisable, we mean that there exists some procedure through which a
classical system, such as a person or a regular computer, when presented with
a candidate solution to a problem, could say whether the solution is correct or
not. Additionally, this process of verifying the candidate solution should be more
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Figure 1.1: Hexadecimal Sudoku puzzle from [7]. This is an example of a problem
with a recognisable solution. It can be difficult to solve the Sudoku, but one can
immediately check whether a given solution is correct or not. The reader might
find it amusing to solve this puzzle.
efficient than the task of finding a solution to the problem. More formally, we
require this verification procedure to run in polynomial time. Upon first thought,
we realise that many of the problems that we encounter around us, do have
recognisable solutions. Sudoku puzzles are one such example. Solving a Sudoku
puzzle can take anywhere from a few minutes to an hour, depending on the
difficulty of the puzzle. But if we’re presented with a candidate solution to the
puzzle, we can immediately check whether it is valid or not. This fact remains
true if we scale up the size of the Sudoku puzzle (see Figure 1.1 for an example
of a hexadecimal Sudoku). Other puzzles, such as crosswords, Rubik’s cube and
jigsaw puzzles share the same features. Proving (or disproving) a mathematical
statement is another example. Given the statement, it can be quite challenging
to produce a proof. In certain cases, this process can take hundreds of years, as
was the case with Fermat’s last theorem [8]. However, when presented with a
purported proof, a mathematician would take far less time to check its validity.
In spite of these, and many other examples, there are also problems that do not
admit recognisable solutions. For instance, given two regular expressions1, the
problem of deciding whether they match the same set of strings does not, in
general, have a recognisable solution [10]. Many other examples exist, but this
one is sufficient to provide an answer to our question: not all problems admit a
solution that can be checked efficiently.
So what does this have to do with quantum computation? Given the conjec-
ture that for certain problems, that are efficiently solvable by quantum algorithms,
there are no efficient classical algorithms, it is only natural to ask whether these
problems at least have recognisable solutions. After all, what good is a machine
that can solve difficult problems if we have no way of checking that the solutions
1A regular expression is a sequence of characters, defining a pattern. Certain strings of
characters will match this pattern while others will not. See [9] for more details.
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are correct? To make things fair, given that quantum mechanics involves ran-
domness and probabilities, we relax “recognisable solution” to “probabilistically
recognisable solution”. By this we mean that the process of checking the solu-
tion is allowed to give an incorrect verdict as long as this happens with small
probability (say, less than 1/3).
At this point, it is convenient to introduce some helpful notation, which will
be formally defined in the next chapter. We will refer to the set of all problems
that can be solved efficiently on a classical computer as BPP. The corresponding
set for quantum computers is BQP and lastly, the set of problems with proba-
bilistically recognisable solutions is denoted MA2. Clearly, BPP ⊆ BQP, since any
problem that can be solved efficiently, classically, can also be solved efficiently
on a quantum computer. Additionally, BPP ⊆ MA, since if one can compute a
solution efficiently, then one can also verify it efficiently. We would like to know
whether BQP ⊆ MA. We certainly know of problems that are contained in both
BQP and MA but are not believed to be contained in BPP. Factoring integers is
one such example. The solution is recognisable since, when given potential fac-
tors, one can simply multiply them and check if the result matches the number to
be factored. In fact, factoring is a particular instance of a more general problem
known as the Abelian Hidden Subgroup Problem (AHSP) [1] which also lies at the
intersection of BQP and MA but is not believed to be contained in BPP 3.
Figure 1.2: The suspected relationship between problems solvable efficiently clas-
sically (BPP), those solvable efficiently quantumly (BQP) and those having recog-
nisable solutions (MA).
In general, however, it is believed that BQP is not contained in MA. Hence, the
aforementioned natural problem for quantum computers, of simulating a quantum
2The names of these classes are abbreviations for bounded-error probabilistic polynomial
time (BPP), bounded-error quantum polynomial time (BQP) and Merlin-Arthur (MA), respec-
tively [11]. The name Merlin-Arthur was chosen in the idea that Merlin, an all-powerful wizard,
could solve any problem and present the solution to Arthur who would have to check its cor-
rectness. Since Arthur is not a wizard, this captures the idea that the solution needs to be
efficiently verifiable by limited agents, such as medieval kings or classical computers.
3Strictly speaking, factoring is not an instance of AHSP. Rather, computing the order of
an element in the multiplicative group of integers modulo n is an instance of AHSP. However,
factoring can be reduced efficiently, classically, to this latter problem. In other words, having
a procedure to solve order finding leads to an efficient algorithm for factoring, using that
procedure [1].
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system, is believed to lie outside of the class MA. There is no known procedure
to efficiently check such a simulation, on a classical computer. The separation
between the two classes is conjectured due to results in computational complexity
theory which provide compelling evidence that there are problems in BQP that
are not contained in MA (as well as the converse) [12–14]. Thus, the assumed
relationship between these classes is the one depicted in Figure 1.2. This raises
an important question, which has spawned an entire field of research [15] and
which sets the stage for our results:
If problems that can be solved efficiently by quantum computers do not admit
recognisable solutions, how then can one verify the correctness of quantum
computations?
We will refer to this as the question of quantum verification.
1.1 Quantum verification
At first, one might be tempted to dismiss the question of quantum verification
and say that as long as each component of a quantum computer has been tested
and works correctly, there is no need to worry about the validity of the device’s
results. However, this is not an adequate solution. Rather than giving a dry
explanation as to why, let us consider a fictitious dialogue between a sceptic of a
general quantum verification technique and a proponent of it:
Proponent: Since we don’t believe that all problems in BQP have recognisable
solutions, it is imperative to come up with some other technique through
which we can verify quantum computations. Perhaps, a technique by which
a verifier could interact with a quantum computer, while it is performing
the computation, thereby verifying it in a step-by-step fashion.
Sceptic: That sounds complicated and unnecessary. We can simply test that
each component of the quantum computer works as expected, before putting
everything together. After all, that’s what we do with classical computers
and they work fine.
Proponent: Yes, but the point of verifying general quantum computations
is much more profound than merely checking that the components work.
Quantum computers would provide us with one of the most stringent tests
of the laws of quantum mechanics.
Sceptic: How so?
Proponent: Well, when someone proposes a new physical theory, the way we
test it is by making predictions from the theory and then checking to see
whether the predictions are true in the real world. However, because of the
exponential overhead in simulating quantum systems, we can’t do that any-
more, at least not in any reasonable amount of time. I mean, sure, we can do
it for small enough systems and even come up with decent approximations
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for slightly larger ones, but once you set up an experiment involving a com-
plex quantum system with many degrees of freedom it becomes completely
infeasible to predict the outcome of that experiment. That’s, basically,
what a quantum computation is. Just like telescopes allow us to probe
the regimes of large distances and time scales, or particle accelerators allow
us to probe short distances and time scales and high energies, a quantum
computer would allow us to probe the regime of high complexity. If there is
new physics in that regime, the only way we can make sense of it is if we
have a general verification technique.
Sceptic: Ok, that’s all well and good, but it sounds very hypothetical and I’m
more of a pragmatist. While I could agree that in the long term we might
need such techniques to probe this “high complexity regime”, for now it’s
fine to just test the components. There’s no need to complicate things.
Proponent: Actually, even if you just care about the short term, or are still not
convinced, I can think of a few more compelling reasons. For starters, you
say “let’s just test each individual component”. That’s fine, except that
each individual component, when considered separately, isn’t capable of
producing the interesting features that seem to be necessary when running
a quantum algorithm. For instance, it seems that entanglement is a key
ingredient in these algorithms. But producing the types of highly entangled,
multi-particle states that appear in, say, Shor’s algorithm, requires putting
the components together. So, in fact, each component working separately
is not interesting. What we want to know is whether they work well when
combined together.
Sceptic: Fair enough...
Proponent: Another reason has to do with security. IBM and Rigetti have
made quantum computers available to users around the world over the
Internet [16,17]. What if their devices are compromised remotely? What if
you, as a user, delegate a problem to one of these computers (or, rather, to
future and more powerful devices) and your communication is intercepted
or altered by some malicious party in the middle. How do you know whether
the results you’re getting back are correct?
Sceptic: Ok, you’ve convinced me. I’m glad we had this discussion.
Presumably, the two then proceed to debate what subjective experience an AI
would have, if it were running on a quantum computer [18].
The question of verification was promoted as a complexity challenge with
a $25 prize, by Aaronson on his blog: “If a quantum computer can efficiently
solve a problem, can it also efficiently convince an observer that the solution is
correct? More formally, does every language in the class of quantumly tractable
problems (BQP) admit an interactive proof where the prover is in BQP and the
verifier is in the class of classically tractable problems (BPP)?” [19]. He credits
Gottesman with first formalising this question, in a complexity theoretic sense, at
a 2004 conference. Vazirani, then emphasised the importance of the question, not
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only from the perspective of complexity theory, but from a philosophical point of
view [20]. In 2007, he related it to the question of whether quantum mechanics is
a falsifiable theory, and suggested that a computational approach could provide
an answer. This perspective was explored in depth by Aharonov and Vazirani
in [21].
So what is the answer? At the time of writing, we still do not know. Or rather,
we do not know an answer to Gottesman and Aaronson’s version of the question,
i.e. whether a completely classical BPP verifier, interacting with a BQP server, can
check the correctness of general quantum computations. We do know, however,
that under slight alterations of this setup, an interactive verification protocol does
exist. Before giving examples, we would like to re-emphasise that the question of
verification only makes sense under certain, widely accepted, complexity theoretic
assumptions. One assumption is that BPP 6= BQP, since otherwise the classical
client could simply perform the BQP computations efficiently, without the need
of a quantum computer. One would assume the second assumption is that BQP
problems do not have recognisable solutions (i.e. BQP 6⊆ MA). In fact, things
are more subtle. It could very well be that BQP ⊆ MA, and yet a BQP server
is unable to convince a BPP machine of the correctness of a particular solutions.
Think back to the Sudoku example. When one is presented with a completion of
a Sudoku puzzle, one also requires a proof that the completion is indeed correct.
This proof entails showing that the candidate solution satisfies the constrains
of the Sudoku puzzle (each row, column and local square contains all the digits
exactly once). The BPP machine recognises the Sudoku solution by verifying this
proof. For BQP problems, it could be that such a proof exists, and could be
verified efficiently by a classical computer, but that the proof cannot be efficiently
generated by a quantum computer. While this may seem counter-intuitive, it
is still a logical possibility. A quantum computer could efficiently solve an MA
problem and yet be unable to produce a proof that that solution is indeed correct.
A candidate problem that is believed to be of this type is Childs et al’s glued trees
problem [22]. Our second assumption is therefore that there are BQP problems
for which producing a proof, verifiable by a BPP machine, cannot be done in
BQP.
Let us now return to how one might change the verification setup so as to have
an interactive protocol. For convenience, we will refer to the classical verifier as
Alice and to the quantum server, which we will also call prover, as Bob. The
first approach was provided by Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [23]. They showed
that if one equips Alice with the ability to prepare quantum states, which she
then sends to Bob, then it is possible to verify arbitrary quantum computations.
Crucially, the states that Alice prepares would not allow her to perform universal
quantum computations. In other words, while she can prepare quantum states,
her computational capability is still limited to BPP. Other protocols, that also
relied on Alice’s ability to prepare quantum states, were later developed [24,25].
We will be especially interested in such a protocol, developed by Fitzsimons and
Kashefi [24]. Collectively, all of these protocols are categorised as single-prover
prepare-and-send protocols.
Another way of changing the original setting, of the verifier and the prover,
is to endow Alice with a measurement device, instead of a preparation device.
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This would allow her to measure quantum states, however she would not have
the ability to prepare them and her computational power is still restricted to
BPP. The first such protocol was proposed by Morimae [26] and, just as with the
prepare-and-send setting, a number of other protocols in this model were later
developed [27–30]. Such protocols are referred to as single-prover receive-and-
measure protocols.
(a) Classical verifier interacting with
two entangled but non-communicating
quantum provers
(b) Verifier with the ability to prepare
or measure quantum states interacting
with a single quantum prover
Figure 1.3: Models for verifiable quantum computation
The verification setting can also be changed by having multiple quantum
provers, instead of one, while keeping the verifier (as well as her communica-
tion with the provers) entirely classical. In such a setting, the provers are as-
sumed to be non-communicating but sharing entanglement. That is, they are
allowed to share quantum correlations but are otherwise prevented from interact-
ing with each other. The first approach of this type was proposed by Reichardt,
Unger and Vazirani [31]. The family of such protocols is known as multi-prover
entanglement-based protocols and, once again, includes a number of different ap-
proaches [32–36].
Throughout this thesis we will be primarily concerned with these three families
of verification protocols, for which we give a pictorial representation in Figure 1.3
(prepare-and-measure and receive-and-measure protocols are merged together in
Subfigure 1.3b).
Recently, a fourth option has also emerged. In a breakthrough result of Ma-
hadev, it was shown that it is possible for a fully classical verifier to delegate
and verify arbitrary BQP computations to a quantum prover [37], provided a
certain problem, known as Learning With Errors (LWE), is not contained in
BQP [38]. Since this problem is indeed believed to not be efficiently solvable by
quantum computers, Aaronson has awarded the $25 prize to Mahadev for the
protocol [39]. A similar approach to that of Mahadev, had also been used by
Bremner and Shepherd to verify a more restricted class of quantum computa-
tions known as instantaneous quantum computations [40]. Again, this was based
on the assumption that a particular problem cannot be efficiently solved using in-
stantaneous quantum computations. We will collectively refer to such approaches
as approaches that are based on computational assumptions. Throughout this
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thesis, however, we will be interested in protocols that do not rely on computa-
tional assumptions and so, we will primarily reference protocols from the three
families, mentioned above.
1.2 Robust verification
As mentioned, the field of quantum verification arose from the question of whether
a classical BPP verifier can check efficient quantum computations performed by
a BQP prover. While that still remains one of the major open problems of the
field (at least for the case of no computational assumptions), the development of
the aforementioned protocols has raised a number of other interesting problems
and challenges. For instance, quantum systems are notoriously difficult to isolate
from their environment. Such an isolation is necessary to preserve quantum in-
formation. In other words, the interaction with the environment acts as a sort
of noise that can corrupt quantum states, leading to erroneous computations.
How do verification protocols behave in the presence of noise? What can be
done in order to mitigate the effects of it? A solution is provided by quantum
error-correcting codes, which, together with specialised operations for preparing
states, performing quantum gates and making measurements lead to fault toler-
ant quantum computation [1]. However, fault tolerance typically requires that
quantum information is stored in larger quantum systems. This isn’t a problem
for the prover, that is assumed to be a general quantum computer, but it can
become a problem for the verifier if we wish to keep her quantum capabilities as
limited as possible. Thus, the challenge is to develop a fault tolerant verification
protocol, while at the same time keeping the verifier as “quantum limited” as in
the non-fault tolerant case.
Another challenge relates to trust assumptions. The whole point of verifica-
tion is that the verifier does not trust the prover and is trying to validate his
computations. But, in the prepare-and-send or receive-and-measure protocols,
why should the verifier trust her own quantum device? An argument could be
made that she can test her device prior to engaging in the protocol with the
prover. However, such tests, performed in isolation, would not reveal any corre-
lations that had been pre-established between that device and the prover. Such
correlations could then be exploited by the prover, during the protocol, in order to
convince the verifier to accept an incorrect result. One could object and say that
it is unfounded to consider such deliberately malicious behaviour by the prover.
However, as was pointed out in the Proponent vs. Sceptic discussion, quantum
verification protocols serve two main purposes. The first one is to test quantum
mechanics itself, and if we are to be fully scientific and not susceptible to biases,
then this test requires the most minimal assumptions possible. It should be our
job to convince even the most radical sceptic that one can indeed verify (or fal-
sify) the predictions of quantum mechanics in the regime of high complexity. This
will become especially important when experimentalists are confronted with this
regime, as they improve their ability to control and manipulate quantum systems.
The second purpose relates to the role of quantum computers in the Internet. As
mentioned, quantum computers are already available for public or commercial
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use through the Internet. With the development of quantum communication, it
is reasonable to imagine that in the future users will have the ability to send or
receive quantum states to or from quantum servers. This then creates the nec-
essary environment for using existing verification protocols, but it also raises the
possibility that malicious agents would attempt to compromise these protocols.
Devices for secure quantum communication are being continuously tested for the
possibility of such attacks, most notably by so-called quantum hackers [41–43]. It
is therefore a necessity to ensure the correctness of these protocols in a malicious
setting and with minimal trust assumptions.
This latter reason has motivated a cryptographic approach to verification pro-
tocols, which will feature prominently throughout the thesis. In turn, this raises
further challenges such as the verifier wanting to encrypt and hide her computa-
tion from the prover, a condition which is known as blind quantum computation.
Under what conditions can this be achieved? How does this relate to the other
aspects of verification, such as fault tolerance?
All of these are challenges in developing robust verification protocols. By
“robust” we do not mean only robustness to noise, but also robustness with
respect to varying trust assumptions. This thesis is concerned with addressing
these challenges, in some cases providing solutions to them, while in other cases
characterising their impact on existing protocols and informing the direction of
future research.
1.3 Thesis overview
The thesis is organised as follows:
(1) Chapter 2 presents the background concepts and notation that will be
used throughout the thesis. These include basics of quantum information
and quantum computation, complexity theory, measurement-based quan-
tum computation, universal blind quantum computation and a number of
verification protocols that will be used in our results. The contents of
the chapter are based on a survey paper of verification protocols which
was completed in collaboration with Theodoros Kapourniotis and Elham
Kashefi [15].
(2) In Chapter 3, we prove that the prepare-and-send protocol, developed by
Fitzsimons and Kashefi, is robust with respect to an imperfect preparation
device. This will also account for correlations between that device and the
prover’s system. We then use this to show how the protocol can be turned
into a device-independent verification protocol. Device-independent, in this
context, means that the verifier retains a quantum device (a measurement
device) however, the device need not be trusted and can be assumed to be
malicious and correlated with the prover. We show that, in this setting,
verification is still possible. This is achieved, using a robust technique of
Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani for testing that two untrusted devices share
a large number of entangled states, using non-local correlations. We refer
to this as rigidity of non-local correlations. The contents of the chapter
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are based on work done in collaboration with Petros Wallden and Elham
Kashefi, in [30].
(3) In Chapter 4, we adapt the rigidity technique to the setting in which only
one device is untrusted (the server) whereas the other is trusted (the mea-
surement device). In this case, the types of correlations that allow for entan-
glement testing are known as EPR-steering correlations, or simply steering
correlations. We prove a number of results concerning these correlations.
First, that they can be used in order to test for pairs of entangled states,
in a setting in which each test is independent of the previous one. We also
show that the fidelity of this sort of test is optimal. Next, we prove how
one can test for multiple entangled states, when removing the independence
assumptions. We then use this result, in the same manner as in Chapter 3,
to give a verification protocol which is one-sided device-independent. This
will illustrate how different trust assumptions affect the efficiency of verifi-
cation protocols. Lastly, we give an argument for why the entangled states
that are useful for these types of verification protocols should be equivalent
to maximally entangled states. This chapter is based on joint work with
Petros Wallden and Elham Kashefi [33].
(4) Chapter 5 is dedicated to giving a fault tolerant verification protocol in
which the verifier’s quantum capabilities are minimal. We first discuss how
noise might negatively affect a protocol that does not utilise a fault tolerant
construction. We then give a simple construction for making a particular
type of protocol, known as post hoc verification protocol, fault tolerant.
A proof of principle example of the protocol, implemented in a quantum
simulator, is also presented. This is based on joint work with Matty Hoban
and Elham Kashefi [44].
(5) In Chapter 6 we explore the possibility of having a verification protocol,
with a classical verifier and a single prover, such that the prover is blind
with respect to the verifier’s computation. We give evidence that this is not
possible. In fact, we merely examine the case of blind quantum computation
with a classical client, without verification, and use complexity theoretic re-
sults to argue that it is improbable for such a protocol to exist. This then
implies that verification, in this setting, is also improbable. We then use
these complexity theoretic techniques to show that a client, with the abil-
ity to prepare and send quantum states to a quantum server, would not
be able to delegate arbitrary MA problems to that server. In other words,
even a client with quantum capabilities cannot exploit those capabilities to
delegate arbitrary problems with recognisable solutions, while also keeping
her input private. This is again true, provided certain complexity theo-
retic statements are true. The work was done in collaboration with Scott
Aaronson, Alexandru Cojocaru and Elham Kashefi, in [45].
(6) We conclude in Chapter 7, where we summarise the main findings of our




Morty: What is it, Rick? Is it the quantum carburettor or some-
thing?
Rick: Quantum carburettor? Jeez, Morty. You can’t just add a
sci-fi word to a car word and hope it means something. Hmm, looks
like something’s wrong with the micro-verse battery.
— Rick and Morty, Season 2, Episode 6
2.1 Quantum information and computation
In this section, we provide a few notions regarding the basics of quantum informa-
tion and quantum computation and refer the reader to the appropriate references
for a more in depth presentation [1, 46,47].
2.1.1 Basics of quantum mechanics
States, unitaries, measurement
A quantum state (or a quantum register) is a unit vector in a complex Hilbert
space, H. We denote quantum states, using standard Dirac notation, as |ψ〉 ∈ H,
called a ‘ket’ state. The dual of this state is denoted 〈ψ|, called a ‘bra’, and is
a member of the dual space H⊥. If |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H are two quantum states, then,
taking the dual of |ψ〉 and acting on |φ〉, a number which is denoted 〈ψ|φ〉, is
defined as:
〈ψ|φ〉 ≡ 〈ψ, φ〉 (2.1)
where 〈ψ, φ〉 is the inner product of |ψ〉 and |φ〉. In other words, the action of
dual states is defined with respect to the inner product over H.
We will only be concerned with finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Qubits are
states in two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Traditionally, one fixes an orthonormal
basis for such a space, called computational basis, and denotes the basis vectors





(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉) |−θ〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − eiθ |1〉) (2.2)
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When θ = 0, we simply denote these states as |+〉 and |−〉, respectively.
Gluing together systems to express the states of multiple qubits is achieved
through the tensor product, denoted ⊗. The notation |ψ〉⊗n denotes a state
comprising of n copies of |ψ〉. If, for a given state |ψ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2, there are no
|a〉 ∈ H1 and |b〉 ∈ H2 such that |ψ〉 = |a〉 ⊗ |b〉, then we say that such a state
is entangled. As a shorthand, we will sometimes write |a〉 |b〉 instead of |a〉 ⊗ |b〉.
As a simple example of an entangled state one can consider the Bell state (also





Quantum mechanics postulates that there are two ways to change a quantum
state: unitary evolution and measurement. Unitary evolution involves acting with
some unitary operation U on |ψ〉, thus producing the mapping |ψ〉 → U |ψ〉. Note
that any such operation is reversible through the application of the hermitian
conjugate of U , denoted U †, since UU † = U †U = I.
Measurement, in its most basic form, involves expressing a state |ψ〉 in a
particular orthonormal basis, B, and then choosing one of the basis vectors as
the state of the system post-measurement. The index of that vector is the classical
outcome of the measurement. The post-measurement vector is chosen at random
and the probability of obtaining a vector |v〉 ∈ B is given by | 〈v|ψ〉 |2.
More generally, a measurement involves a collection of linear operators {Mi}i
acting on the state space of the system to be measured and satisfying:∑
i
M †iMi = I (2.4)
Notice that M †iMi is a hermitian, positive operator. The label i indicates a po-
tential measurement outcome. Given a state |ψ〉 to be measured, the probability
of obtaining outcome i is:
p(i) = 〈ψ|M †iMi |ψ〉 (2.5)




If we are only interested in the probabilities of the different outcomes and not in
the post-measurement state then we can write Ei = MiM
†
i and we will refer to
the set {Ei}i as a positive-operator valued measure (POVM). When performing
a measurement in a basis B = {|i〉}i, we are essentially choosing Mi = |i〉 〈i|.
This is known as a projective measurement and in general consists of operators
Mi satisfying the property that M
2
i = Mi and M
†
i = Mi.
Lastly, when discussing measurements we will sometimes use observables.
These are hermitian operators which define a measurement specified by the di-
agonal basis of the operator. Specifically, for some hermitian operator O, on H,
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where {λi}i is the set of eigenvalues of O. Measuring the O observable on some
state |ψ〉 is equivalent to performing a projective measurement of |ψ〉 in the basis
B1. When using observables, one takes the measurement outcomes to be the
eigenvalues of O, rather than the basis labels. In other words, if when measuring
O the state is projected to |i〉, then the measurement outcome is taken to be λi.
Density matrices
States denoted by kets are referred to as pure states. Quantum mechanics tells
us that for an isolated quantum system the complete description of that system
is given by a pure state2. This is akin to classical physics where pure states are
points in phase space, which provide a complete characterisation of a classical
system. However, unlike classical physics where knowing the pure state uniquely
determines the outcomes of all possible observations of the system, in quantum
mechanics measurements are probabilistic even given the pure state. It is also
possible that the state of a quantum system is specified by a probability distri-
bution over pure states. This is known as a mixed state and can be represented
using density matrices. These are positive semi-definite, trace one, hermitian
operators. For a pure state, |ψ〉, the corresponding density matrix is:
ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| (2.8)
For an ensemble of states {|ψi〉}i, each occurring with probability pi, such that∑




pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| (2.9)
It can be shown that if ρ corresponds to a pure state then Tr(ρ2) = 1, whereas
when ρ is a mixed state Tr(ρ2) < 1. One of the most important mixed states,
which we encounter throughout this thesis, is the maximally mixed state. The
density matrix for this state is I/d, where I is the identity matrix and d is the
dimension of the underlying Hilbert space. As an example, the maximally mixed
state for a one qubit system is I/2. This state represents the state of maximal
uncertainty about a quantum system. What this means is that for any basis
1Note that if the operator is degenerate (i.e. has repeating eigenvalues) then the projec-
tors for degenerate eigenvalues will correspond to projectors on the subspaces spanned by the
associated eigenvectors.
2It should be noted that this is the case provided that quantum mechanics is a complete
theory in terms of its characterisation of physical systems. See [48] for more details.
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Equivalently, any projective measurement, specified by a complete basis B, of the
maximally mixed state will have all outcomes occurring with equal probability.
We will denote the set of all density matrices over some Hilbert space H as D(H).
When performing a measurement on a state ρ, specified by operators {Mi}i,








Partial trace and purification
An essential operation concerning density matrices is the partial trace. This
provides a way of obtaining the density matrix of a subsystem that is part of a
larger system. Taking the partial trace is a linear operation, and is defined as
follows. Given two density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 with Hilbert spaces H1 and H2,
we have that:
ρ1 = Tr2(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) ρ2 = Tr1(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) (2.13)
In the first case one is ‘tracing out’ system 2, whereas in the second case we trace
out system 1. This property together with linearity completely define the partial




aii′jj′ |i〉1 〈i′|1 ⊗ |j〉2 〈j′|2 (2.14)
where {|i〉}, {|i′〉} are orthonormal bases for H1 and {|j〉}, {|j′〉} are orthonormal









aii′jj |i〉1 〈i′|1 (2.15)
An important fact, concerning the relationship between mixed states and pure
states, is that any mixed state can be purified. In other words, for any mixed
state ρ over some Hilbert spaceH1 one can always find a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H1⊗H2
such that dim(H1) = dim(H2)3 and:
Tr2(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = ρ (2.16)
3One could allow for purifications in larger systems, but we restrict attention to same di-
mensions.
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Moreover, the purification |ψ〉 is not unique and so another important result is
the fact that if |φ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗ H2 is another purification of ρ then there exists a
unitary U , acting only on H2 (the additional system that was added to purify ρ)
such that:
|φ〉 = (I ⊗ U) |ψ〉 (2.17)
We will refer to this as the purification principle.
CPTP maps and isometries
All operations on quantum states can be viewed as maps from density matrices
on an input Hilbert space to density matrices on an output Hilbert space, O :
D(Hin)→ D(Hout), which may or may not be of the same dimension. Quantum
mechanics dictates that such a map, must satisfy three properties:
1. Linearity: O(aρ1 + bρ2) = aO(ρ1) + bO(ρ2).
2. Complete positivity: the map O⊗ I, where I acts on HE, takes positive
states to positive states, for all extensions HE.
3. Trace preserving: Tr(O(ρ)) = Tr(ρ).
For this reason, such maps are referred to as completely positive trace-preserving








for some set of linear operators {Ki}i, known as Kraus operators, satisfying:∑
i
K†iKi = I (2.19)
CPTP maps are also referred to as quantum channels. Additionally, we also
mention isometries which are CPTP maps O for which O† ◦ O = I.
Let us also define isometries. First, let Φ : Hin → Hout be a bounded linear
map. The adjoint of Φ, denoted Φ† is the unique linear map Φ† : Hout → Hin
such that for all |ψ〉 ∈ Hin, |φ〉 ∈ Hout:
〈Φ(ψ)|φ〉 = 〈ψ|Φ†(φ)〉 (2.20)
An isometry is a bounded linear map, Φ : Hin → Hout such that:
Φ† ◦ Φ = id (2.21)
where id is the identity map (on Hin).
The tensor product of isometries (or linear maps in general) is defined as
follows. Let Φ1 : H1in → H1out and Φ2 : H2in → H2out be two isometries. The
product isometry Φ : H1in ⊗H2in → H1out ⊗H2out, which we write as Φ = Φ1 ⊗ Φ2,
is defined (linearly) by its action on a basis of H1in ⊗H2in. Specifically, let {|i〉}i
31
be an orthonormal basis of H1in and {|j〉}j be an orthonormal basis of H2in. We
then have that:
Φ(|i〉 ⊗ |j〉) ≡ Φ1(|i〉)⊗ Φ2(|j〉) (2.22)
Consider now two Hilbert spaces Hin =
⊗n
i=1Hiin and Hout =
⊗n
i=1Hiout. We
say that an isometry Φ : Hin → Hout is a local isometry (with respect to the
n-partitioning of spaces Hin and Hout) if there exist isometries Φi : Hiin → Hiout
such that Φ = Φ1 ⊗ Φ2...⊗ Φn.
Trace distance
We will frequently be interested in comparing the “closeness” of quantum states.
To do so we will use the notion of trace distance which generalises variation
distance for probability distributions. Recall that if one has two probability
distributions p(x) and q(x), over a finite sample space denoted Ω, the variation







Informally, this represents the largest possible difference between the probabilities
that the two distributions can assign to some event E, where E ⊆ Ω. The




Tr (|ρ1 − ρ2|) (2.24)
One could think that the trace distance simply represents the variation distance
between the probability distributions associated with measuring ρ1 and ρ2 in the
same basis (or using the same POVM). However, there are infinitely many choices
for a measurement basis. So, in fact, the trace distance is the supremum over
all possible measurements of the variation distance between the corresponding
probability distributions4.
Similar to variation distance, the trace distance takes values between 0 and 1,
with 0 corresponding to identical states and 1 to perfectly distinguishable states.
Additionally, like any other distance measure, it satisfies the triangle inequality.
Quantum computation
Quantum computation is most easily expressed in the quantum gates model. In
this framework, gates are unitary operations which act on groups of qubits. Uni-
versal quantum computation is achieved by considering a fixed set of quantum
gates which can approximate any unitary operation up to a chosen precision5.






5To be more precise, we say that a given set S is universal if the following is true: for any
n-qubit unitary U (i.e. U is a matrix of size 2n × 2n) and any ε > 0, there exists a finite
number of matrix products and tensor products of elements of S, yielding a matrix Ũ , such
that: max|ψ〉||(U − Ũ) |ψ〉 || ≤ ε.
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1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

(2.25)
In order, the operations are known as Pauli X and Pauli Z, Hadamard, the T-gate
and controlled-NOT. Note that general controlled-U operations are operations
performing the mapping |0〉 |ψ〉 → |0〉 |ψ〉, |1〉 |ψ〉 → |1〉U |ψ〉. The first qubit
is known as a control qubit, whereas the second is known as target qubit. The
matrices express the action of each operator on the computational basis states.













which are known as the Pauli Y gate and the S or phase gate, respectively. Note
that S = T2.
We also mention an important class of quantum operations known as Clifford
operations. To define them, consider first the n-qubit Pauli group:
Pn = {α σ1 ⊗ ...⊗ σn|α ∈ {+1,−1,+i,−i}, σi ∈ {I,X,Y,Z}} (2.27)
As a useful side note, the n-qubit Pauli group forms a basis for all 2n×2n matrices.
The Clifford group is then defined as follows:
Cn = {U ∈ U(2n)|σ ∈ Pn =⇒ UσU † ∈ Pn} (2.28)
where U(2n) is the set of all 2n× 2n unitary matrices. Clifford operations, there-
fore, are operations which leave the Pauli group invariant under conjugation. Op-
erationally they can be obtained through combinations of the Pauli gates together
with H, CNOT and S, in which case they are referred to as Clifford circuits. We
note that the T is not a Clifford operation. However, Clifford circuits combined
with the T give us a universal set of unitaries.
Having a universal gate set, an n-qubit quantum computation can then be
represented as a circuit comprising of gates from that set, acting on an n-qubit
input state. As an example, a 2-qubit circuit is shown in Figure 2.1.
|0〉 H • H
|1〉 H
Figure 2.1: Simple quantum circuit
The circuit involves the application of two Hadamard gates, followed by a CNOT
(top qubit is the control, bottom qubit is the target), followed by a Hadamard
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on the top qubit. The boxes at the end of the circuit represent measurements
in the computational basis. Classical outputs from quantum circuits are always
obtained by performing a measurement. In the circuit model, all measurements
can be postponed to the end of the circuit if one is allowed to add extra qubits,
known as ancilla.
Bloch sphere
Another important concept that we will utilise is the Bloch sphere, which offers
a useful geometric picture for visualising single qubit states. Any such state is
represented as a point on the surface of the sphere. In Figure 2.2, one can see a
visualisation of the Bloch sphere together with the states |0〉 , |1〉, the eigenstates
of Z, as well as |+〉 , |−〉, the eigenstates of X and
∣∣+π/2〉 , ∣∣−π/2〉, the eigenstates
of Y. All of the previously mentioned single-qubit operations can be viewed
as rotations of this sphere. Specifically, the Pauli X,Y,Z gates correspond to
rotations by π radians around the corresponding X,Y,Z axes. The Hadamard
gate, which can be expressed as H = 1√
2
(X + Z) acts as a rotation by π radians
around the X + Z axis. The T gate, corresponds to a rotation by π/4 radians
around the Z axis and the S corresponds to a rotation by π/2 around the Z axis.
Figure 2.2: Bloch sphere
Notice that the states |+φ〉 , |−φ〉, for all φ ∈ [0, 2π], lie on the boundary of
the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere, represented in blue in the above figure. These
states can be viewed as rotations of the |+〉 , |−〉 states by φ radians around the
Z axis. For example, the |+π/2〉 , |−π/2〉 states are rotations by π/2 around the Z
axis of the |+〉 , |−〉 states. One can also consider measurements in the XY-plane.
Any two diametrically opposed states in this plane form a basis for a one-qubit
Hilbert space and therefore define a projective measurement. Suppose we choose
the basis (|+φ〉 , |−φ〉) and wish to measure the state |+θ〉. It can be shown that
the probability of the state being projected to |+φ〉 is cos2((φ − θ)/2), whereas
the probability of it being projected to |−φ〉 is sin2((φ − θ)/2). In other words,
the probabilities only depend on the angle difference between φ and θ. This fact
will prove very useful later on.
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Quantum SWAP test
A test which is widely used in quantum information is the quantum SWAP test.
This is a simple procedure for determining whether two pure quantum states
|ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ H are close to each other or far apart. We express closeness in terms
of the absolute value of their inner product | 〈ψ|φ〉 |. The test involves preparing
a qubit in the state (|0〉 + |1〉)/
√
2 and performing a controlled-SWAP opera-
tion between that qubit and the state |ψ〉 |φ〉. SWAP is defined by the mapping
SWAP |ψ〉 |φ〉 = |φ〉 |ψ〉, for any pair of states |ψ〉 and |φ〉. The controlled-SWAP
procedure leads to the following state:
|0〉 |ψ〉 |φ〉+ |1〉 |φ〉 |ψ〉√
2
If one then applies a Hadamard operation to the first qubit and measures it in the
computational basis it can be shown that the probability of obtaining outcome
|0〉 is (1 + | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2)/2. When the states are close, i.e. | 〈ψ|φ〉 | ≈ 1, the SWAP
test yields |0〉 with high probability. Conversely, when the states are far apart,
i.e. | 〈ψ|φ〉 | ≈ 0, the SWAP test yields |0〉 with probability close to 1/2. The
“probability gap” between the two cases can be made arbitrarily close to 1, by
simply repeating the procedure many times (provided that multiple copies of |ψ〉
and |φ〉 are available).
Quantum error correction
One important consideration, when discussing quantum protocols, is that any
implementation of quantum operations will be subject to noise stemming from
interactions with the external environment. For this reason, one needs a fault
tolerant way of performing quantum computation. This is achieved using pro-
tocols for quantum error detection and correction, of which we give a simplified
description.
Suppose we have a k-qubit quantum state |ψ〉 on which we want to perform
some quantum gate G. The quantum memory storing |ψ〉 as well as the im-
plementation of G are subject to noise. This means that if we were to apply
G directly on |ψ〉 the result would be E(G |ψ〉), where E is a CPTP error map
associated with the noisy application of G. Using the Kraus decomposition, the




Ej G |ψ〉 〈ψ|G† E†j (2.29)
where {Ej}j is a set of Kraus operators. If one can correct for all Ej’s then one
can correct for E as well [49].
To detect and correct for errors from the set {Ej}j, one first performs an
encoding procedure on |ψ〉 by mapping it to a so-called logical state |ψ〉L on n
qubits, where n > k. This procedure involves the use of n − k auxiliary qubits
known as ancilla qubits. If we denote the state of these n − k ancillas as |anc〉
we then have the encoding procedure Enc(|ψ〉 |anc〉) → |ψ〉L. This logical state
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is part of a 2k-dimensional subspace of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space of all
n qubits, denoted H. The subspace is usually referred to as the code space of
the error correcting code. One way to represent this space is by giving a set of
operators such that the code space is the intersection of the +1 eigenspaces of all
the operators.
As an example, consider the 3-qubit bit flip code. We will take k = 1 and
n = 3, so that one qubit is encoded in 3 qubits. The code is able to detect and
correct Pauli X errors occurring on a single qubit. The encoding procedure for a
state |ψ〉 = a |0〉+b |1〉maps it to the state |ψ〉L = a |000〉+b |111〉. The code space
is therefore defined by span(|000〉 , |111〉). It is also the unique +1 eigenspace of
the operators g1 = Z ⊗ Z ⊗ I and g2 = I ⊗ Z ⊗ Z6. All valid operations on
|ψ〉L must be invariant on this subspace, whereas any error from the set {Ej}j
should map the state to a different subspace. In this case, valid operations,
or logical operations, are the analogues of the single-qubit unitaries that map
|ψ〉 → |φ〉 = U |ψ〉. Thus, a logical operation UL would map |ψ〉L → |φ〉L. The
error set simply consists of {X⊗ I ⊗ I, I ⊗X⊗ I, I ⊗ I ⊗X}. We can see that any
of these errors will map a state inside span(|000〉 , |111〉) to a state outside of this
code space. One then defines a projective measurement in which the projectors
are associated with each of the 2n−k subspaces of H. This is called a syndrome
measurement. Its purpose is to detect whether an error has occurred and, if
so, which error. Knowing this, the effect of the error can be undone by simply
applying the inverse operation. For the 3-qubit code, there are 23−1 = 4 possible
subspaces in which the state can be mapped to, meaning that we need a 4-outcome
measurement. The syndrome measurement is defined by jointly measuring the
observables g1 and g2. An outcome of +1 for both observables indicates that
the state is in the correct subspace, span(|000〉 , |111〉). Conversely, if either of
the two observables produces a −1 outcome, then this corresponds to one of the
3 possible errors. For instance, an outcome of +1 for the first observable and
−1 for the second, indicates that the state is in the subspace span(|001〉 , |110〉),
corresponding to an X error on the third qubit. The error is corrected by applying
another X operation on that qubit.
2.1.2 Measurement-based quantum computation
(MBQC)
Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC), defined in [50,51], is a model
of quantum computation that is unlike the circuit model. In MBQC, a quantum
computation is performed by doing successive measurements on qubits from a
large entangled state. Typically, this state consists of qubits that have all been
6These are known as stabilizer operators for the states in the code spaces. We also encounter
these operators in Subsection 2.1.2. The operators form a group under multiplication and so,
when specifying the code space, it is sufficient to provide the generators of the group.
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initialised as |+〉 and then entangled using the CZ (controlled-Z) operation, where:
CZ =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1
 (2.30)
The qubits are then measured in the basis (|+φ〉 , |−φ〉). These measurements
are denoted by M(φ), and depending on the values of φ for each qubit, one can
perform universal quantum computation. For this to work, the entangled qubits
need to form a so-called universal graph state. A graph state, denoted |G〉, is one
in which the qubits have been entangled according to the structure of a graph G.
Given some fixed constant k, a universal graph state is a family of graph states,
denoted {|Gn〉}n, with n > 0, and having kn qubits, such that, for any quantum
circuit C, consisting of n gates, there exists a measurement pattern7 on |Gn〉 that
implements C |00..0〉. In other words, for each quantum circuit of size n, there is










Figure 2.3: Brickwork state, reproduced from [52]
An example of a universal graph state is the brickwork state, defined in [52],
which we illustrate in Figure 2.3 from that work. To be more precise, suppose we
would like to perform some quantum computation described by a circuit consist-
ing of N gates. The corresponding MBQC computation consists of the following
steps:
1. Initialisation. Prepare O(N) qubits, each in the state |+〉.
2. Entanglement. Entangle the qubits according to some universal graph
state structure, such as the brickwork state.
3. Measurement. Measure each qubit, i using M(φi), for some angle φi
determined based on the computation we would like to perform. The angles
φi are referred to as the computation angles.
7A measurement pattern is simply a tuple consisting of the measurement angles, for the
qubits in |Gn〉, and the partial ordering of these measurements.
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4. Correction. Apply appropriate corrections (Pauli X and Z operations) to
the qubits, based on the measurement outcomes.
The last two steps can be performed together. This is because if we would
like to apply a Pauli X correction to a qubit, i, before measuring it, we can
simply measure it using M(−φi). Similarly, if we would like to apply a Pauli
Z correction to that same qubit we measure it using M(φi + π). Therefore, the
general measurement performed on a particular qubit will be M((−1)sφi + rπ),
where s, r ∈ {0, 1} are determined by previous measurement outcomes.
One element concerning graph states, which we will encounter in some proto-
cols, is the representation of these states using stabilizers. A stabilizer state for
a unitary hermitian operator, O, is some state |ψ〉 such that O |ψ〉 = |ψ〉. O is
referred to as a stabilizer of |ψ〉. It is possible to specify a state, |ψ〉, by giving
a set of operators, such that |ψ〉 is the unique state which is stabilized by all the
operators in the set. As an example, the state |Φ+〉 = (|00〉+|11〉)/
√
2 is uniquely
stabilized by the set {X⊗X,Z⊗Z}. Note that the set of all stabilizers for a state
forms a group, since if O1 |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and O2 |ψ〉 = |ψ〉, then clearly O−11 |ψ〉 = |ψ〉
and O1O2 |ψ〉 = |ψ〉. So, it is sufficient to specify a set of generators for that
group in order to describe the stabilizer group for a particular state.
To specify the generators for the stabilizer group of a graph state |G〉, let us
first denote V (G) as the set of vertices in the graph G and NG(v) as the set of
neighbouring vertices for some vertex v (i.e. all vertices in G that are connected
to v through an edge). Additionally, for some operator O, when we write Ov we
mean that O is acting on the qubit from |G〉 associated with vertex v in G. The





for all v ∈ V (G).
As a final remark, it should be noted that one can translate quantum circuits
into MBQC patterns in a canonical way. For instance, the universal gate set
mentioned in the previous subsection, and hence any quantum circuit comprising
of those gates, can be translated directly into MBQC. See for example [52] for
more details.
2.1.3 Self-testing
A concept which is of particular importance to entanglement-based verification
protocols is that of self-testing. The idea of self-testing was introduced by Mayers
and Yao in [53], and is concerned with characterising the shared quantum state
and observables of n non-communicating players in a non-local game. A non-local
game is one in which a referee (which we will later identify with the verifier) will
ask questions to the n players (which we will identify with the provers) and, based
on their responses, decide whether they win the game or not. Importantly, we are
interested in games where there is a quantum strategy that outperforms a classical
strategy. By a classical strategy, we mean that the players can only produce local
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correlations8. Conversely, in a quantum strategy, the players are allowed to share
entanglement in order to produce non-local correlations and achieve a higher
win rate. Even so, there is a limit to how well the players can perform in the
game. In other words, the optimal quantum strategy has a certain probability of
winning the game, which may be less than 1. Self-testing results are concerned
with non-local games in which the optimal quantum strategy is unique, up to
local isometries on the players’ systems. This means that if the referee observes
a maximal win rate for the players in the game, she can conclude that they are
using the optimal strategy and can therefore characterise their shared state and
their observables, up to local isometries. More formally, we give the definition of
self-testing, adapted from [54] and using notation similar to that of [36]:
Definition 1 (Self-testing). Let G denote a game involving n non-communicating
players denoted {Pi}ni=1. Each player will receive a question from a set, Q and
reply with an answer from a set A. There exists some condition establishing which
combinations of answers to the questions constitutes a win for the game. Let
ω∗(G) denote the maximum winning probability of the game for players obeying
quantum mechanics.
The responses of each player Pi are implemented through a measurement strat-
egy S = (|ψ〉 , {Oji }ij) consisting of a state |ψ〉 shared among the n players and
local observables {Oji }j, for each player Pi. In other words, when player i re-
ceives question j, his answer will be the outcome of measuring observable Oji on
the state |ψ〉. We say that the game G self-tests the strategy S, with robustness
ε = ε(δ), for some δ > 0, if, for any strategy S̃ = (|ψ̃〉 , {Õji }ij) achieving winning
probability ω∗(G)−ε there exists a local isometry Φ = ⊗ni=1 Φi and a state |junk〉
such that:
TD(Φ(|ψ̃〉), |junk〉 |ψ〉) ≤ δ (2.32)















To give some intuition, let us consider an example. Suppose we have two
players, Alice and Bob. The game they will be playing is the CHSH game [55].
Alice and Bob will receive one of two possible questions. We denote Alice’s input
question as x and Bob’s input as y, and we have that x, y ∈ {0, 1}. They will
each provide a one bit output and we label Alice’s output as a and Bob’s output
as b, with a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Alice and Bob win the game if an only if:
a⊕ b = x · y (2.34)
In other words, when the input bits are x = y = 1, Alice and Bob need to provide
8To define local correlations, consider a setting with two players, Alice and Bob. Each
player receives an input, x for Alice and y for Bob and produces an output, denoted a for Alice
and b for Bob. We say that the players’ responses are locally correlated if: Pr(a, b|x, y) =∑
λ Pr(a|x, λ)Pr(b|y, λ)Pr(λ), where λ is known as a hidden variable. In other words, given
this hidden variable, the players’ responses depend only on their local inputs.
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different responses (a 6= b). However, in all other cases, their responses must be
identical (a = b). Assuming the referee chooses the inputs uniformly at random,
it is not difficult to show that the optimal classical strategy for Alice and Bob
achieves a success probability of 3/4 or 75%. In contrast to this, the optimal
quantum strategy has a probability of success of ω∗(CHSH) = cos2(π/8), or
approximately 85.4% [56].
The optimal quantum strategy works as follows. First, Alice and Bob will
share the state |Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2. If Alice receives input a = 0, then
she will measure the Pauli X observable on her half of the |Φ+〉 state, otherwise
(when a = 1) she measures the Pauli Z observable. Bob, on input b = 0 measures
V = (X + Z)/
√
2, on his half of the Bell pair, and on input b = 1, he measures
W = (X− Z)/
√
2. Thus, in keeping with the notation of Definition 1, we have a
strategy S = (|Φ+〉AB , {{X,Z}A, {V,W}B}).
It was shown by McKague, Yang and Scarani that the CHSH game robustly
self-tests the above strategy [32]. Specifically, they proved the following:
Theorem 1 (CHSH self-testing [32]). Suppose Alice and Bob play the CHSH
game with a referee that chooses the inputs x, y uniformly at random. Then, for
any strategy S̃ = (|ψ̃〉AB , {{Ã1, Ã2}A, {B̃1, B̃2}B}) achieving winning probability
cos2(π/8) − ε there exists a local isometry Φ = ΦA ⊗ ΦB and a state |junk〉AB
such that:
TD(Φ(|ψ̃〉AB), |junk〉AB |Φ+〉AB) ≤ δ (2.35)







, |junk〉AB AiBj |Φ+〉AB
)
≤ δ (2.36)
where A1 = X, A2 = Z, B1 = V, B2 = W and δ = O(ε
1/4).
It should be noted that self-testing of Bell states, though not explicitly called
that, had been considered in a number of works prior to that of McKague, Yang
and Scarani [57–59].
It should also be noted that the 1/4 exponent in δ is not optimal. A tighter
bound of δ = O(
√
ε) can be achieved, as is shown for instance in [31].
2.1.4 Quantum one-time pad
Suppose Alice wishes to send a classical message, M , to Bob, through a public
channel, without anyone learning what the message is. Let us also suppose that
Alice and Bob have a pre-shared key K, of the same length as M , denoted
n = |K| = |M |. We also assume that this key is a uniformly random bit string,
i.e. for any K, Pr(K) = 2−n. What can Alice do? The answer is given by
a construction known as the one-time pad. Alice will perform a bit-wise xor
between the key and the message, obtaining a ciphertext C:
C = K ⊕M (2.37)
40
She will send C, over the public channel, to Bob. Bob then xors his copy of K
with C yielding:
M = C ⊕K (2.38)
The reason he gets back M is because the xor operation is commutative and
because K ⊕K = 0, for any K.
Suppose an eavesdropper, Eve, makes a copy of C in an attempt to learn M .
What can she learn about M from C? To answer that, let us consider Eve’s
prior information about the message, before observing C, which is encoded in
the probability distribution Pr(M). We want to compare this distribution to the
posterior distribution of Eve guessing M , after seeing C, i.e. Pr(M |C). Using
Bayes’ theorem we have:
Pr(M |C) = Pr(C|M)Pr(M)
Pr(C)
(2.39)
But we know that C = K⊕M and that xor-ing with a given value is an injective








Pr(M) = 2−n (2.40)
This leads to:
Pr(M |C) = Pr(M) (2.41)
In other words, seeing the string C has not changed Eve’s information about the
message M . The encrypted ciphertext reveals no information to Eve. Note that
this argument did not rely on any sort of assumption about Eve’s computational
capabilities. For this reason, the one-time pad is said to be information-theoretic
secure (or unconditionally secure).
We now consider the quantum case, where we have a quantum one-time pad
for encrypting quantum information. Once again, we have two parties, Alice
and Bob, but this time Alice wishes to send one qubit, ρ, to Bob such that all
information about ρ is kept hidden from a potential eavesdropper, Eve. For this to
work, we will assume that Alice and Bob share two classical random bits, denoted
b1 and b2, that are known only to them. Alice will then apply the operation X
b1Zb2
(the quantum one-time pad) to ρ, resulting in the state Xb1Zb2ρZb2Xb1 , and send
this state to Bob. If Bob then also applies Xb1Zb2 to the state he received, he will
recover ρ. What happens if Eve intercepts the state that Alice sends to Bob?












Xb1Zb2ρZb2Xb1 = I/2 (2.43)
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In other words, the state that Eve intercepts is the totally mixed state, irrespective
of the original state ρ. But the totally mixed state is, by definition, the state
of maximal uncertainty. Hence, Eve cannot recover any information about ρ,
regardless of her computational power. Note, that for this argument to work,
and in particular for Equation 2.43 to be true, Alice and Bob’s shared bits must
be uniformly random. If Alice wishes to send n qubits to Bob, then as long as
Alice and Bob share 2n random bits, they can simply perform the same procedure
for each of the n qubits. Equation 2.43 generalises for the multi-qubit case so













Zb(i) and I is the
2n-dimensional identity matrix.
2.2 Complexity theory
As mentioned in the introduction, the questions regarding verification of quantum
computation can be easily expressed in the language of complexity theory. To
that end, we provide definitions for the main complexity classes used in the thesis.
We let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all finite binary strings and {0, 1}n the set of all
binary strings of length n. We use standard complexity theory notation and
assume familiarity with the concepts of Turing machines and uniform circuits.
For a more general introduction to the subject we refer the reader to [11,60].
2.2.1 Decision classes
We start by describing decision classes. These are sets of languages, where a
language is a subset of {0, 1}∗. We assume familiarity with the classes P, of lan-
guages that can be decided in deterministic polynomial time and NP, of languages
for which the “yes” instances can be verified in deterministic polynomial time.
Let us now provide definitions for some of the main classes that we encounter
throughout this thesis.
Definition 2. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to BPP if there exists a polynomial
p, and a probabilistic Turing machine M , whose running time on inputs of size
n is bounded by p(n), such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
• when x ∈ L, M(x)9 accepts with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, M(x) accepts with probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
9The notation M(x) means running the Turing machine M on input x.
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Here, and in all subsequent definitions, c is referred to as completeness and
s is referred to as soundness. Traditionally, one takes c = 2/3 and s = 1/3,
however, in full generality, the only requirement is that there exists an inverse
polynomial gap between c and s.
Before defining BQP we first define the concept of polynomial-time uniform
circuit family.
Definition 3. A family of (quantum) circuits {Cn}n is said to be polynomial-
time uniform if there exists a deterministic Turing machine M and a polynomial
p such that the running time of M on inputs of length n is bounded by p(n) and
M(1n) outputs a description of Cn.
From now on, whenever we refer to “uniform circuits” we are implicitly speaking
about a polynomial-time uniform circuit family.
Definition 4. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to BQP if there exists a polynomial
p, and a uniform quantum circuit family {Cn}n, where each circuit has at most
p(n) gates, such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
• when x ∈ L, Cn(x) accepts with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, Cn(x) accepts with probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
For the quantum circuit Cn, acceptance can be defined as having one of its
output qubits yielding 1 when measured in the computational basis. As men-
tioned in the introduction, it is known that BPP ⊆ BQP, though it has not been
proven that the containment is strict.
Definition 5. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to MA if there exists a polynomial
p, and a probabilistic Turing machine V , whose running time on inputs of size n
is bounded by p(n), such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a string w ∈ {0, 1}p(n), such that V (x,w) accepts
with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, for all strings w ∈ {0, 1}p(n), V (x,w) accepts with probability
at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
For this class, V is traditionally referred to as the verifier (or Arthur), whereas
w, which is the witness string, is provided by the prover (or Merlin). Essentially,
the verifier is tasked with checking a purported proof that x ∈ L, provided by
the prover. A related class, which is briefly mentioned in Chapter 6 is AM. In
AM the verifier flips a polynomial number of coins and sends the outcomes to
the prover. The prover will then send a witness to the verifier, and based on
this witness and the random bits the verifier will determine whether to accept or
reject x. Assuming certain derandomization assumptions hold, it is the case that
AM = MA = NP [11] (see also [61,62]).
We now define a quantum version of MA:
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Definition 6. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to QMA if there exists a polynomial
p and a uniform quantum circuit family {Vn}n, where each circuit has at most p(n)
gates, taking x and a quantum state |ψ〉 as inputs, such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n
the following are true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H, such that Vn(x, |ψ〉)
accepts with probability at least c, and
• when x 6∈ L, for all quantum states |ψ〉 ∈ H, Vn(x, |ψ〉) accepts with proba-
bility at most s,
where dim(H) ≤ 2p(|x|) and c− s ≥ 1/p(|x|).
For QMA we also provide the definition of a complete problem10 since this
will be referenced in some of the protocols. The specific problem we state was
defined by Kitaev et al. and is known as the k-local Hamiltonian problem [63].
A k-local Hamiltonian, acting on a system of n qubits, is a hermitian operator
H that can be expressed as H =
∑
iHi, where each Hi is a hermitian operator
which acts non-trivially on at most k qubits. We reproduce the definition of the
k-local Hamiltonian problem from [64]:
Definition 7 (The k-local Hamiltonian (LH) problem).
• Input: H1, . . . , Hm, a set of m Hermitian matrices each acting on k qubits
out of an n-qubit system and satisfying ‖Hi‖ ≤ 1. Each matrix entry is
specified by poly(n)-many bits. Apart from the Hi we are also given two
real numbers, a and b (again, with polynomially many bits of precision)
such that Γ = b − a > 1/poly(n). Γ is referred to as the absolute promise
gap of the problem.
• Output: Is the smallest eigenvalue of H = H1 +H2 + ...+Hm smaller than
a or are all its eigenvalues larger than b?
Essentially, for some language L ∈ QMA, and given a and b, one can construct
a k-local Hamiltonian such that, whenever x ∈ L, its smallest eigenvalue is less
than a and whenever x 6∈ L, all of its eigenvalues are greater than b. The witness
|ψ〉, when x ∈ L, is the eigenstate of H corresponding to its lowest eigenvalue
(or one such eigenstate if the Hamiltonian is degenerate). The uniform circuit
family {Vn}n represents a BQP verifier, whereas the state |ψ〉 is provided by a
prover. The verifier receives this witness from the prover and measures one of
the local terms Hi (which is an observable) on that state. This can be done
with a polynomial-size quantum circuit and yields an estimate for measuring H
itself. Therefore, when x ∈ L and the prover sends |ψ〉, with high probability
the verifier will obtain the corresponding eigenvalue of |ψ〉 which will be smaller
than a. Conversely, when x 6∈ L, no matter what state the prover sends, with
high probability, the verifier will measure a value above b. The constant k, in the
definition, is not arbitrary. In the initial construction of Kitaev, k had to be at
10A problem, P , is complete for the complexity class QMA if P ∈ QMA and all problems in
QMA can be classically reduced in polynomial time to P .
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least 5 for the problem to be QMA-complete. Subsequent work has shown that
even with k = 2 the problem remains QMA-complete [65].
It should be noted that there is another quantum analogue of MA, called
QCMA, for which we also provide the definition:
Definition 8. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to QCMA if there exists a poly-
nomial p and a uniform quantum circuit family {Vn}n, where each circuit has at
most p(n) gates, taking x and a string w as inputs, such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n
the following are true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a string w ∈ {0, 1}p(n), such that Vn(x,w) accepts
with probability at least c, and
• when x 6∈ L, for all strings w ∈ {0, 1}p(n), Vn(x,w) accepts with probability
at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(|x|).
Essentially, this is the same as QMA, except that the witness is a classical
string, instead of a quantum state. Clearly MA ⊆ QCMA ⊆ QMA and it is
believed that the containments are strict, though this is unproven.
We now move on to classes that characterise languages decided by interactive
protocols. Let us start by defining an interactive protocol with classical messages.
This definition is adapted from [60]:
Definition 9. Let V be a probabilistic Turing machine whose running time on
inputs of size n is bounded by p(n), where p is a polynomial, and let P : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗ be a function from binary strings to binary strings. We will refer to the
function P as a prover. A k-round (for even k ≥ 0) interactive protocol between V
and P , denoted 〈V, P 〉k (x) is the sequence of strings m1, m2, ... mk ∈ {0, 1}p(|x|)
defined as follows:
m1 = V (x)
m2 = P (x,m1)
m3 = V (x,m1,m2)
· · ·
mk = P (x,m1,m2, ...mk−1)
We say that the interactive protocol accepts x if V (x,m1,m2, ...mk) accepts and
say that it rejects x otherwise.
One can analogously define an interactive protocol with quantum messages in
which each message is a quantum state on p(|x|) qubits and the verifier has the
ability to receive and process quantum states.
Definition 10. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to IP if there exists a polynomial
p, and a probabilistic Turing machine V , whose running time on inputs of size n
is bounded by p(n), such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a prover P : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that
〈V, P 〉p(n) (x) accepts with probability at least c,
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• when x 6∈ L, for any prover P : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, 〈V, P 〉p(n) (x) accepts
with probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
All previously defined complexity classes are contained in IP. In fact, a cele-
brated result of Shamir shows that IP is equivalent to the set of languages that
can be decided using polynomial space on a deterministic Turing machine [66].
In other words, IP = PSPACE.
While the previous are fairly standard complexity classes, we now state the
definition of a more non-standard class, which first appeared in [23]:
Definition 11. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to QPIP if there exist polynomials
p, a constant κ and a probabilistic Turing machine V , whose running time on
inputs of size n is bounded by p(n), and which is augmented with the ability to
prepare and measure groups of κ qubits, such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following
is true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a BQP prover P which exchanges at most p(n)
classical or quantum messages (of length at most p(n)) with V and makes
V accept with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, any BQP prover P which exchanges at most p(n) classical or
quantum messages (of length at most p(n)) with V , makes V accept with
probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
Some clarifications are in order. The class QPIP differs from IP in two ways.
Firstly, while computationally the verifier is still restricted to the class BPP, op-
erationally it has the additional ability of preparing or measuring groups of κ
qubits. Importantly, κ is a constant which is independent of the size of the input.
This is why this extra ability does not add to the verifier’s computational power,
since a constant-size quantum device can be simulated in constant time by a BPP
machine. Secondly, unlike IP where the prover can be any function from binary
strings to binary strings (and may not even be a computable function), in QPIP
the prover is restricted to BQP computations. This constraint on the prover has
the direct implication that QPIP ⊆ BQP. As we will see, the Fitzsimons-Kashefi
protocol and the Morimae-Fitzsimons protocol, which we detail in Subsection 2.4,
allow a BPP verifier with the ability to prepare or measure single qubits to dele-
gate and verify arbitrary BQP computations to a quantum prover. This, in effect,
shows that BQP ⊆ QPIP. Hence QPIP = BQP.
We now proceed to the multi-prover setting and define the multi-prover gen-
eralisation of IP:
Definition 12. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to MIP[k] if there exists a poly-
nomial p, and a probabilistic Turing machine V , whose running time on inputs
of size n is bounded by p(n), such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
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• when x ∈ L, there exists a k-tuple of provers (P1, P2, ...Pk) which exchange
at most p(n) messages (of length at most p(n)) with V , are not allowed to
communicate, and make V accept with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, any k-tuple of provers (P1, P2, ...Pk) which exchange at most
p(n) messages (of length at most p(n)) with V and are not allowed to com-
municate, can make V accept with probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
Note that MIP[1] = IP and it was shown that for all k > 2, MIP[k] = MIP[2]
[67]. The latter class is simply denoted MIP. If the provers are allowed to share
entanglement then we obtain the class MIP∗[k]:
Definition 13. A language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ belongs to MIP∗[k] if there exists a poly-
nomial p, and a probabilistic Turing machine V , whose running time on inputs
of size n is bounded by p(n), such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n the following is true:
• when x ∈ L, there exists a k-tuple of provers (P1, P2, ...Pk) which can share
arbitrarily many entangled qubits, are not allowed to communicate, exchange
at most p(n) messages (of length at most p(n)) with V and make V accept
with probability at least c,
• when x 6∈ L, any k-tuple of provers (P1, P2, ...Pk) which can share arbitrarily
many entangled qubits, are not allowed to communicate and which exchange
at most p(n) messages (of length at most p(n)) with V , make V accept with
probability at most s,
where c− s ≥ 1/p(n).
As before it is the case that MIP∗[k] = MIP∗[2], for k ≥ 2, and this class is
denoted as MIP∗ [68]. It is not known whether MIP = MIP∗, however, it is known
that both classes contain BQP. If the provers are restricted to BQP computations,
then the resulting class is, in fact, equal to BQP [31]. This is demonstrated by
the Reichardt-Unger-Vazirani protocol, which we describe in Subsection 2.4.
Note that while the protocols we will be presenting can be understood in terms
of the listed complexity classes, we will often give a more fine-grained description
of their functionality and resources than is provided by complexity theory. To
give an example, for a protocol of the QPIP type, from the complexity theoretic
perspective, we know that we have a BPP verifier with a quantum device for
preparing or measuring a constant number of qubits and that this verifier can
delegate arbitrary BQP decision problems to the prover by interacting with it
for a polynomial number of rounds. However, we will also be interested in other
characteristics of such a protocol, for instance:
• whether the verifier can delegate not just decision problems, but also sam-
pling problems (i.e. problems in which the verifier wishes to obtain a sample
from a particular probability distribution and is able to certify that, with
high probability, the sample came from the correct distribution),
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• whether the prover can receive a particular quantum input for the compu-
tation or return a quantum output to the verifier,
• having minimal quantum communication between the verifier and the
prover,
• whether the verifier can “hide” the input and output of the computation
from the prover.
An important category of complexity classes, that we will use in Chapter 6,
is that of advice classes. Let us provide a definition of this concept:
Definition 14. Let C be a complexity class and F a family of functions f : N→
{0, 1}∗. The complexity class C/F , known as C with F advice, is the set of all
languages L, for which there exists an L′ ∈ C and a function f ∈ F such that for
all x ∈ {0, 1}∗, x ∈ L iff. 〈x, f(|x|)〉 ∈ L′.
As an example, consider the class P/poly. This consists of all languages that
can be decided by a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine, that receives
polynomially-many bits of advice for all inputs of the same length. In other
words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the Turing machine also receives some string
a ∈ {0, 1}poly(n), aiding it in deciding whether to accept x or not. Analogously
NP/poly consists of languages that can be decided by a polynomial-time non-
deterministic Turing machine, that receives polynomially-many bits of advice,
for inputs of the same length. In Chapter 6 we will also encounter the class
NP/O(nd) in which the size of the advice string is O(nd), for some fixed constant
d.
We will also use complexity classes with advice that are not covered by Def-
inition 14. For instance, the class BPP/rpoly denotes the set of languages that
can be decided by a BPP machine that receives randomized polynomial-size ad-
vice. In other words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the probabilistic Turing machine
(or algorithm) also receives some string a ∈ {0, 1}poly(n), that is drawn from a
distribution Dn. We can see that this does not satisfy Definition 14 since the
advice string is not the result of some deterministic function, but is a sample
from a probability distribution. It is therefore to be understood that rpoly will
correspond to polynomial-size advice drawn from a probability distribution that
only depends on the size of the input.
Another possibility, which we will encounter in Chapter 6 is that of quantum
advice. As an example, the class BQP/qpoly denotes the set of languages that
can be decided by a BQP machine that receives as advice a quantum state of
polynomially-many qubits. In other words, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, the quantum
Turing machine (or quantum circuit) also receives a quantum state |ψn〉 ∈ Hn,
such that dim(Hn) = 2poly(n). It is therefore to be understood that qpoly will
correspond to polynomial-size quantum advice and represents a quantum state
of polynomially-many qubits that only depends on the size of the input.
The concept of oracles will be encountered in Chapter 6, and so we give a
brief description of the subject. An oracle is a black box function that can be
invoked by a Turing machine in order to obtain the solution to some problem in
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one time step. For example, the class of problems which can be solved by a de-
terministic polynomial-time Turing machine with access to some oracle function
O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} is denoted PO. If O is an oracle for some NP-complete prob-
lem, then the corresponding class is PNP. For quantum classes, oracles are viewed
as unitaries performing mappings such as UO |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |y ⊕O(x)〉, where O is
the oracle function. Additionally, whenever a result involving complexity classes
remains true when those classes are given access to an oracle, O, we say that the
result relativises.
Another important concept is that of the complement of a complexity class:
Definition 15. Let C be a complexity class. The class coC is the complement of
C and consists of all languages Lc = {0, 1}∗ \ L, where L ∈ C.
Note that Lc is referred to as the complement of the language L. It should also
be noted that P, BPP and BQP are closed under complement, i.e. P = coP,
BPP = coBPP, BQP = coBQP. The same is not known to be true for NP or the
Merlin-Arthur classes (MA, QCMA, QMA). Having the notion of the complement,
we can now define the polynomial hierarchy :
Definition 16. Let ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = P, denote the zeroth level of the polynomial
hierarchy. Additionally, for some k > 0, let ΣPk = NP
ΣPk−1, ΠPk = coNP
ΣPk−1 denote
the k’th level of the polynomial hierarchy. Finally, the polynomial hierarchy is
denoted PH and is defined as PH = ΣP0 ∪ ΣP1 ∪ ΣP2 ∪ ....
It is clear that each level of the polynomial hierarchy is contained in the one
above it and it is conjectured that all of these containments are strict. This
condition is typically expressed by saying “the polynomial hierarchy is infinite”
or “the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse”. A collapse of the polynomial







The final complexity class we define is #P, which is a counting class (a class
of functions that output natural numbers) and not a decision class.
Definition 17. A function f : {0, 1}∗ → N belongs to the class #P if there exists
a polynomial p, and a language L ∈ P such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗:
f(x) =
∣∣{w ∈ {0, 1}p(|x|)| 〈x,w〉 ∈ L}∣∣ (2.45)
While #P itself is not a decision class, we can easily create a decision class that
captures the power of #P by considering P#P. A celebrated result by Toda shows
that PH ⊆ P#P [69].
2.2.2 Sampling classes and BosonSampling
In contrast to decision classes, where one is only interested in providing a yes/no
answer to a problem, sampling classes involve problems requiring one to obtain
a sample from a particular probability distribution. We provide the definition,
from [70], for the classes of sampling problems that can be solved efficiently by
polynomial-time classical and quantum algorithms, respectively:
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Definition 18. A sampling problem S is a collection of probability distributions
(Dx)x∈{0,1}∗, one for each input string x ∈ {0, 1}
n, where Dx is a distribution over
{0, 1}p(n), for some fixed polynomial p. Then SampBPP is the class of sampling
problems S = (Dx)x∈{0,1}∗ for which there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time




as input, samples from a probability distribution
Cx such that D(Cx,Dx) ≤ ε, where D denotes total variation distance. SampBQP
is defined the same way, except that B is a quantum algorithm rather than a
classical one.
Similar definitions can be given for SampMA, SampQMA and so on. In other
words, for any decision class involving randomness, one can define the corre-
sponding sampling class. For this reason, we will occasionally abuse the notation
and say that a particular sampling problem is contained in, say, BPP, rather than
SampBPP.
A specific sampling problem, contained in SampBQP, that we will encounter
in Chapter 6 is BosonSampling. This problem was defined by Aaronson and
Arkhipov in [71] and used to show that if the problem were also contained in
SampBPP, and provided certain assumptions about the permanents11 of Gaussian
matrices are true, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level. We
refer the reader to [71] for a more detailed description of the problem as well as the
result of Aaronson and Arkhipov. It should be noted that Definition 18 considers
the case of approximate sampling, i.e. the distribution that is sampled from should
be close in variation distance to the target distribution. If one is interested in
exact sampling (sampling from the target distribution), for BosonSampling,
then it is relatively easy to show that an exact BPP sampler would lead to a
collapse of the polynomial hierarchy. Let us give a description of this argument.
First of all, we start by describing BosonSampling. In BosonSampling,
identical photons (bosons) are sent through a linear optics network and non-
adaptive measurements are performed to count the number of photons in each
mode. For a system with m modes and n photons, the basis states of the system
are of the form S = (s1, ...sm), where si denotes the number of photons in mode







|αS|2 = 1 (2.46)





. The action of the linear
optics network can be expressed as a matrix A ∈ Um,n, where Um,n is the set of all
m × n column-orthonormal matrices. Let AS be the matrix obtained by taking
si copies of the i’th row of A, for all i ≤ m. If the initial state of the system
consists of one photon in each of the first n modes (it is assumed that m ≥ n),
then it can be shown that the probability of observing the state S, upon passing
the photons through the network described by A and measuring the number of






Sn the symmetric group of all permutations of the elements 1 up to n.
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BosonSampling is then the problem of sampling from the distribution defined
by Equation 2.47.
To explain why BosonSampling is believed to be hard for classical comput-
ers, we first need to state a result known as Stockmeyer’s approximate count-
ing method [72]. This says that given an efficiently computable12 function








Now, suppose there existed a BPP algorithm that, given A as input, could sam-
ple from the distribution of Equation 2.47. This algorithm can be viewed as a
deterministic polynomial-time computable function F that, given A and a string
r ∈ {0, 1}p(n), for some polynomial p, produces a vector S = (s1, ...sm) (of the
form described above). The fact that this algorithm can sample from the Boson-
Sampling distribution can be expressed mathematically as:
Pr
r←R{0,1}p(n)




where r ←R {0, 1}p(n) denotes the fact that r was drawn uniformly at random
from the set {0, 1}p(n). Consider now a vector, which we denote as S|1〉 in which
all si are either 0 or 1 (of course, it should still be the case that s1 + ...+sm = n).
Note that Pr(S|1〉) = |Per(AS|1〉)|2. We will define a function f as follows:
f(A, r) =
{
0, if F (A, r) 6= S|1〉
1, if F (A, r) = S|1〉
(2.50)
Note that f is computable in polynomial time (since it simply involves evaluating
F and testing whether the output is S|1〉). The probability that the BPP algorithm












But this sum can be estimated, up to multiplicative error, in BPPNP using Stock-
meyer’s method. In other words, there is a BPPNP algorithm for estimating
|Per(AS|1〉)|2. It is shown in [71] that one can consider any matrix having entries
from the set {−1, 0, 1} and embed it in A (with only an added polynomial over-
12In other words, there is a polynomial-time classical algorithm for computing f .
13A multiplicative estimate of some value p is a number p̃ such that there exists a g ≥ 1 and
p/g ≤ p̃ ≤ gp. For the p of Equation 2.48, the BPPNP algorithm produces an estimate with
g = 1 + 1/poly(n) [71,72].
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head) so that the probability of sampling the S|1〉 vector is the squared permanent
of this matrix. By the above argument, this means that computing a multiplica-
tive estimate for the squared permanent of a matrix over {−1, 0, 1} is in BPPNP.
However, computing such an estimate is #P-hard [71]. Since it is known that
BPPNP is contained in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy [73], by Toda’s
theorem, the existence of such an algorithm would lead to a collapse of PH at
that level. Such a collapse is regarded as unlikely and therefore the existence of
an efficient classical algorithm for BosonSampling is also considered unlikely.
2.3 Universal blind quantum computation
(UBQC)
The concept of blind computing is highly relevant to quantum verification. Here,
we simply give a succinct description of a particular protocol, known as universal
blind quantum computation (UBQC). For more details, see this review of blind
quantum computing protocols by Fitzsimons [74] as well as [52,75–78].
Blindness is related to the idea of computing on encrypted data [79]. Suppose
a client has some input x and would like to compute a function f of that input,
however, evaluating the function directly is computationally infeasible for the
client. Luckily, the client has access to a server with the ability to evaluate
f(x). The problem is that the client does not trust the server with the input x,
since it might involve private or secret information (e.g. medical records, military
secrets, proprietary information etc). The client does, however, have the ability
to encrypt x, using some encryption procedure E , to a ciphertext y = Enc(x).
As long as this encryption procedure hides x sufficiently well, the client can send
y to the server and receive in return (potentially after some interaction with
the server) a string z which decrypts to f(x). In other words, f(x) = Dec(z),
where Dec is a decryption procedure that can be performed efficiently by the
client14. The encryption procedure can, roughly speaking, provide two types of
security: computational or information-theoretic. Computational security means
that the protocol is secure as long as certain computational assumptions are true
(for instance that the server is unable to invert one-way functions). Information-
theoretic security, as we have seen with the (quantum) one-time pad, guarantees
that the protocol is secure even against a server of unbounded computational
power. See [84] for more details on these topics.
In the quantum setting, the situation is similar to that of QPIP protocols:
the client is restricted to BPP computations, but has some limited quantum ca-
pabilities, whereas the server is a BQP machine. Thus, the client would like to
delegate BQP functions to the server, while keeping the input and the output
hidden. The first solution to this problem was provided by Childs [75]. His pro-
14In the classical setting, computing on encrypted data culminated with the development of
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), which is considered the “holly grail” of the field [80–83].
Using FHE, a client can delegate the evaluation of any polynomial-size classical circuit to a
server, such that the input and output of the circuit are kept hidden from the server, based
on reasonable computational assumptions. Moreover, the protocol involves only one round of
back-and-forth interaction between client and server.
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tocol achieves information-theoretic security but also requires the client and the
server to exchange quantum messages for a number of rounds that is proportional
to the size of the computation. This was later improved in the UBQC protocol
of Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi [52], that we present here. UBQC main-
tained information-theoretic security but reduced the quantum communication
to a single message from the client to the server. The protocol still requires
the client and the server to have a total communication which is proportional
to the size of the computation, however, apart from the first quantum message,
the interaction is purely classical. Let us now state the definition of perfect, or
information-theoretic, blindness from [52]:
Definition 19 (Blindness). Let P be a quantum delegated computation protocol,
between a client and server, on input X and let L(X) be any function of the
input. We say that P is blind while leaking at most L(X) if, on the client’s input
X, for any fixed Y = L(X), the following two hold when given Y :
1. The distribution of the classical information obtained by the server in P is
independent of X.
2. Given the classical information described in 1 (i.e. given a sample from
the distribution of classical information), the state of the quantum system
obtained by the server in P is fixed and independent of X.
For L(X) = |X|, UBQC satisfies this definition of blindness [52]. What this
means is that the server’s “view” of the protocol should be independent of the
input, when given the length of the input. This view consists, on the one hand,
of the classical information he receives, which is independent of X, given L(X).
On the other hand, for any fixed choice of this classical information, his quantum
state should also be independent of X, given L(X). Note that the definition can
be extended to the case of multiple servers as well. We now give the description
of UBQC.
We will refer to the client as Alice and the server as Bob. Alice is restricted to
BPP computations but has the ability to prepare single-qubit states. Bob, on the
other hand is a full fledged quantum computer, with the ability to perform BQP
computations. Alice wishes to delegate to Bob the application of some quantum
circuit C on a particular input, |x〉, where x is a classical bit string15. UBQC will
allow Alice to do this while keeping both x and C hidden from Bob, in the sense
of Definition 19.
We will view C as an MBQC computation. By considering some universal
graph state, |G〉, such as the brickwork state (see Figure 2.3), Alice can convert
C |x〉 into a description of |G〉 (the graph G) along with the appropriate measure-
ment angles for the qubits in the graph state. By the property of the universal
graph states, the graph G would be the same for all circuits C ′ having the same
number of gates as C (and acting on inputs of the same size as x). Hence, if she
were to send this description to Bob, it would not reveal to him the circuit C, nor
15In UBQC, Alice can also provide a quantum state as input, however, for our purposes we
are only interested in a classical input.
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the input x, but merely an upper bound on their size. It is, in fact, the measure-
ment angles and the ordering of the measurements (known as flow) that uniquely
characterise C |x〉 [85]. However, the measurement angles are chosen assuming all
qubits in the graph state were initially prepared in the |+〉 state. Since these are
XY-plane measurements, as explained in Subsection 2.1, the probabilities, for the
two possible outcomes, depend only on the difference between the measurement
angle and the preparation angle of the state, which is 0, in this case16. Suppose
instead that each qubit, indexed i, in the cluster state, were instead prepared in
the state |+θi〉. Then, if the original measurement angle for qubit i was φi, to
preserve the relative angles, the new value would be φi + θi. If the values for θi
are chosen at random, then they effectively act as a one-time pad for the original
measurement angles φi. This means that if Bob does not know the preparation
angles of the qubits and were instructed to measure them at the updated angles
φi+θi, to him, these angles would be indistinguishable from random, irrespective
of the values of φi. He would, however, learn the measurement outcomes of the
MBQC computation. There is a simple way to hide this information as well. One
can flip the probabilities of the measurement outcomes for a particular state by
performing a π rotation around the Z axis. In other words, the updated mea-
surement angles will be δi = φi + θi + riπ, where ri is sampled randomly from
{0, 1}.
Figure 2.4: Universal Blind Quantum Computation
To recap, UBQC works as follows:
(1) Alice chooses an input x and a quantum computation C that she would like
Bob to perform on |x〉.
(2) She converts C |x〉 into a pair (G, {φi}i) and sends G to Bob, where |G〉 is an
N -qubit universal graph state (with an established ordering for measuring
the qubits), N = O(|C|) and {φi}i is the set of computation angles allowing
for the MBQC computation of C |x〉.
(3) She picks, uniformly at random, values θi, with i going from 1 to N , from
the set {0, π/4, 2π/4, ...7π/4} as well as values ri from the set {0, 1}.
16This remains true even if the qubits have been entangled with the CZ operation.
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(4) She then prepares the states |+θi〉 and sends them to Bob, who is instructed
to entangle them, using CZ operations, according to the graph structure of
G.
(5) Alice then asks Bob to measure the qubits at the angles δi = φ
′
i+θi+riπ and
return the measurement outcomes to her. Here, φ′i is an updated version of
φi that incorporates corrections resulting from previous measurements, as
in the description of MBQC given in Subsection 2.1.2.
(6) After all the measurements have been performed, Alice undoes the ri one-
time padding of the measurement outcomes, thus recovering the true out-
come of the computation. This is done by xor-ing ri with the corrected
measurement outcome of qubit i.
The protocol is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.4, reproduced from [45] (the
variables b1, b2, b3 indicate measurement outcomes).
We can see that as long as Bob does not know the values of the θi and ri
variables, the measurements he is asked to perform, as well as their outcomes,
will appear totally random to him. The reason why Bob cannot learn the values
of θi and ri from the qubits prepared by Alice is due to the limitation, in quantum
mechanics, that one cannot distinguish between non-orthogonal states. In fact,
a subsequent paper by Dunjko and Kashefi shows that Alice can utilise any two
non-overlapping, non-orthogonal states in order to perform UBQC, as opposed
to using |+θ〉 states [86]. Of course, this is merely a sketch argument for how
blindness works and for a complete proof we refer the reader to the following
[52,86,87].
2.4 Verification of quantum computation
In this section, we will outline three protocols for verifying quantum computa-
tions. We will be referencing these protocols particularly in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Each of these protocols is representative for a family of verification techniques.
The first protocol we describe is the Fitzsimons and Kashefi protocol, which is
representative of prepare-and-send protocols. The second protocol is the one of
Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani, which is representative of entanglement-based
protocols. Lastly, we outline the post hoc verification protocol of Morimae and
Fitzsimons, which is representative of receive-and-measure protocols.
2.4.1 Fitzsimons-Kashefi (FK) protocol
In this subsection we discuss the prepare-and-send protocol developed by Fitzsi-
mons and Kashefi in [24], which we shall refer to as the FK protocol. The protocol
is written in the language of MBQC and relies on two essential ideas. The first
is that an MBQC computation can be performed blindly, using UBQC, as de-
scribed in Subsection 2.3. The second, is the idea of embedding checks or traps
in a computation in order to verify that it was performed correctly. Blindness
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will ensure that these checks remain hidden and so any deviation by the prover
will have a high chance of triggering a trap.
Let us identify Alice as the verifier and Bob as the prover. To augment UBQC
with the ability to detect malicious behaviour on the prover’s part, the verifier
will introduce traps in the computation. How will she do this? Recall that the
qubits which will comprise |G〉 need to be entangled with the CZ operation. Of
course, for XY-plane states CZ does indeed entangle the states. However, if either
qubit, on which CZ acts, is |0〉 or |1〉, then no entanglement is created. So suppose
that we have a |+θ〉 qubit whose neighbours, according to G, are computational
basis states. Then, this qubit will remain disentangled from the rest of the qubits
in |G〉. An illustration is provided in Figure 2.5.
(a) When the neighbours of the |+θ〉 state
are XY-plane states, the state becomes en-
tangled with them upon the application of
the CZ operations.
(b) When the neighbours of the |+θ〉
state are computational basis states,
the state does not become entangled
with them upon the application of the
CZ operations.
Figure 2.5
This means that if the qubit is measured at its preparation angle, the outcome
will be deterministic. The verifier can exploit this fact to certify that the prover is
performing the correct measurements. Such states are referred to as trap qubits,
whereas the |0〉, |1〉 neighbours are referred to as dummy qubits. Importantly, as
long as G’s structure remains that of a universal graph state17 and as long as the
dummy qubits and the traps are chosen at random, adding these extra states as
part of the UBQC computation will not affect the blindness of the protocol. The
implication of this is that the prover will be completely unaware of the positions
of the traps and dummies.
Traps serve two purposes: one is to ensure that the server is performing
the correct measurements; the second is to ensure that the server entangles the
states according to the graph structure G. The second property might not seem
17Note that adding dummy qubits into the graph will have the effect of disconnecting qubits
that would otherwise have been connected. It is therefore important that the chosen graph
state allows for the embedding of traps and dummies so that the desired computation can still
be performed. For instance, the brickwork state from Subsection 2.1.2 allows for only one trap
qubit to be embedded, whereas other graph states allow for multiple traps. See [24,88] for more
details.
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obvious at first sight. The reason the traps check the entanglement structure
is because, while traps themselves are not entangled to the rest of the qubits
in the graph, the CZ operation will make them classically correlated with their
dummy neighbours. Specifically, a CZ between a |1〉 state and a |+θ〉 qubit has
the effect of mapping this latter qubit to |+θ+π〉 = |−θ〉. The π rotation, as
before, flips the measurement outcome for this qubit. Therefore, the verifier can
check whether the outcome for a particular trap has been flipped, in accordance
with its local neighbours. Having many such local checks, allows the verifier to
effectively check the global entanglement structure. Thus, by using the traps
(and the dummies), the verifier can check both the prover’s measurements and
his entangling operations and hence verify the MBQC computation.
It should be noted, that checking for the correlation between the traps and
the neighbouring dummies can be done in two ways. Either the verifier adjusts
the measurement angles for the trap qubits accordingly, or the θ angles for the
traps (as well as any other qubit that is connected to a dummy) are chosen as a
function of the neighbouring dummies. FK uses this latter approach. Specifically,
if for qubit i, one chooses the preparation angle θi, the actual angle that will be





G (i) denotes the set of dummy neighbours of
qubit i in |G〉, and dj is the value of dummy qubit j.
We are now ready to present the steps of the FK protocol:
(1) The verifier chooses an input x and a quantum computation C that she
would like the prover to perform on |x〉18.
(2) She converts x and C into a pair (G, {φi}i), where |G〉 is an N -qubit uni-
versal graph state (with an established ordering for measuring the qubits),
which admits an embedding of T traps and D dummies. We therefore have
that N = T + D + Q, where Q = O(|C|) is the number of computation
qubits used for performing C and {φi}i≤Q is the associated set of computa-
tion angles19.
(3) Alice picks, uniformly at random, values θi, with i ranging from 1 to T +Q,
from the set {0, π/4, 2π/4, ...7π/4} as well as values ri from the set {0, 1}
for the trap and computation qubits.
(4) She then prepares the T +Q states |+θi〉, as well as D dummy qubits which
are states chosen at random from {|0〉 , |1〉}. All these states are sent to Bob,
who is instructed to entangle them, using CZ operations, according to the
graph structure G. Note that here we are slightly abusing notation since, as




(5) Alice then asks Bob to measure the qubits as follows: computation qubits
will be measured at δi = φ
′
i + θi + riπ, where φ
′
i is an updated version of φi
18As in UBQC, this need not be a classical input and the verifier could prepare an input of
the form |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ψn〉.
19Note that the number of traps, T , and the number of dummies, D, are related, since each
trap should have only dummy neighbours in |G〉.
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that incorporates corrections resulting from previous measurements; trap
qubits will be measured at δi = θi + riπ; dummy qubits are measured at
randomly chosen angles from {0, π/4, 2π/4, ...7π/4}. This step is interactive
as Alice needs to update the angles of future measurements based on past
outcomes. The number of rounds of interaction is proportional to the depth
of C. If any of the trap measurements produce incorrect outcomes, Alice
will abort.
(6) Assuming all trap measurements succeeded, after all the measurements have
been performed, Alice undoes the ri one-time padding of the measurement
outcomes, thus recovering the outcome of the computation.
Figure 2.6: The FK protocol for verifiable universal blind quantum computing.
The ij subscripts index the positions of the qubits in a rectangular graph state.
The protocol is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.6.
Notice that when Bob is being honest, i.e. following the instructions of the
protocol (and of Alice), the verifier will accept the correct output. Or, more
precisely, she will be sampling from the correct probability distribution, obtained
by measuring C |x〉 in the computational basis.
What about the case when Bob is dishonest and trying to deceive Alice? One
can upper bound the probability that Alice accepts and the outcome is incorrect.
We will sketch the proof of this, from [24], for a simplified version of the protocol
in which Alice introduces a single trap qubit, (T = 1) at a uniformly random
position in |G〉, denoted |+θt〉. First of all, what does it mean for the outcome
to be incorrect? Fitzsimons and Kashefi define it as follows. If the prover is
honest and follows the instructions of the protocol, then, the result of the MBQC
computation should be C |x〉 (prior to measuring this result). An incorrect output
is then defined as a state in the complementary subspace, defined by the projector
I − C |x〉 〈x| C†. As an extension of this, they also define:
P νincorrect = (I − C |x〉 〈x| C†)⊗ |+νθt〉 〈+νθt| (2.52)
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as the projection of the output to the incorrect subspace, but with the trap
projected on the state that leads the verifier to acceptance. The superscript ν
denotes the set of secret parameters of Alice, i.e. the positions of the traps and
dummies as well as the sets {φi}i, {θi}i and {ri}i (in this case, there is only
one trap qubit and the only dummies are the neighbours of that trap). The
dependence on ν, for the trap, encodes the position of the trap in the graph state
as well as the fact that the state could have been flipped depending on the states
of its neighbouring dummies.




pν,j(s) |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρsν,j (2.53)
denote the outcome density operator of all classical and quantum messages ex-
changed between the verifier and the prover throughout the protocol, excluding
the last round of measurements, performed by the prover (which corresponds to
measuring the output of the computation). The subscript j ranges over the pos-
sible strategies of the prover20 with j = 0 corresponding to the honest strategy;
s is a binary vector which ranges over all possible corrected values of the mea-
surement outcomes sent by the prover; lastly, ρsν,j is the state of the unmeasured
qubits, representing the output state of the computation (prior to the final mea-
surement). Note that s and ρsν,j are classically correlated, since s is a result of
the classical transcript of interaction between Alice and Bob.
For the probability of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome to be upper







The proof entails fixing the measurement angles δi, and then considering all possi-
ble transcripts compatible with the fixed angles. One can do this because UBQC
guarantees that Bob learns nothing from the interaction except for, at most, an
upper bound on |C|. This means that there will be multiple transcripts com-
patible with the same values for the δi angles. It also means that any deviation
that the prover performs is independent of the secret parameters of the verifier
(though it can depend on the δi angles) and can therefore be commuted to the
end of the protocol. The outcome density operator Bj(ν) can then be expressed
as the ideal outcome with a CPTP deviation, Ej, on top, that is independent of
ν:
Bj(ν) = Ej(B0(ν)) (2.55)
The deviation Ej is then decomposed into Kraus operators which, in turn, are
20Since the prover is unbounded and is free to choose any of the uncountably many CPTP
strategies, j should be thought more of as a symbolic parameter indicating that there is a
dependence on the prover’s strategy and whether or not this strategy is the ideal one.
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where αkl(j) (and their conjugates) are the complex coefficients for the Pauli
operators. This summation can be split into the terms that act as identity on
B0(ν) and those that do not. Suppose the terms that act trivially have weight
0 ≤ β ≤ 1, we then have:






where the second term is summing over Pauli operators that act non-trivially.
We now use this to compute the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome,

















We now use the fact that P νincorrect = (I −C |x〉 〈x| C†)⊗ |+νθt〉 〈+νθt| and keep only
the projection onto the trap qubit. The projection onto the space orthogonal to


















The summation over ν can be broken into two summations: one over the position
of the trap (and the dummies) and one over the remaining parameters. This
latter sum makes the reduced state appear totally mixed to Bob (a fact which is















θt | ⊗ (I/Tr(I)))Pm
)
(2.60)
But notice that, on the identity system, the terms in which l 6= m will have no
contribution to the summation. This is because at least one of the Paulis (either
Pl or Pm) will act on the identity system. Since Pauli operators are traceless,
when taking the trace these terms will be zero. What about the trap system?
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p(νt) |+νtθt 〉 〈+ν
t















But now recall that νt consists of three things: θt, rt and the position of the
trap. Additionally, we’re taking p(νt) to be the uniform distribution over these
parameters. By summing over the first two parameters, the above expression
becomes zero, whenever l 6= m. This is known as Pauli twirling [15, 25]. Thus,














θt | ⊗ (I/Tr(I)))Pl
)
(2.62)
In other words, the resulting state is a convex combination of Pauli deviations.
The position of the trap is completely randomised so that it is equally likely that
any of the N qubits is the trap. Therefore, in the above summation, there will
be N terms (corresponding to the N possible positions of the trap), one of which












We have found that for the case of a single trap qubit, out of the total N qubits,
one has ε = 1− 1
N
.
If however, there are multiple trap states, the bound improves. Specifically,
for a type of resource state called dotted-triple graph, the number of traps can be
a constant fraction of the total number of qubits, yielding ε = 8/9. If the protocol
is then repeated a constant number of times, d, with the verifier aborting if any
of these runs gives incorrect trap outcomes, it can be shown that ε = (8/9)d can
be achieved [88]. Alternatively, if the input state and computation are encoded
in an error correcting code of Pauli-weight21 d, then one again obtains ε = (8/9)d.
This is useful if one is interested in a quantum output, or a classical bit string
output. If, instead, one would only like a single bit output (i.e. the outcome of the
decision problem) then sequential repetition and taking the majority outcome is
sufficient. The fault tolerant encoding need not be done by the verifier. Instead,
the prover will simply be instructed to prepare a larger resource state which also
offers topological error-correction. See [24,89,90] for more details. An important
observation, however, is that the fault tolerant encoding, is used only to boost
security and not for correcting deviations arising from faulty devices.
21The Pauli-weight of an error correcting code represents the maximum number of non-
identity Pauli operations that the code can correct for.
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For a more detailed derivation of the above bound, see [24,91].
2.4.2 Reichardt-Unger-Vazirani (RUV) protocol
In this subsection we describe the entanglement-based protocol of Reichardt,
Unger and Vazirani, which we shall refer to as the RUV protocol. As we saw in
Subsection 2.1.3, the CHSH game is an example of a two-player non-local game in
which a quantum strategy for playing the game outperforms any classical strategy.
The quantum strategy achieves a success probability of cos2(π/8) ≈ 85.4%. It
was shown by Tsirelson that this strategy is optimal for quantum mechanics [56],
which led to the development of robust self-tests based on the CHSH game [32,57].
More specifically, these results show that if one observes two players winning the
CHSH game with a near cos2(π/8) probability, it can be concluded that the
players’ shared state is close to a Bell pair and that their observables are close
to the ideal observables of the optimal strategy (Pauli X and Z, for Alice, and
(X + Z)/
√
2 and (X− Z)/
√
2, for Bob).
Figure 2.7: Ideal CHSH game strategy
Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani then proved a more general result for self-
testing a tensor product of multiple Bell states as well as the observables acting
on these states [31]22. It is this latter result that is relevant for the RUV protocol
so we give a more formal statement:
22Note that the Summers and Werner and McKague, Yang and Scarani results could also be
used to certify a tensor product of Bell pairs, by repeating the self-test of a single Bell pair
multiple times. However, this would require each repetition to be independent of the previous
one. In other words the states shared by Alice and Bob, as well as their measurement outcomes,
should be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) in each repetition. The Reichardt,
Unger and Vazirani result makes no such assumption.
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Theorem 2. Suppose two players, Alice and Bob, are instructed to play n se-
quential CHSH games. Let the inputs, for Alice and Bob, be given by the n-bit
strings a,b ∈ {0, 1}n. Additionally, let S = (|ψ̃〉 , Ã(a), B̃(b)) be the strategy em-
ployed by Alice and Bob in playing the n CHSH games, where |ψ̃〉 is their shared
state and Ã(a) and B̃(b) are their respective observables, for inputs a,b.
Suppose Alice and Bob win at least n(1 − ε)cos2(π/8) games, with ε =
poly(δ, 1/n) for some δ > 0, such that ε → 0 as δ → 0 or n → ∞. Then,
there exists a local isometry Φ = ΦA ⊗ ΦB and a state |junk〉 such that:














P (a(i)), B(b) =
n⊗
i=1
Q(b(i)) and P (0) = X, P (1) = Z, Q(0) =
(X + Z)/
√
2, Q(1) = (X− Z)/
√
2.
What this means is that, up to a local isometry, the players share a state which
is close in trace distance to a tensor product of Bell pairs and their measurements
are close to the ideal measurements. This result, known as CHSH game rigidity,
is the key idea for performing multi-prover verification using a classical verifier.
Before giving the description of the protocol, we first give a succinct intro-
duction to the concept of gate teleportation, first defined in [92]. Suppose two
parties, Alice and Bob, share a Bell state |Φ+〉. Bob applies a unitary U on his
share of the entangled state so that the joint state becomes (I ⊗ U) |Φ+〉. Alice
now takes an additional qubit, labelled |ψ〉, and measures this qubit and the one













The outcome of this measurement will be two classical bits which we label b1
and b2. After the measurement, the state on Bob’s system will be UX
b1Zb2 |ψ〉.
Essentially, Bob has a one-time padded version of |ψ〉 with the U gate applied.
While this example involved a one-qubit gate, it is simple to extend the primitive
to two-qubit gates, by simply considering two Bell pairs. If one were to repeat
this procedure with gates from a universal gate set, then one would be able to
perform universal quantum computations. In that sense, as is explained in [92],
gate teleportation is a universal computational primitive.
We now describe the RUV protocol. It uses a classical verifier and two quan-
tum provers, but can be generalised to any number of provers greater than two.
Suppose that Alice and Bob are the two provers23. They are allowed to share an
23Note that here we are breaking from the convention of having Alice as the verifier and Bob
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unbounded amount of quantum entanglement but are not allowed to communi-
cate during the protocol. A verifier will interact classically with both of them in
order to delegate and check an arbitrary quantum computation specified by the
quantum circuit C, acting on some input |x〉. The protocol consists of alternating
randomly between four sub-protocols:
• CHSH games. In this subprotocol, the verifier will simply play CHSH
games with Alice and Bob. To be precise, the verifier will repeatedly in-
struct Alice and Bob to perform the ideal measurements of the CHSH game.
She will collect the answers of the two provers (which we shall refer to as
CHSH statistics) and after a certain number of games, will compute the win
rate of the two provers. The verifier is interested in the case when Alice and
Bob win close to the maximum number of games as predicted by quantum
mechanics. Thus, at the start of the protocol she takes ε = poly(1/|C|) and
accepts the statistics produced by Alice and Bob if and only if they win at
least a fraction (1 − ε)cos2(π/8) of the total number of games. Using the
rigidity result, this implies that Alice and Bob share a state which is close
to a tensor product of perfect Bell states (up to a local isometry). This step
is schematically illustrated in Figure 2.7.
• State tomography. This time the verifier will instruct Alice to perform
the ideal CHSH game measurements, as in the previous case. However,
she instructs Bob to measure his halves of the entangled states so that
they collapse to a set of resource states which will be used to perform gate
teleportation. The resource states are chosen so that they are universal
for quantum computation. Specifically, in the RUV protocol, the following
resource states are used:
{P |0〉 , (HP)2 |Φ+〉 , (GY)2 |Φ+〉 ,CNOT2,4P2Q4(|Φ+〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉) :
P,Q ∈ {X,Y,Z, I}}






and the subscripts index the qubits upon which
the operators act. Assuming Alice and Bob do indeed share Bell states,
Bob’s measurements will collapse Alice’s states to the same resource states
(up to a one-time padding known to the verifier). Alice’s measurements
on these states are used to check Bob’s preparation, effectively performing
state tomography on the resource states.
• Process tomography. This subprotocol is similar to the state tomog-
raphy one, except the roles of Alice and Bob are reversed. The verifier
instructs Bob to perform the ideal CHSH game measurements. Alice, on
the other hand, is instructed to perform Bell basis measurements on pairs
of qubits. As in the previous subprotocol, Bob’s measurement outcomes are
as the prover. The Alice and Bob convention is used here in a similar fashion to how it is used
for the CHSH game. The two parties that are sharing entanglement (in this case, the provers)
are the ones traditionally known as Alice and Bob.
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used to tomographically check that Alice is indeed performing the correct
measurements.
• Computation. The final subprotocol combines the previous two. Bob
is asked to perform the resource preparation measurements, while Alice is
asked to perform Bell basis measurements. This effectively makes Alice
perform the desired computation through repeated gate teleportation.
An important aspect, in proving the correctness of the protocol, is the local
similarity of pairs of subprotocols. For instance, Alice cannot distinguish between
the CHSH subprotocol and the state tomography one, or between the process
tomography one and computation. This is because, in those situations, she is
asked to perform the same operations on her side, while being unaware of what
Bob is doing. Moreover, since the verifier can test all but the computation part,
if Alice deviates there will be a high probability of her deviation being detected.
The same is true for Bob. In this way, the verifier can, essentially, enforce that the
two players behave honestly and thus perform the correct quantum computation.
Note, that this is not the same as the blindness property, discussed in relation to
the previous protocols. The RUV protocol does, however, possess that property
as well. This follows from a more involved argument regarding the way in which,
as a by-product of the teleportation, the state is kept one time padded.
It should be noted that there are only two constraints imposed on the provers:
that they cannot communicate once the protocol has commenced and that they
produce close to quantum optimal win-rates for the CHSH games. Importantly,
there are no constraints on the quantum systems possessed by the provers, which
can be arbitrarily large. Similarly, there are no constraints on what measurements
they perform or what strategy they use in order to respond to the verifier. In spite
of this, the rigidity result shows that for the provers to produce statistics that are
accepted by the verifier, they must behave according to the ideal strategy (up to
local isometry). Having the ability to fully characterise the prover’s shared state
and their strategies in this way is what allows the verifier to check the correctness
of the delegated quantum computation.
2.4.3 Morimae-Fitzsimons (MF) protocol
In this subsection, we present the post hoc verification protocol of Morimae and
Fitzsimons, which we shall refer to as the MF protocol [28,93]. We note that the
same protocol was independently proposed in [94] by Hangleiter et al.
The starting point is the complexity class QMA, for which we have stated
the definition in Subsection 2.2. Recall, that one can think of QMA as the class
of problems for which the solution can be checked by a BQP verifier receiving
a quantum state |ψ〉, known as a witness, from a prover. We also stated the
definition of the k-local Hamiltonian problem, a complete problem for the class
QMA, in Definition 7. We mentioned that for k = 2 the problem is QMA-complete.
For the post hoc protocol, Morimae and Fitzsimons consider a particular type of
2-local Hamiltonian known as an XZ-Hamiltonian.
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To define an XZ-Hamiltonian we introduce some helpful notation. Consider an
n-qubit operator S, which we shall refer to as XZ-term, such that S =
⊗n
j=1 Pj,
with Pj ∈ {I,X,Z}. Denote wX(S) as the X-weight of S, representing the total
number of j’s for which Pj = X. Similarly denote wZ(S) as the Z-weight for S.
An XZ-Hamiltonian is then a 2-local Hamiltonian of the form H =
∑
i aiSi, where
the ai’s are real numbers and the Si’s are XZ-terms having wX(Si) +wZ(Si) ≤ 2.
Essentially, as the name suggests, an XZ-Hamiltonian is one in which each local
term consists of two terms, each of which can be either X or Z.
The MF protocol starts with the observation that BQP ⊆ QMA. This means
that any problem in BQP can be viewed as an instance of the 2-local Hamiltonian
problem. Therefore, for any language L ∈ BQP and input x, there exists an XZ-
Hamiltonian, H, such that the smallest eigenvalue of H is less than a when x ∈ L
or larger than b, when x 6∈ L, where a and b are a pair of numbers satisfying
b− a ≥ 1/poly(|x|). Hence, the lowest energy eigenstate of H (also referred to as
ground state), denoted |ψ〉, is a quantum witness for x ∈ L. In a QMA protocol,
the prover would be instructed to send this state to the verifier. The verifier then
performs a measurement on |ψ〉 to estimate its energy, accepting if the estimate
is below a and rejecting otherwise. However, we are interested in a verification
protocol for BQP problems where the verifier has minimal quantum capabilities.
This means that there will be two requirements: the verifier can only perform
single-qubit measurements and the prover is restricted to BQP computations.
The MF protocol satisfies both of these constraints.
The first requirement is satisfied because estimating the energy of a quantum
state, |ψ〉, with respect to an XZ-Hamiltonian H, can be done by measuring
one of the observables Si on the state |ψ〉. Specifically, it is shown in [95] that
if one chooses the local term Si according to a probability distribution given
by the normalised terms |ai|, and measures |ψ〉 with the Si observables, this
provides an estimate for the energy of |ψ〉. Since H is an XZ-Hamiltonian, this
entails performing a constant number of measurements each of which can be
either an X or a Z measurement. Thus, the verifier need only perform single-
qubit measurements.
For the second requirement, one needs to show that for any BQP computation,
there exists an XZ-Hamiltonian such that the ground state can be prepared by
a polynomial-size quantum circuit. Suppose the computation that the verifier
would like to delegate is denoted as C and the input for this computation is x.
Given what we have mentioned above, regarding the local Hamiltonian problem,
it follows that there exists an XZ-Hamiltonian H and numbers a and b, with
b − a ≥ 1/poly(|x|), such that if C accepts x with high probability then the
ground state of H has energy below a, otherwise it has energy above b. It was
shown in [63,65], that starting from C and x one can construct an XZ-Hamiltonian
satisfying this property and which also has a ground state that can be prepared
by a BQP machine. The ground state is known as the Feynman-Kitaev clock
state. To describe this state, suppose the circuit C has T gates (i.e. T = |C|)
and that these gates, labelled in the order in which they are applied, are denoted
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UtUt−1...U0 |x〉 |1t0T−t〉 (2.66)
This is essentially a superposition over all time steps of the time evolved state
in the circuit C. Hence, the state can be prepared by a BQP machine. The
XZ-Hamiltonian, proposed by Kempe, Kitaev and Regev [65], is then a series of
2-local constraints that are all simultaneously satisfied by this state.
We can now present the steps of the MF protocol:
(1) The verifier chooses a quantum circuit, C, and an input x to delegate to the
prover.
(2) The verifier determines the XZ-Hamiltonian H, associated to C |x〉. In other
words, she computes the terms ai of H =
∑
i aiSi, which has as a ground
state the Feynman-Kitaev state associated with Cx. Denote that state as
|ψ〉.
(3) The verifier instructs the prover to send her |ψ〉, qubit by qubit.
(4) The verifier chooses one of the XZ-terms Si, according to the normalised
distribution {|ai|}i, and measures it on |ψ〉. She accepts if the measurement
indicates the energy of |ψ〉 is below a.
Note that the protocol is not blind, since the verifier informs the prover about
both the computation C and the input x.
As mentioned, the essential properties that any QPIP protocol should satisfy
are completeness and soundness. For the post hoc protocol, these follow immedi-
ately from the local Hamiltonian problem. Specifically, we know that there exist
a and b such that b−a ≥ 1/poly(|x|). When C accepts x with high probability, the
state |ψ〉 will be an eigenstate of H having eigenvalue smaller than a. Otherwise,
any state, when measured under the H observable, will have an energy greater
than b. Of course, the verifier is not computing the exact energy |ψ〉 under H,
merely an estimate. This is because she is measuring only one local term from
H. However, it is shown in [28] that the precision of her estimate is also inverse
polynomial in |x|.
The protocol, as described, suggests that it is sufficient for the verifier to
measure only two qubits. However, since the energy gap b− a, that distinguishes
acceptance from rejection, decreases with the size of the input, in practice one
would perform a sequential repetition of this protocol in order to boost the prob-






Dr. Chase: You can trust me.
Dr. House: Problem is, if I can’t trust you, I can’t trust your
statement that I can trust you.
— House MD, Season 1, Episode 15
As mentioned, while the implementation of a large-scale universal quantum
computer is still distant, there is a need to develop protocols for the verification of
quantum computations. The approaches that have proven to be the most promis-
ing are those based on interactive proof systems, where a trusted, computationally
limited verifier exchanges messages with an untrusted, powerful quantum prover,
or multiple provers. As mentioned, it is still an open problem as to whether a
fully classical verifier can validate the computations performed by a single quan-
tum prover. Existing approaches avoid this problem by either having the verifier
prepare and send quantum states to the prover, receive and measure quantum
states from the prover or simply have a classical verifier interact with multiple
provers that share entanglement.
One protocol, in particular, that is of interest to us, is the Fitzsimons-Kashefi,
or FK, protocol. We saw that this is a prepare-and-send protocol in which the
verifier is required to prepare single qubit states and send them to the prover.
FK has a number of advantages. Firstly, quantum communication between the
verifier and the prover is only one-way and happens at the beginning of the
protocol, whereas the rest of the communication is entirely classical. Secondly,
the protocol can be made to have linear communication complexity [88,96]. This
refers to the fact that, if the verifier wishes to delegate the computation of some
quantum circuit C, then the total communication between verifier and prover
scales as O(|C|). Thirdly, the protocol is blind, meaning that the description of
C (as well as the input |x〉 on which it acts) is hidden from the prover, in an
information theoretic sense. Finally, the protocol achieves inverse exponential
security in a security parameter, d. In other words, for some value d > 0, that is
chosen by the verifier, the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome is upper
bounded by (8/9)d.
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In this chapter we wish to address two important questions about the FK
protocol:
1. Is the protocol robust with respect to deviations in the quantum state that
is sent by the verifier to the prover? What if the deviations are known
to the prover (i.e. its system is correlated with the state prepared by the
verifier)1?
2. Can the protocol be made device-independent? In other words, can one have
an FK-like protocol in which all quantum devices, including the verifier’s
device, are untrusted?
We answer both questions in the affirmative. We will first prove the robust-
ness of the FK protocol and then use that result in order to construct a device-
independent version of the protocol. This construction will involve composing FK
with the entanglement-based RUV protocol. The end result will be a protocol
that takes the best of both worlds.
We note that our construction does not utilise the universal composability
(UC) framework (that allows for secure composition of cryptographic proto-
cols and primitives) [98], which has been successfully extended to the quantum
regime [99–101]. There are two reasons for this. The first is that we are not liter-
ally composing the RUV protocol with the FK protocol. Instead, we are taking
elements from the RUV protocol in order to design a new protocol that makes
use of those elements and FK in order to achieve device-independent verification.
The second reason is that UC requires the protocols to be proven secure in the
abstract cryptographic framework [102]. While this has been done for the FK
protocol, in [103], no such proof exists for the RUV protocol. Of course, this does
not stop us from proving the stand-alone security of our protocol.
Our construction essentially works as follows: the verifier will interact clas-
sically with an untrusted measurement device and a quantum server, that are
non-communicating but sharing entanglement. We will first use a sub-protocol
of RUV, known as a state tomography protocol. This will involve the verifier
directing the two untrusted devices so as to remotely prepare the quantum state
used by the FK protocol (i.e. the |+θ〉 states and the |0〉, |1〉 dummies) on the
server’s system. The verifier will then run the FK protocol with the server, as
if she had sent the ideal quantum states to that server. A schematic illustration
of the protocol is given in Figure 3.1. At first glance, this construction might
be problematic. This is because the “output” of the state tomography protocol,
the state prepared on the server’s side, might not necessarily be an acceptable
state for the FK protocol. In particular, since the protocols are probabilistic, the
state can be deviated from its intended value. Thus, it is necessary for the FK
protocol to be robust to such deviations. Moreover, we have to make sure that
the two quantum devices cannot exploit their shared correlations to compromise
the security of the protocol.
The two main results of this chapter can be summarised as follows:
1Presumably, the verifier’s device was acquired from some vendor. This vendor could have
added (or been instructed to add) known deviations to the prepared quantum states as a type of
“backdoor” into the protocol. There is, of course, precedent for this with classical devices [97].
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Figure 3.1: Device-independent single-server quantum verification protocol.
1. We prove that the FK protocol is strongly robust, see Theorem 3. First, we
show that FK can tolerate quantum states which deviate from their ideal
values by a small amount. This is shown in Lemma 1. The result assumes
that the prover does not have a purification of the deviated state (in fact
we are assuming that the prover’s system is completely uncorrelated with
the deviated state). But this is a requirement for our composite protocol.
We therefore proceed to show that the FK protocol is robust even when
the deviated state is correlated with an external system possessed by an
adversary, like the prover. This is shown in Lemma 2.
2. As an immediate consequence of the robustness theorem, we construct our
composite protocol combining RUV with FK. The required quantum states
for the FK protocol, that would normally be sent by the verifier’s prepara-
tion device, are prepared via the state tomography sub-protocol of RUV.
We will require the verifier to have a measurement device, instead of a
preparation device, which will be untrusted. This device will act as the
second prover of the RUV protocol. Our composite protocol then inherits
the device independence property of RUV, see Theorem 5. Additionally,
since we do not require the full RUV protocol, the composite protocol also
has an improved communication complexity, when compared to RUV.
We should emphasize that the composite protocol we propose does not inherit
the linear communication complexity of the FK protocol. This is due to the fact
that the state tomography sub-protocol adds an additional overhead in communi-
cation complexity. One can therefore wonder why we emphasized the efficiency of
the FK protocol at the beginning of this chapter. The reason is that our compos-
ite protocol can be divided into a state preparation part and a verification part,
this latter part corresponding to the FK protocol. The communication complex-
ity of the whole protocol is therefore the sum of the communication complexities
of these two parts. This means that any improvement in how state preparation is
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performed will directly improve the complexity of our approach and, in particu-
lar, if state preparation can be achieved with a linear overhead this will result in a
linear communication complexity for the composite as well. Thus, the complexity




The first result we prove is that the FK protocol is robust with respect to small
variations in the quantum input. Throughout this chapter, by “quantum input”
(or sometimes just “input”) we will be referring to the quantum states that the
verifier sends to the prover and not the input x for the quantum computation
associated with the delegated circuit C. Without loss of generality we can assume
that the desired computation, that will be delegated to the server, has the fixed
classical input x = 00 . . . 0. Hence, for the rest of this chapter we define the input
state of the FK protocol to be the tensor product of the individual qubits prepared
by the verifier (including traps and dummies). These qubits will comprise the
graph state that the prover should prepare by entangling the states using CZ
operations. We will also refer to “ideal input” to mean the quantum input state
that has no deviations. In other words this is the state that the verifier intends
to prepare in a run of the FK the protocol.
Robustness of the FK protocol means that the protocol’s input state can be
deviated from its ideal value by some small amount and the protocol will continue
to function. In particular, this input state could be the output of some other
protocol, provided that this state was close to its ideal value. As we will see in
the next subsection, the RUV protocol, or more specifically its state tomography
sub-protocol, is capable of such a preparation. We start by formally defining
robustness in this context. Before doing so, we first provide definitions for the
notions of completeness and soundness that we will be using in relation to the
FK protocol, though these apply for other verification protocols as well:
Definition 20 (δ-completeness). For some 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we say that a verification
protocol has δ-completeness, if the probability that the verifier accepts and the
prover(s) performs the honest strategy is lower bounded by δ.
Definition 21 (η-soundness). For some 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, we say that a verification pro-
tocol has η-soundness, if the probability that the verifier accepts and the prover(s)
does not perform the honest strategy is upper bounded by η.
Note that the FK protocol has completeness δ = 1 and soundness η = (8/9)d, for
a fixed constant d > 0, chosen by the verifier [88]. We now define robustness as
follows:
Definition 22 (Weak and Strong Robustness). Let V = V (ρ, δ, η) be a verifi-
cation protocol, with quantum input ρ, having completeness δ and soundness η,
such that 0 ≤ δ, η ≤ 1. For some ε ≥ 0, we denote Vε = V (ρε, δε, ηε) as the
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protocol V with quantum input state ρε, completeness δε and soundness ηε such
that 0 ≤ δε, ηε ≤ 1 and:
TD(ρ, ρε) ≤ ε (3.1)
We say that protocol V is weakly robust in its quantum input (with respect to the
parameters δ, η) iff:
(1) The prover’s quantum system in Vε is uncorrelated with ρε.
(2) It is the case that:
δε → δ ηε → η (3.2)
as ε→ 0.
We say the protocol is strongly robust in its quantum input if only condition (2)
is true2.
As a point of clarification, note that if a protocol has completeness δ > 0 then
it also has completeness δ′ for some 0 ≤ δ′ < δ. For instance, if a protocol has
completeness 2/3 then it also has completeness 1/2. A similar fact is true for
soundness. For this reason it is important to specify robustness with respect to
the given completeness and soundness parameters of a protocol. In regards to
the FK protocol, we will always implicitly consider robustness with respect to
aforementioned parameters δ = 1 and η = (8/9)d.
For the FK protocol, in the case of a computation C, the N = O(|C|)-qubit
input state is comprised of single qubit states πi, where i ranges from 1 to N .










Depending on whether we are interested in strong robustness or weak robustness,
the prover may or may not be correlated with the state ρε. In the case of strong
robustness, one can even assume that the prover holds a purification of ρε. Given
this, we prove the following:
Theorem 3. The FK protocol is strongly robust, in the sense of Definition 22,
and given an input which is ε-close to its ideal value, for ε ≥ 0, the completeness
becomes δε = 1 − 2ε and the soundness becomes ηε = (8/9)d + O(
√
ε), for some
constant d > 0, chosen by the verifier.
Let us give a sketch of the proof, while the full proof can be found in Section 3.2
Proof sketch. We first examine soundness which considers the case of a dishonest
prover. Intuitively, when the prover is malevolent, he will try to convince the
verifier to accept an incorrect outcome. We know that, in the ideal case, this
probability is upper bounded. One could expect that if the input state (which
2It might seem paradoxical that a strongly robust protocol needs to satisfy fewer constraints
than a weakly robust one. However, strong robustness implies weak robustness (i.e. if a protocol
is strongly robust then it is also weakly robust, whereas the converse is not necessarily true)
hence the reason for naming them this way.
73
contains the trap qubits) is deviated from ideal, the soundness bound remains
unchanged. Why? Because the effect of a deviated input could be incorporated
in the deviated actions of the prover, leading to a corruption of the trap states
and determining the verifier to reject. However, this is not necessarily the case,
even if the input state is uncorrelated with the prover’s system. The reason is
that we are only assuming that the state is close to the ideal one, however the
way in which it is deviated from ideal could, in principle, depend on the secret
parameters. Specifically, one could have a state in which all the trap and dummy
qubits are in the ideal state, whereas the state of the computation qubits is ε-close
in trace distance to the ideal state (for some ε > 0). In this case, even if the prover
behaves honestly, the probability that the verifier accepts an incorrect outcome
increases by O(ε). We prove that this is essentially optimal and the soundness
bound changes by at most O(ε). We do this by using the fact that when the
input state is uncorrelated with the prover’s system, the action of the protocol
can be viewed as a CPTP map acting on this state. Since CPTP maps are trace
non-increasing, it follows that soundness bound changes by at most O(ε). This
is shown in Lemma 1.
In the general case, however, the deviated input could be correlated with the
malicious prover’s system. In fact, one can even assume that the deviation was
orchestrated by the prover in such a way so as to improve his cheating probability.
Mathematically this is made manifest by the fact that the prover’s deviation, in
the presence of initial correlations, is not, in general, a trace preserving map.
Instead, it can be expressed as a linear combination between a CPTP map and an
inhomogeneous term which could be either positive or negative as shown in [104].
In this case, we use the ε-closeness of the input state to derive a bound of order
O(
√
ε) for the norm of the inhomogeneous term. From linearity, and using the
previous argument, it follows that in the general case (of strong robustness) the
soundness bound changes by at most O(
√
ε) (see Lemma 2 for the detailed proof).
In the case of completeness, the prover is assumed to be honest. If we start
with an ε-close input state, because of the linearity of the operators involved, we
will end up with an output state that is ε-close to the ideal output. This is true,
regardless of whether the state is correlated with the prover’s system, since he is
not being malicious (see Lemma 3).
A similar approach to Lemma 1 (the proof of weak robustness) was used in
[105] for defining ε-blindness. This simply means performing the UBQC protocol
with a quantum state that is ε-close in trace distance to the ideal state. The
concept was then used in [103] to prove universal composability for blind quantum
computing protocols. However, to our knowledge, these results are not strong
enough to cover the requirements for the composition with the RUV protocol.
In [105] only the blindness property was examined while verifying the quantum
computation was not considered. In [103] the authors considered a concept known
as local-verifiability which does not take into account the possibility of correlated




As mentioned, we intend to use the robustness result in order to construct a
device-independent version of the FK protocol. Strong robustness guarantees that
if we have an input state that is only approximately the ideal one, the protocol
continues to work (the completeness and soundness bounds do not change by
much). We can now break the task of achieving device-independent FK into two
parts, which we will compose sequentially:
1. Verified State Preparation - use a device-independent protocol to pre-
pare, on the server’s side, a state which is ε-close to the intended FK input.
2. Verified Delegated Computation - run the FK protocol with the server
that has the ε-close input state (since robustness allows this).
The advantage of this modular approach is that we are free to use any protocol
for state preparation as long as we have the guarantee of ε-closeness. This is due
to our strong robustness result, which shows that FK will work even if the devia-
tion in the prepared state is correlated with the prover’s cheating strategy in the
delegated computation stage. In our case, we achieve state preparation using the
device-independent state tomography sub-protocol of RUV. This sub-protocol has
the ε-closeness property that we require, as explained in [31]. The resulting proto-
col, will consist of a verifier with an untrusted, single-qubit, measurement device
and a quantum server. While both of these devices can be viewed as provers, as
in the RUV setting, the difference is that in the RUV protocol both provers are
quantum computers. In our case, only one prover is required to perform univer-
sal quantum computations, whereas the other prover is only required to perform
single-qubit measurements. The protocol will also have a smaller communication
complexity than the RUV protocol. The complexity could be improved further
if a more efficient state preparation protocol is used, such as the one from [106].
We first clarify some details of the RUV protocol, which are essential in un-
derstanding how our composite protocol will work. As we have seen, RUV uses
the rigidity property of CHSH games to determine if the provers share multiple
copies of the Bell state |Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2, which is XZ-determined. A
state is XZ-determined if it is uniquely characterised by its traces against tensor
products of the I and Pauli X and Z operators. RUV uses state tomography, in
the X and Z bases, to verify the preparation of XZ-determined states. In particu-
lar, they use it to tomographically verify the preparation of a set of states which
can be used to perform universal computation (the resource states mentioned in
Subsection 2.4.2).
This XZ state tomography is possible, because RUV leverages the rigidity
result to characterise the provers’ measurement operations and determine that
they are indeed, up to an isometry, tensor products of X and Z observables.
They also describe how it is possible to extend the protocol to include the Y
observable as well. However, there is a catch. It is not possible to find an
isometry that allows one to determine all three Pauli observables at the same
time. Instead, one can determine that the provers are using X and Z and either
Y or −Y. In other words, the Y operator is fixed up to a sign change. That is,
75
the provers can always choose to measure in either the Y or −Y bases without
being detected (this corresponds to complex conjugating the states with respect
to their representations in the computational basis). This problem has been
mentioned by others as well [32, 107]. The reason for this potential flip of the
Y operator is quite technical and exceeds the scope of this chapter. However,
for our purposes, we need to mention that it is the Y operator that cannot be
fixed because the Bell states that need to be determined are |Φ+〉 Bell states,
which are XZ-determined and invariant under complex conjugation. In spite of
this limitation, it is possible to force the provers to consistently choose either Y
or −Y for their measurements, as explained in [31]. By “force” we simply mean
that if the provers decide to change the Y observable to −Y (or vice-versa) during
the protocol, this will be detected by the verifier, with high probability. For state
tomography, this means that the state, that will be remotely prepared, will be
close to either the ideal state or the complex conjugate of the ideal state.
At first glance it would seem that this could be problematic for the FK pro-
tocol. However, note that the complex conjugation attack affects only states in
the XY-plane, while the computational basis states (the dummy qubits) are un-
affected. We can simply turn this around, so that only dummies are affected,
while traps and computation qubits are not. There are two ways of doing this.
One is to perform MBQC (and the FK protocol) in the XZ-plane rather than
the XY-plane. This is known as real MBQC [108, 109] and is used, for instance,
by McKague in [32]. If one were to adapt the FK protocol to real MQBC, then
the computation and trap qubits would be states from the XZ-plane, whereas
the dummy qubits would be the eigenstates of the Y operator. Alternatively, we
could do the following. Ultimately, the complex conjugation problem stems from
the fact that we are attempting to self-test the XZ-determined |Φ+〉 state. Let us
instead consider the Bell state |Ψ+〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/
√
2. This state is stabilized
by the operators generated by the set {X⊗ X,Y ⊗ Y}. It is shown in [31] that:
Theorem 4. A stabilizer state is determined by any of its sets of stabilizer gen-
erators.
In other words, the |Ψ+〉 state is XY-determined. In principle it is possible to
run a form of the RUV protocol in which we choose the CHSH games such that
we rigidly determine that the provers share multiple copies of the Bell state |Ψ+〉
instead of |Φ+〉. Analogous to the previous case, the extended form of the protocol
would then fix the Z operator up to a sign change (instead of the Y operator).
This means that the provers can always perform a reflection with respect to the
XY-plane with no noticeable changes (but recall that the provers are forced to
do this consistently). However, the XY-plane states are invariant under such a
reflection. Instead, the dummy qubits will be flipped (|0〉 is mapped to |1〉 and
vice-versa). As described in Subsection 2.4.1, these dummy qubits are used to
isolate the trap qubits from the computation qubits. In the honest scenario for the
FK protocol, dummy qubits in the state |1〉 introduce an additional Z correction
on their neighbouring qubits, effectively flipping the measurement outcomes (this
is because we are using the controlled-Z operation for entangling qubits). In
the dishonest case, where the prover chooses to perform the flip, all trap qubits
having an unequal number of |0〉 and |1〉 dummy neighbours, will have their
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measurement outcome flipped, with respect to the honest case. Since the states
of the dummies are chosen at random, there will be a high probability that at
least one trap qubit will be of this type. The verifier can detect this and abort.
We, therefore, give a modified version of the state tomography protocol of RUV,
which uses this extended self-test for the |Ψ+〉 state as well as the Pauli X, Y and
Z operators (see Protocol 1). In this protocol, prover 1 is the quantum server and
prover 2 is an untrusted measurement device.
The state tomography protocol is then sequentially combined with FK, re-
sulting in our composite protocol, given as Protocol 2. Note, that since prover 1
(acting as the quantum server) is involved in both state tomography as well as
the FK protocol, the strong version of the robustness property is required. This
is to address the effect of any potential correlated attacks where provers 1 and
2 have agreed in advance on a strategy. Overall, the resulting protocol can be
viewed as a device-independent single-server verification protocol. We therefore
have the following:
Theorem 5. Assuming the verifier wants to delegate the computation of a quan-
tum circuit C, Protocol 2 is a device-independent verification protocol satisfying
the following completeness and soundness properties:
Completeness: Provided that the provers behave honestly and respect the ver-
ifier’s instructions, the verifier will accept with probability at least 1 −
O(|C|−32).
Soundness: Provided that the verifier accepts with probability at least 1 −
O(|C|−64/3) in the verified preparation stage (step 1 of the protocol), the
probability that she accepts an incorrect outcome of the computation is up-
per bounded by O(|C|−10/3).
Additionally, the protocol has communication complexity O(|C|c), with some con-
stant c, c > 2048.
The detailed proofs are given in Section 3.3. While the obtained commu-
nication complexity is an improvement over RUV (which has a communication
complexity of O(|C|c), with c > 8192 [30, 31]), it is still far from practical. How-
ever, we believe our approach serves as a proof of principle, that this type of
composition can be beneficial. Indeed, a number of protocols have been devel-
oped which have the same division between verified preparation and verified com-
putation [34, 96, 106]. The approach also highlights where improvements could
be made. It is the state tomography subprotocol that has the large commu-
nication overhead, while the FK protocol has only linear communication com-
plexity [24, 88]. A recent approach of Coladangelo et al., from [106], inspired
from [36], introduces a rigidity result with drastically smaller communication
overhead. This allows them to develop entanglement-based verification proto-
cols, with two provers, in which the total communication complexity scales as
O(|C|log(|C|)). However, in their protocols both provers are universal quantum
computers. It would be interesting to see whether their result can be adapted to
our setting, in which one prover is a single-qubit measurement device. We leave
this as an open problem, to be explored in future work.
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Protocol 1 Modified State Tomography Protocol
Assumptions:
C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3



















Let Mv be a 2 outcome projective measurement defined by the projectors:
1
2
(I + ~v · (X,Y,Z)) and 1
2
(I − ~v · (X,Y,Z)). Let the tuple (~a,~b) ∈ C × C
denote the measurementsMa for prover 1 andMb for prover 2 that they need
to perform on their halves on an entangled state when instructed by the
verifier. Sets of such tuples define CHSH games. For example, as explained
in [31], the set {(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)}×{ 1√
2
(1, 0, 1), 1√
2
(1, 0,−1)} defines an XZ
CHSH game as does the set { 1√
2
(1, 0, 1), 1√
2
(1, 0,−1)}× {(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
Given C, there are six such sets of CHSH games (two XZ, two XY and two
YZ) [31]. For a suitable numbering of these games, we let CHSHi be the
ith type of CHSH game, i ∈ {1, ...6}.
Protocol: Suppose the verifier wishes to certify the preparation of n > 0 resource
states in prover 1’s system. These resource states will be the states used for
the FK protocol (they are |+θ〉 states and |0〉, |1〉 states). Let ng = O(n64)
and N = O(nα−1g ), with α > 32. With probability 1/2, the verifier chooses
to perform one of the following:
(1) CHSH games. The verifier referees 6 groups of Nng sequential CHSH
games between prover 1 and prover 2. Group i contains only CHSH
games of type CHSHi. The order of the games is chosen at random
by the verifier. In other words, from the provers’ perspectives, game j
is equally likely to be any of the 6 possible games. For each group of









(2) State tomography. Let R6 be a random permutation of the elements
{1, ...6}. For j going from 1 to 6, the verifier does the following. She
chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly at random and also chooses CHSHR6(j) as
one of the 6 possible CHSH games. She referees (K−1)ng CHSHR6(j)
games, which can be viewed as (K − 1) rounds, each consisting of
ng CHSH games. In the Kth round, she will send ng questions corre-
sponding to CHSHR6(j) to prover 1, while running a state tomography
protocol with prover 2. In this protocol prover 2 is asked to prepare
resource states by measuring his halves of the shared Bell states. This
will collapse prover 1’s states to the same resource states up to cor-
rections. The verifier uses the measurement outcomes of prover 1 to
tomographically check this preparation. She rejects if the tomography
statistics are inconsistent. For the remaining N −K rounds, she again
referees ng CHSHR6(j) games.
Protocol 2 Composite Verification Protocol
1. Run the modified state tomography protocol (Protocol 1).
2. From the states prepared by this protocol on prover 1’s side, select the input
for FK and run the FK protocol with prover 1.
3.2 Proof of Robustness
In this section we prove the robustness of the FK protocol. We will first look at
how the soundness of the protocol is affected by having a deviated input state
and then examine the simpler case of completeness. To do this, we start by
considering weak robustness, as per Definition 22. Recall that this means that
the input state is ε-deviated but uncorrelated with the prover’s system. We will
then remove this assumption and consider strong robustness.
Lemma 1. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ε-close to the ideal input
state, for some ε ≥ 0, and uncorrelated with the prover’s system, the soundness
bound changes by at most O(ε).
Proof. To prove this, we will incorporate the deviated state into the outcome den-
sity operator from Subsection 2.4.1. Recall that the outcome density operator of
the FK protocol is denoted Bj(ν), where ν denotes the verifier’s secret parameters
and j ranges over the prover’s choices of possible actions (with j = 0 being the
correct/honest action). For a given computation C, the projector associated with
the output state being incorrect and the verifier accepting was the following:
P νincorrect = (I− C |0〉 〈0| C†)⊗
⊗
t∈T




|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | is the state associated with the trap qubits. Note that, un-
like in Subsection 2.4.1, we are considering the more general projector which has
multiple trap qubits, as opposed to just one. Also note that, as we mentioned in
Section 3.1, we are taking the input to the computation to be |0〉 and incorpo-
rating the preparation of an arbitrary input in C. However, what we have been
referring to as the quantum input state of the protocol will be denoted |ψνin〉. This
state has a dependency on the secret parameters, since it consists of the |+θi〉
states that act as computation qubits and traps, as well as the |0〉, |1〉 dummy
qubits. The choices for the angles {θi}i as well as for the values of the dummies
are encoded in ν. The associated probability for accepting an incorrect outcome





which is a weighted average of the incorrect outcome probabilities (expressed by
the trace operator) over all choices of the secret parameters. We now need to
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|0〉 〈0|P ⊗ |ψνin〉 〈ψνin| ⊗
⊗
i
∣∣δbi〉 〈δbi ∣∣ (3.7)
Let us explain the two equations:
• We are tracing over the prover’s qubits.
• b indicates the possible branches of computation parameterised by the mea-
surement results sent by the prover to the verifier. Thus, b denotes classical
information. It should be noted that b denotes measurements performed up
to but excluding the last layer, which is the output of the computation (on
which we perform the projection with P νincorrect).
• cr indicates corrections that need to be performed on the classical output
(the b’s) due to the MBQC computation together with the random phases
introduced by the verifier. In other words b + cr represents the corrected
outcomes (as if we had performed the MBQC computation of C and there
was no need for corrections).
• CνC ,b are the corrections the prover should apply to the output state (i.e.
the final layer in the MBQC computation), depending on the previous mea-
surement outcomes (as well as the verifier’s secret parameters).
• Ω is a unitary map which represents the prover’s deviation from the desired
computation. Technically, Ω should have a dependency on j, but this was
suppressed to simplify the already cumbersome notation. When j = 0,
Ω = I.
• P is the ideal action of the protocol, that the prover should perform in the
honest setting. Mathematically this is expressed as P = (
⊗
i HiZi(δi))EG,
where Zi(δi) is a unitary rotation around the Z axis of the Bloch sphere by δi
radians, and EG is the entanglement operator. This operator corresponds
to performing CZ gates on the provided qubits, according to the graph
structure G. Note that the Zi(δi) operation is symbolic, since P should be
independent of the δi angles. The actual operation is a controlled rotation
around the Z axis, where the control system will be a state of the form |δbi 〉,
contained in σν,b.
• The joint state, comprised of the input state, the prover’s qubits, as well
as the measurement angles δbi , is denoted σ
ν,b. Note that the measurement
angles depend on b, since future angles are adapted based on past measure-
ment outcomes.
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We now need to incorporate the approximate input state into this operator.
For some ε ≥ 0, let ρν be a state, such that:
TD(ρν , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) ≤ ε (3.8)
Instead of using σν,b in the expression for Bj(ν), we will use:
τ ν,b =
⊗
|0〉 〈0|P ⊗ ρν ⊗
⊗
i
∣∣δbi〉 〈δbi ∣∣ (3.9)
Note that:
TD(τ ν,b, σν,b) ≤ ε (3.10)
and that ρν and the prover’s system are in product form (i.e. they are not




|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩ′P τ ν,b P †Ω′†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
(3.11)
Because the input state and the prover’s system are uncorrelated, the state B′j(ν)
can be written as:
B′j(ν) = E(ρν) (3.12)
where E is a CPTP map defined by acting on the state with the honest run of the
protocol, followed by the prover’s deviation, followed by tracing out the prover’s
system. Since CPTP maps cannot increase the trace distance, we have:
TD(Bj(ν), B
′
j(ν)) ≤ TD(ρν , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) ≤ ε (3.13)






j(ν)) ≤ ε (3.14)





j(ν)) ≤ ε (3.15)











We therefore find that:
|Tr(P νincorrectB′j(ν))− Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν))| ≤ 2ε (3.18)
It immediately follows that the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome in
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the case where the input state is deviated, denoted p′incorrect will satisfy:
|p′incorrect − pincorrect| ≤ 2ε (3.19)







which is a convex sum of terms each of which is 2ε-close to a term from the
corresponding expression for pincorrect. Thus, the soundness bound of the protocol
changes by at most 2ε.
We now examine the more general case, in which we make no assumption
about how the input state has been ε-deviated. In this case, the state can be
correlated with the prover’s system. To address this issue, we make use of the
Gentle Measurement Lemma [110,111], which states the following:









More specifically, we will use a corollary of this, that was introduced in [31]:
Corollary 1. Let ρAB be a state in D(HA⊗HB), and let π be a pure state on HA.
If for some δ ≥ 0, Tr(πTrB(ρAB)) ≥ 1− δ, then
TD(ρAB, π ⊗ TrA(ρAB)) ≤ 2
√
δ + δ (3.22)
This will allow us to show the following:
Lemma 2. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ε-close to the ideal input
state, for some ε ≥ 0, the soundness bound changes by at most O(√ε).
Proof. Consider a composite state ρV P ∈ D(HV ⊗HP ), where we identify system
V with the verifier and system P with the prover. Additionally, let:
ρV = TrP (ρV P ) ρP = TrV (ρV P ) (3.23)
The state ρV is the deviated input state of the verifier, which can be correlated
with the prover’s system, ρP . Thus, if the state ρV is used as input for the FK
protocol, the existence of initial correlations can be exploited by an adversarial
prover. This means that the action of the protocol (which includes the prover’s
deviation) can no longer be expressed as a CPTP map over this subsystem. To
characterise the more general deviation, let us first consider:
ρcorr = ρV P − ρV ⊗ ρP (3.24)
Now, assume that the state ρV P evolves under the action of some unitary U . We
will later identify this unitary with the honest action of the protocol and prover’s
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deviation. As it is shown in [104], in the presence of correlations, the evolution
of subsystem ρV is given by:
ρ′V = TrP (UρV PU
†) = TrP (UρV ⊗ρPU †)+TrP (UρcorrU †) = E(ρV )+δρV (3.25)
where E is a CPTP map and δρV is known as an inhomogeneous term which is
added to the CPTP evolution due to the presence of initial correlations. This
inhomogeneous term need not be positive, since it is defined as:
δρV = TrP (UρcorrU
†) (3.26)
We can now see that if we substitute ρV in the outcome density operator of the
FK protocol, and use the above relations (identifying U = PΩCνC ,b), we would
have a term that is identical to the one obtained in Lemma 1, corresponding to
E(ρV ), and a term arising from the inhomogeneous term δρV .
To determine how much this extra term affects the soundness bound, we make
use of the ε-closeness of ρV to the ideal input state |ψνin〉. We first find a bound
for the norm of ρcorr, and since δρV is obtained by tracing out the prover’s system
from ρcorr, the same bound will hold for the norm of δρV as well. The soundness
bound can change by at most the norm of this term. This is because averaging
over the different computational paths (the b’s) and over the verifier’s secret
parameters (the ν’s) cannot increase the norm.
We start by noting that:
TD(ρV , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) ≤ ε (3.27)
for some ε ≥ 0. It is also known, from the relationship between fidelity and trace
distance, that:
1− 〈ψνin| ρV |ψνin〉 ≤ TD(ρV , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) (3.28)
Combining these two yields:
〈ψνin| ρV |ψνin〉 ≥ 1− ε (3.29)
But since Tr(|ψνin〉 〈ψνin| ρV ) = 〈ψνin| ρV |ψνin〉, using Equation 3.29 and Corollary 1
we have:
TD(ρV P , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin| ⊗ ρP ) ≤ 2
√
ε+ ε (3.30)
Now, the trace norm of ρcorr is simply the trace distance between ρV P and ρV ⊗ρP ,
as can be seen from Equation 3.24. Using the triangle inequality, we have:
TD(ρV P , ρV ⊗ ρP ) ≤ TD(ρV P , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin| ⊗ ρP ) + TD(|ψνin〉 〈ψνin| ⊗ ρP , ρV ⊗ ρP )
(3.31)
The second term is simply ε and the first term is upper bounded from Equa-
tion 3.30 so:
TD(ρV P , ρV ⊗ ρP ) ≤ 2
√
ε+ 2ε (3.32)





which is a bound of order O(
√
ε). Therefore, the inhomogeneous term can change
the soundness bound of the FK protocol by at most O(
√
ε). This concludes the
proof.
We now examine the completeness of the protocol.
Lemma 3. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ε-close to the ideal input
state, for some ε ≥ 0, the protocol’s completeness will be lower bounded by 1−2ε.
Proof. As we have seen, the FK protocol can be abstractly thought of as a CPTP
map P , that takes some input state to an output state. Since we are assuming
the prover is honest, the output state, for an ideal (non-deviated) input, will be
B0(ν). In the deviated input case, we will again denote the output state as B
′
0(ν).
Writing these out explicitly we have:
B0(ν) = P(|ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) (3.34)
B′0(ν) = P(ρν) (3.35)
Where, ρν is the deviated input:
TD(ρν , |ψνin〉 〈ψνin|) ≤ ε (3.36)











But Tr(PcorrectB0(ν)) = 1, since the FK protocol (with ideal input state) has
completeness 1. Thus:
|1− Tr(PcorrectB′0(ν))| ≤ 2ε (3.39)
Lastly, because Tr(PcorrectB
′
0(ν)) ≤ 1, we get:
1− 2ε ≤ Tr(PcorrectB′0(ν)) (3.40)
In other words, the probability of accepting a correct outcome, under the assump-
tion that the input state is ε-close to the ideal input, is at least 1− 2ε.
It is now easy to see that the proof of Theorem 3 follows directly from Lem-
mas 2 and 3. Having the robustness property, the FK protocol can receive an
input, which is ε-close to its ideal value, from another protocol. As we have
shown, even if this input is correlated with an external and adversarial system,
we can still perform the verification as long as ε is sufficiently small.
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3.3 Proof of Compositionality
To prove the security of the composite protocol, we first need to prove that the FK
protocol rejects with high probability a state close to a reflection with respect to
the XY-plane (Lemma 4). Then we prove that, excluding the XY-reflected case,
the modified state tomography protocol (Protocol 1), satisfies the ε-closeness
property required by FK. This is shown in Lemma 5.
Lemma 4. The soundness bound of the FK protocol, with ε-deviated input state,
does not change, if the initial input state is ε-close to a reflection along the XY-
plane, of the ideal input state, for some ε ≥ 0.
Proof. Let us denote the reflection operation as RXY. We will first consider the
case in which we have an exact reflection of the ideal input state and then consider
the ε-close case.
Recall that the input to the FK protocol consists of XY-plane states and
dummy qubits which are either |0〉 or |1〉. The XY-plane states are invariant
under the reflection, while the dummy states will be flipped. More formally:
∀θ ∈ [0, 2π],RXY(|+θ〉) = |+θ〉 (3.41)
and:
RXY(|0〉) = |1〉 RXY(|1〉) = |0〉 (3.42)
As in the proof outlined in Subsection 2.4.1, the outcome density operator of the




|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP σν,b P †Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
(3.43)
except this time σν,b is:
σν,b =
⊗
|0〉 〈0|P ⊗RXY (|ψνin〉 〈ψνin|)⊗
⊗
i
∣∣δbi〉 〈δbi ∣∣ (3.44)
We can now go through the proof of the FK protocol, as outlined in Subsec-
tion 2.4.1, noting the changes resulting from having the reflected state. First of
all, Bj(ν) can still be split into a term containing the honest action of the prover
B0(ν) and the complement of this. Of course, in this case, B0(ν) represents the
state obtained when acting with the ideal operators of the protocol on the re-
flected state. Since the computation state remains unaffected, this term will still
be cancelled by P νincorrect. Following the proof, we will have that the probability














〉 〈+νtθ′t | ⊗ (I/Tr(I)))Pm
)
(3.45)
This is similar to the state from expression 2.60, except the trap state has angle
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θ′t instead of θt. The difference is the following:





t = θt +
∑
j∈NDG (t)
(dj ⊕ 1)π (3.46)
where NDG (t) denotes the set of dummy neighbours of trap t in |G〉, and dj is the
value of dummy qubit j. Note that for θ′t the difference stems from the reflection
operator essentially flipping the values of the dummies (dj has become dj ⊕ 1).
Also note that the system containing the computation and dummy qubits is still
the maximally mixed state (just like in expression 2.60). The reason for this is, on
the one hand, because the XY-plane computation states are invariant under RXY,
and on the other hand, because it flips the dummy qubits. But flipping qubits
that were chosen uniformly at random to be either |0〉 or |1〉 does not change the
density matrix associated to this state, which is still the maximally mixed state.
For the identity system, we will, as before, have all terms for which l 6= m be
equal to zero. But, for the trap system, the situation will be slightly different,




p(νt) |+νtθt 〉 〈+ν
t







p(νt) 〈+νtθt |Pl |+ν
t
θ′t
〉 〈+νtθ′t |Pm |+
νt
θt 〉 (3.47)
If θt = θ
′
t then the rest of the proof proceeds as in the normal FK case, since the
above expression will be zero in all but the cases in which l = m, thanks to the
Pauli twirl. So when does θt = θ
′






(dj ⊕ 1) (3.48)
Now note that if |NDG (t)| is even, the two expressions are equal, whereas when
|NDG (t)| is odd, the expressions differ by a one (since we’re working over Z2). For
this latter case, this means that expression 3.47 becomes:∑
νt







We can commute Z and Pl as PlZ = (−1)f(l)ZPl, where f(l) = 0 if Pl and Z























But Ql and Qm are arbitrary Pauli operators, which means we can now use the
Pauli twirl relation so that the above expression is zero when l 6= m. This implies













θt | ⊗ (I/Tr(I)))Pl
)
(3.52)
While this is not a convex combination of Pauli deviations, due to the negative
terms, those terms cannot increase the value of the bound. The important re-
quirement for the proof was to eliminate the so-called “off-diagonal” terms, i.e.
the terms for which l 6= m. Having done so, the above expression, as well as the
one for the case when |NDG (t)| is even, will be upper bounded by 1− 1/N (or 8/9
when considering multiple traps and using the special graph state of [88]) as in
the proof given in Subsection 2.4.1.
We therefore find that the XY-plane reflected input state does not change
the soundness bound of the FK protocol. For the case when the input state is
ε-close to the reflected state, using the same argument as in the robustness proof




Let us now turn our attention to the composite protocol (Protocol 2). As
we mentioned in Subsection 3.1.2, this protocol works by using a modified state
tomography sub-protocol (Protocol 1) to prepare a state (or rather, certify the
preparation of a state) that is ε-close to the ideal state of the FK protocol, or
to its XY-reflected version, and then running the FK protocol. We would like
to show that the modified state tomography sub-protocol does indeed certify the
preparation of the desired state. Before doing so, we first state the definition
of a state tomography protocol3 from [31] and also a theorem concerning such
protocols4.
Definition 23. An XZ (XY, YZ) state tomography protocol is parameterised by
natural numbers q, n and m, with qn ≤ m, a q-qubit POVM Q with at most 2q
outcomes, and a list σ of qn distinct indices from [m]. The protocol involves a
verifier, Eve, and two provers, Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob share a state in
HA ⊗HB. The protocol proceeds as follows:
• Eve’s interaction with Alice has m rounds. In round j, Eve sends Alice
an independent, uniformly random bit, Aj. Alice applies a two-outcome
projective measurement on HA to determine her reply Xj ∈ {0, 1}.
• Eve has one round of interaction with Bob. First, Eve sends Bob the list σ.
Bob returns to Eve a string O1, . . . , On, with the Oj ∈ [2q] determined by
successive 2q-outcome projective measurements on HB.
3Specifically, this is Definition 6.11 from [31]. The original definition was specific to XZ
tomography and we changed it slightly to emphasise this fact and how it can be altered for XY
and YZ tomography, respectively.
4Specifically, this is Theorem 6.17 from [31].
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No other communication is allowed.
Alice’s strategy is ideal, with respect to an isometry UA : HA ↪→ (C2)⊗m⊗H′A,
if in round j of her interaction with Eve, Alice returns the result of measuring
the jth qubit with the Z (X, Y) observable, if Aj = 0, or the X (Y, Z) observable,
if Aj = 1.
Alice and Bob’s joint strategy is ideal, with respect to the isometries UD :
HD ↪→ (C2)⊗m ⊗H′D, D ∈ {A,B}, if Alice’s strategy is ideal with respect to UA
and if
1. The initial state consists of m EPR states in tensor product with a state in
H′A ⊗H′B, and
2. Bob returns the results of measuring with Q each successive block of q qubits
specified in σ.
Theorem 7. Fix Q = {π1, . . . , π2q} a complete, orthonormal set of q-qubit XZ-
determined pure states. For a sufficiently large constant α and for sufficiently
large n, let m = m(n) ≥ qn and N ≥ mα−1. Let σ ∈ [m]qn be a list of distinct in-
dices. Consider a combination of the following two protocols between the verifier,
Eve, and the provers, Alice and Bob:
1. CHSH games: In the first protocol, Eve referees Nm sequential CHSH
games. She accepts if∣∣{j ∈ [Nm] : AjBj = Xj ⊕ Yj}∣∣ ≥ cos2(π/8)Nm− 12√2√Nm log(Nm)
(3.53)
2. State tomography: In the second protocol, Eve chooses K ∈ [N ] uniformly
at random. She referees (K − 1)m CHSH games. For the Kth set, she
referees a state tomography protocol with parameters q, n, m, Q and σ. She
accepts if the following criteria are satisfied:
max
o∈[2q ]
∣∣#{j : Oj = o} − n/2q∣∣ ≤ 4q√n log n (3.54a)
max
o∈[2q ],P∈{I,X,Z}⊗q
|τ o,P − Tr(πoP )| ≤ 4q
√
(log n)/n (3.54b)
The combined protocol satisfies the following completeness and soundness con-
ditions:
Completeness: If Alice and Bob use Nm shared EPR states to play the CHSH
games according to an ideal strategy, and if Bob uses an ideal strategy with
respect to the projections Q on the Kth set of m EPR states in the state
tomography protocol, then in both protocols,
Pr[Eve accepts] ≥ 1−O(n−1/2) (3.55)
Soundness: Assume that for both protocols, Pr[Eve accepts] ≥ 1− n−1/3. Let ρ
be Alice’s state in the second protocol after (K−1)m games and conditioned
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on Bob’s messages
O1, . . . , On. Then there exists an isometry XA : HA ↪→ (C2)⊗m ⊗H′A such
that letting ρσ,j be XAρXA† reduced to Alice’s qubits {σ(j, i) : i ∈ [q]},
Pr
[∣∣{j ∈ [n] : Tr(ρσ,jπOj) ≥ 1−O(n−1/16)}∣∣ ≥ (1−O(n−1/16))n]
≥ 1− 4n−1/12 (3.56)
Here, the probability is over K, the first (K − 1)m games and O1, . . . , On.
Consider now the following corollary to this theorem:
Corollary 2. There is a state tomography protocol for q-qubit XY-determined
(YZ-determined) states, which achieves the same completeness and soundness
bound as the one from Theorem 7.
Proof. The characterisation of the XZ-determined pure states is done up to an
isometry. Indeed, the CHSH game (the self-testing using that game) allows for
the characterisation of Alice and Bob’s measurement operators and shared state
up to an isometry. However, if such an isometry is shown to exist, then, of
course, there are also isometries for any other pair of anti-commuting 2-outcome
observables, such as X and Y or Y and Z. In other words, the result of Theorem 7
holds for XY-determined pure states, as well as YZ-determined pure states.
We can now give the main lemma proving that Protocol 1 certifies the resource
states required for the FK protocol.
Lemma 5. Protocol 1 achieves the following completeness and soundness condi-
tions:
Completeness: If the provers use 6Nng shared EPR states to play the CHSH
games according to an ideal strategy, and if prover 2 performs the instructed
measurements in the state tomography part of the protocol, then:
Pr[verifier accepts] ≥ 1−O(n−1/2g ) (3.57)
Soundness: Provided that the verifier accepts with probability at least 1 −
O(n
−1/3
g ) then, with probability at least 1 − O(n−1/48g ), it is the case that








≤ O(n−1/64g ) (3.58)
where ρS(O1,ng) is the reduced state on prover 1’s system, conditioned on




is the intended resource state. The trace distance is up to an isometry on
the provers’ systems that determines the observables X and Y, whereas Z is
determined up to a reflection.
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Proof. As mentioned, the set C of measurement directions, from Protocol 1,
defines 6 CHSH games between the two provers, Alice (prover 1) and Bob (prover
2). In fact, the 6 games together define an extended CHSH game, as explained
in [31]. The main difference, with respect to [31], is that in that paper, the
authors take the probability of Alice and Bob’s outcomes to be x and y, when
performing the ideal strategy (i.e. measuring |Φ+〉 EPR states along directions
















In our case, we will consider the ideal strategy to be that which arises when
















Recall that the extended CHSH game does not allow the verifier to simultaneously
characterise all three Pauli observables, for the two provers. By this we mean that
there isn’t one isometry, such that Alice and Bob’s observables are isomorphic to
X, Y and Z. Instead, one can find an isometry such that one of the observables
is only characterised up to a reflection with respect to the plane defined by the
other two observables. The choice of |Φ+〉, allows one to characterise X and Z,
while Y is determined up to a reflection. In our case, we choose |Ψ+〉 so that we
can characterise X and Y, while Z is determined up to a reflection. Of course, this
choice is arbitrary, since we could just as well use the XZ version, as long as we
consider an XZ FK protocol (i.e. the |+θ〉 states are substituted with analogous
states from the XZ plane, the dummies are substituted with the eigenstates of
the Y operator and the CZ operations are substituted with CNOTs)5.
In Protocol 1, the verifier will perform a state tomography sub-protocol for
each of the 6 CHSH games. We are primarily interested in the XY ones, where
the verifier is attempting to certify the correct preparation of the resource state:
|+〉 ⊗
∣∣+π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+2π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+3π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+4π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+5π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+6π/4〉⊗ ∣∣+7π/4〉 (3.61)
To keep things symmetric, we will assume that she also certifies the analogous
states for the other games. In particular, for the XZ games, this will include:
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 (3.62)
For each CHSH game and state tomography sub-protocol, we can apply Theo-
rem 7. It was shown in [31] (see Theorem 6.21), that doing so leads to the following
result. Provided that the verifier accepts with probability at least 1 − O(n−1/3g )
5Another way to view things is to note that labels like X, Y, Z are arbitrary. Ultimately, we
are interested in the group theoretic properties of these operations.
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≤ O(n−1/64g ) (3.63)
Where S is a uniformly random subset from the set [n], of size O(n1/64) and
ρS(O1,n) is prover 1’s state (up to an isometry), reduced to the subset S and
conditioned on outcomes O1,n. This is the soundness condition of our lemma.
Completeness also follows from Theorem 7.
Finally, note that in the state tomography sub-protocol, the number of CHSH
games that the verifier runs with the two provers is Nng, where ng = O(|C|64)
and N = O(|C|64(α−1)), for some α > 32. Overall this means that the round
complexity of the protocol will be O(|C|c), for some c > 64 · 32 = 2048.
We are now able to prove of our main result:
Proof of Theorem 5. In the verified preparation stage of the protocol, the verifier
certifies the preparation of the input state for the FK protocol. Assuming that
this consists of n qubits (where n = O(|C|), and C is the quantum computation
that the verifier wishes to delegate), Lemma 5 tells us that that state will be
O(n−1) close to ideal (since, recall that ng = O(n
64)). Then, in the verified
computation stage, the verifier performs the FK protocol, which we have shown
is robust to deviations in the input state.
The completeness of this protocol will be inherited from the modified state
tomography sub-protocol (since FK has completeness 1 in the ideal case). In
other words, in the ideal case, the verifier accepts with probability at least 1 −
O(n
−1/2
g ) = 1−O(n−32). For soundness, we will have that, as long as the verifier
accepts in the preparation stage with probability at least 1 − O(n−64/3), then
she accepts an incorrect outcome of the computation with probability at most
O(n−64/48 ·n−2) = O(n−10/3). The n−2 term comes from the soundness of the FK
protocol when run with an input that is O(n−1)-close to ideal.
3.4 Chapter summary and outlook
We have shown that the single server universal verifiable blind quantum comput-
ing protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi is robust with respect to general deviations
in the quantum input state. We did this by first proving robustness with respect
to deviations that are uncorrelated with the prover’s private system and then gen-
eralising to the case of arbitrary deviations. In the former case, one could express
the action of the protocol as a CPTP map which preserves distances. In the lat-
ter case, this is no longer true since the presence of initial correlations makes the
action of the protocol a non-CPTP map. This general map differs from a CPTP
map by a so-called inhomogeneous term. However, provided that the input state
is ε-close to the ideal FK input, we showed that this inhomogeneous term has
norm bounded by O(
√
ε). Therefore, the contribution of this term can be made
arbitrarily small, by reducing ε. This result complements the local -verifiability
proof of [103] which is based on the universal composability framework.
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Robustness, together with the rigidity result of Reichardt Unger and Vazirani,
allowed us to come up with a device-independent verification protocol involving a
single quantum server and a verifier with an untrusted measurement device. The
resulting protocol is essentially a composition of the entanglement-based RUV
protocol and the prepare-and-send FK protocol. This composite protocol achieves
a lower communication complexity than RUV. This is because it uses only the
(modified) state tomography part of RUV. The communication complexity of the
composite protocol is still far too high to allow for any practical implementation
in the near future. However, the reason for this high round complexity is the state
tomography subprotocol and therefore, any improvement on how to prepare the





Sheldon: Quantum physics makes me so happy.
— The Big Bang Theory, Season 5, Episode 20
In the previous chapter, we saw that a key component of the RUV protocol,
which was also essential for our device-independent protocol, is the rigidity of
non-local correlations. In this chapter, we will prove an analogous rigidity result
for a type of correlations known as EPR-steering (or just steering) correlations.
Along the way, we will also provide a self-testing result for Bell states using
these correlations. We will then show that if the composite protocol, given in the
previous chapter, uses EPR-steering correlations instead of non-local correlations,
this leads to a protocol that is one-sided device-independent.
Figure 4.1: The basic steering setup.
EPR-steering correlations first appeared in the seminal paper of Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen [112] to support their argument that quantum mechanics
is incomplete. In that paper, EPR never explicitly referred to these correlations
as “steering” correlations. This name was given later, by Schrödinger, in [113],
when he identified the defining feature of these correlations. To explain what
that is, let us consider our favourite agents, Alice and Bob. Suppose that Alice
has a single-qubit measurement device, which she trusts completely, and suppose
that Bob sends Alice one qubit. Bob claims to be able to “steer” Alice’s state.
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What this means is that if Alice informs Bob that she wishes to measure her qubit
in a particular basis, Bob can steer her state so as to predict her measurement
outcome in that basis. He convinces Alice by telling her this outcome.
As an explicit example, suppose the qubit that Bob sent to Alice was half of
an EPR state. Let us also assume that Alice wishes to test for steering in the
eigenbases of X and Z. If she tells Bob to steer her state in the X basis, then Bob
simply measures his half of the Bell pair using the X observable and sends the
measurement outcome to Alice. Due to the properties of the Bell state, Alice,
upon measuring her qubit with the X observable will obtain the same outcome as
the one reported by Bob. Her state has been correctly steered in the X eigenbasis.
Similarly, if she had chosen Z, then Bob would have measured the Z observable.
Assuming both parties follow this protocol, Alice will always be convinced of
Bob’s steering abilities. Such correlations, between Bob’s classical response and
Alice’s post-measurement quantum state, are known as steering correlations. This
situations is shown schematically in Figure 4.1.
The study of quantum correlations has progressed a lot since the days of EPR
and Schrödinger and this, in turn, has led to the development of numerous appli-
cations that make use of them. In particular, non-local correlations, apart from
revealing counter intuitive features of nature and being tremendously important
to quantum foundations, have led to the development of device-independent pro-
tocols for quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum random number generation
(QRNG) and quantum verification [30–32, 34, 114–117]. As we’ve seen already
with RUV and the device-independent protocol, non-local correlations allow one
to characterise the behaviour of devices that are completely untrusted, based
solely on the classical outputs of those devices. The characterisation involves de-
termining that the devices are sharing a certain type of entangled state (such as
EPR states) and are measuring them appropriately (for instance, with the Pauli
observables). Such protocols are highly desired for practical implementation as
they provide a higher level of security, unachievable by classical systems. How-
ever, there are certain practical issues that hinder their development, such as the
need for high detection thresholds, high fidelity transmission channels, space-like
separation and a high overhead [114,118].
The practical limitations of device-independent protocols motivated the re-
vival of research into quantum steering, due to its more relaxed trust assump-
tions. The existing research involves the characterisation of steering correlations
both analytically and geometrically [119–121], their relationship to other types of
correlations [122,123] and their application to cryptographic tasks such as QKD
and QRNG [124, 125]. Experiments testing quantum steering inequalities [126]
(loophole-free) and testing local but steerable states [127] have also been per-
formed. In the case of QKD, Branciard et al. showed in [124], that there is a
natural correspondence between the trust assumptions of the protocol and the
types of correlations between the two parties. Using this correspondence, Bran-
ciard et al. introduced one-sided device-independent QKD, which uses steering
correlations in order to distil a shared secret key. In the cryptographic setting,
such correlations allow only one device to be untrusted leading to a reduction
in the overall experimental requirements of the protocol. To be precise, they
showed that in typical device-independent settings, the detection efficiency of
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Alice and Bob should be above 91.1%, whereas their one-sided protocol lowers
that to 65.9%. A similar relation between trust assumptions and correlations is
exploited for QRNG as well [125]. In this case it was shown that a detection effi-
ciency of 50% is sufficient for random number generation in the steering setting,
versus 70.7% in the device-independent setting.
For quantum verification, we will show that using steering correlations leads to
a reduction in communication complexity, compared to the device-independent
protocol. This comes as a direct result of having a trusted measurement de-
vice. As a technical observation, this one-sided device-independent protocol is a
measurement-only verification protocol, according to the terminology defined in
Chapter 2.
Verification takes place in a different setting than both QKD and QRNG. In
the latter two, Alice and Bob are two parties that are working together towards a
common objective (obtaining a shared key or certified randomness), using possibly
untrusted quantum devices. But in the verification setting, Alice is a client who
is delegating a difficult computation to Bob, an untrusted quantum server. Alice
and Bob, in this case, are not collaborating, since the server is assumed to be
malicious and attempting to deceive Alice. This is the standard cryptographic
scenario when considering verification of computation, whether it is quantum
or classical [23, 128]. Interestingly, the asymmetry in trust is similar to that
of steering correlations. In the steering case, Alice interacts with Bob, whom
she does not trust, and attempts to test his ability to steer her state. In the
verification setting, Alice delegates a computation to Bob and attempts to test
his ability to correctly perform that computation. One could thus argue that
verification is a very natural application for steering correlations. While it is
definitely possible to introduce such an asymmetry in QKD, for example, the
traditional setting is to have the parties involved be identical in all respects. A
broader discussion pertaining to the relationship between steering and verification
can be found in [129].
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 is devoted to proving the
rigidity result, which states that from observing maximal steering correlations
between two parties, one can determine, up to a local isometry, that they share a
tensor product of Bell pairs and that the untrusted party is performing the ideal
measurements. To derive this result, we first prove the self-testing of Bell states
and Pauli X and Y measurements1 from steering correlations, in Subsection 4.1.1.
Specifically, we show how from steering correlations one obtains a bound on the
trace distance between the parties’ shared state, and a perfect Bell pair. We also
prove that this bound is optimal, up to constant factors.
It should be noted that we could also use existing self-testing results based
on the CHSH game, rather than proving another self-testing result for Bell pairs.
However, it is important to note that in the setting in which one party is trusted
and the other is not it is not evident that a maximally entangled state can be
self-tested from steering correlations as opposed to non-local correlations. Fur-
1The reason for choosing X and Y is to keep the same setup as in the device-independent
case. Of course, this choice is arbitrary, as our result applies for any pair of anti-commuting
two-outcome observables.
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thermore, the steering-based self-test is simpler and highlights an important dis-
tinction with respect to non-local self tests: in the latter one needs to check that
each party’s observables anti-commute (thus showing that they are equivalent to
the Pauli X and Z observables up to an isometry), whereas in the former this is
not necessary. Knowing that one party is implementing the correct observables
requires us to test only that the observables of the second party behave in the
same way.
The self-testing result, on its own, is not of immediate practical use, since
it involves exact probability distributions and expectation values (the so-called
infinite statistics regime). For a realistic scenario, one should consider a finite
number of observations. But this incurs two difficulties. The first is that we
need to find a way to relate these finite statistics to the ideal quantum expec-
tation values, that are used in the self-testing result. The second is that, in the
most general case, we cannot assume that each observation is independent of
the previous one, at least not for the untrusted party. Both of these aspects are
addressed in Subsection 4.1.2. This latter result does not immediately yield the
desired rigidity theorem, since there is a possibility that the characterised Bell
states overlap2. To solve this problem we leverage the fact that the characterised
states are Bell pairs as well as the fact that Alice is trusted, to derive a tensor
product structure on Bob’s system. This will lead to our rigidity result, which is
described in Subsection 4.1.3.
Lastly, in Section 4.2 we use the rigidity result to construct a one-sided device-
independent verification protocol (Subsection 4.2.1). We also show that in the
verification setting, and specifically for the types of protocols we have considered,
the required entangled states must be close to Bell pairs (Subsection 4.2.2).
4.1 State and strategy certification via steering
While quantum steering has been studied extensively in the context of verify-
ing entanglement, it is important to elaborate on the subtle difference between
verifying entanglement and verifying maximal entanglement and how this relates
to the verification of quantum computations. It has already been shown that
it is possible to certify, from steering correlations, that a state shared between
two parties is entangled. In fact, this type of certification can be done in a fully
device-independent way (under certain assumptions), and has been tested exper-
imentally [130, 131]. However, it should be noted that these results use steering
correlations as a witness for quantum entanglement. The purpose of a witness
is to separate between entangled and non-entangled states and its existence is
proven through the violation of a steering inequality, in analogy to a Bell in-
equality. In our setting, however, we do not simply require correlations that
violate a steering inequality, rather, we require them to achieve close to their
2Overlapping means that the states share common degrees of freedom. As an example,
suppose we have a state |ψ〉 of n qubits and a state |φ〉 of m qubits. If the states have no
overlapping qubits, then |ψ〉 |φ〉 is a state in a 2n+m-dimensional Hilbert space. Otherwise, the
joint state lives in a Hilbert space of dimension strictly less than 2n+m, since there are shared
degrees of freedom.
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maximum possible value. This is analogous to the rigidity of non-local correla-
tions, where one would check that CHSH correlations are close to their maximal
quantum value, and similar to that case, this will enable us to certify the state
and strategies used in producing those correlations.
The setting that we will consider is similar to the one used in [122, 124].
This involves two parties, Alice and Bob, where Alice has a trusted measurement
device, while Bob has an untrusted measurement device. They share an unknown
joint quantum state, |ψ〉, which, without loss of generality, can be assumed to
be pure3. Alice instructs Bob to perform a measurement on their joint state.
For example, if the shared state is |Ψ+〉, Alice can instruct Bob to measure the
Y observable on his qubit and report the outcome. The measurement steers
Alice’s qubit to a particular quantum state. She can then measure her state
to confirm that her qubit was indeed steered to the expected state. This setup
defines a steering game, in analogy to non-local games, mentioned in Chapter 2
(Subsection 2.1.3).
We know that non-local correlations are correlations that cannot be explained
by a local hidden variable model. In keeping with the analogy to non-locality,
in our case, the correlations between Alice and Bob’s responses, given certain
input questions, are steering correlations if they cannot be explained by a local
hidden state model. Alternatively, in analogy to Bell inequalities, there are so-
called steering inequalities. Whenever the expectation values of Alice and Bob’s
observables violate a steering inequality, this again indicates that Bob is able to
steer Alice’s state. Throughout this chapter, we will use the steering inequality
as our “steering test” as opposed to local hidden state models. For a derivation of
a similar self-testing result, using local hidden state models, see the independent
result of Šupić and Hoban that appeared on the arXiv around the same time as
our result [133].
Our main objective, in this section, is to show that if Alice and Bob violate
a steering inequality close to maximally (i.e. up to order O(ε)), this allows us
to determine that their shared state is a tensor product of Bell pairs and that
their measurements are close to the ideal Pauli measurements. The proof of this
rigidity result goes as follows. First, building on the work regarding self-testing
the singlet by McKague, Yang and Scarani [134], we derive a robust self-testing
result of the |Ψ+〉 Bell state from steering correlations. This will then allow us
to characterise a tensor product of Bell pairs, under an i.i.d. assumption. We
also show that the closeness bound, for self-testing the EPR state, is tight, up to
constant factors. All of this is covered in Subsection 4.1.1.
Then, in Subsection 4.1.2, we remove the i.i.d. assumption by modelling the
measurement process as a martingale and using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
[135, 136], as is also done in [34, 116]. The way in which we remove the i.i.d.
assumption is not specific to steering and can be applied to the non-local setting
as well, thus complementing the work of McKague, Yang and Scarani. Our
rigidity result then follows from the non-i.i.d. characterisation and ideas inspired
3To be more precise, if HA is Alice’s Hilbert space and HB is Bob’s Hilbert space, their
shared state, ρ, could be mixed. But one can always take such a mixed state to the Church of
the Larger Hilbert space [132] (i.e. a purification of the state). Hence, we view the state |ψ〉 as
belonging to HA ⊗HB ⊗HC , where HC is a space associated with the purification of ρ.
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from [31]. This is covered in Subsection 4.1.3.
Throughout this chapter we denote || |ψ〉 || =
√
〈ψ |ψ〉 as the l2-norm of a
state |ψ〉. Additionally, for the trace distance of pure states we will often write
TD(|ψ〉 , |φ〉), to mean TD(|ψ〉 〈ψ| , |φ〉 〈φ|).
4.1.1 Self-testing from steering correlations
Recall that in self-testing, we examine the correlations in the responses of players
of a non-local game and from these correlations we determine two things:
• That their shared quantum state is close to some target quantum state.
• That they are performing local measurements on this state and their mea-
surement operators are close to some target measurement operators (when
acting on the target state).
What changes in the steering setting? As explained, the difference is that we
will know, a priori, Alice’s (the trusted party) measurement operators, as well as
the local dimension of the quantum state she is measuring (or, in other words,
the dimension of her Hilbert space HA). Thus, self-testing in the steering setting
involves determining the shared state between her and Bob as well as Bob’s
measurement operators.
The target shared state that we wish to characterise will be the XY-determined
|Ψ+〉 Bell state, and the target observables for Bob will be the Pauli X and
Y observables. The result can, of course, be generalized for any pair of anti-
commuting observables and any Bell state. It should be noted, that our steering
game will involve Alice and Bob measuring only Pauli X and Y and not observables




2, as one would consider for the CHSH game.
This leads to an interesting observation: a Bell state has a local hidden variable
model for Pauli basis measurements by both parties, but it does not have a local
hidden state model. This highlights the difference between non-local and steering
correlations and emphasizes the importance of trusting Alice’s system in order to
characterise the shared state and Bob’s measurements.
We start by proving a theorem analogous to Theorem 1 of [134], allowing us
to characterise the shared state of Alice and Bob, given bounds on the action of
their observables on that state. Just as in [134], the primed observables denote
untrusted operators. The shared state, which is also assumed to be untrusted is
denoted as |ψ〉.
Theorem 8. Suppose that from the observed correlations of measurements per-
formed by Alice and Bob and knowing that Alice is measuring the {X, Y} observ-
ables (denoted XA, YA), one can deduce the existence of local observables {X′B,
Y′B} on Bob’s side, with eigenvalues ±1, which act on a bipartite state |ψ〉 such
that:
||(XA − X′B) |ψ〉 || ≤ γ1, (4.1)
||(YA − Y′B) |ψ〉 || ≤ γ1, (4.2)
||(X′BY′B + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 || ≤ γ2. (4.3)
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for some γ1, γ2 ≥ 0. Then there exists a local isometry Φ = I ⊗ ΦB and a state
|junk〉B such that∣∣∣∣Φ(MAN ′B |ψ〉)− |junk〉BMANB |Ψ+〉AB∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε (4.4)








Figure 4.2: The local isometry Φ = IA ⊗ ΦB.
Proof sketch. The proof relies on finding an isometry which, given conditions (4.1-
4.3), maps |ψ〉 to an almost perfect Bell state. Similar to [134], MA and N ′B are
the physical observables of Alice and Bob which act on the shared state. The
isometry we considered is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where P = 1√
2
(X + Y) and the
control gates act on the target state when the control qubit is in the |−y〉 state
instead of the |1〉 state, and act as identity when the control is in the |+y〉 state
instead of the |0〉 state. Here, |+y〉 and |−y〉 are the two eigenstates for the Pauli
Y operator, corresponding to the +1 and −1 eigenvalues, respectively. The fact
that we are using these states and the P operator is a consequence of shifting
everything to the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere instead of the more familiar XZ-
plane. It should be noted that MA is trusted and acts on Alice’s part of the
shared state, whereas N ′B, acting on Bob’s part of |ψ〉, is untrusted. However,
the action of N ′B is equivalent to the honest NB acting on the ancilla introduced
by Φ. Having the isometry, we write out its action on the state MAN
′
B |ψ〉 and use
inequalities (4.1-4.3) together with the trace preserving properties of the operators
and triangle inequalities to prove condition 4.4. The full proof of Theorem 8 can
be found in Section 4.3.
Our next result is to show that conditions (4.1-4.3) are satisfied if an almost
maximal violation of a particular steering inequality occurs. As mentioned be-
fore, the requirement for maximal violation is in contrast to previous work on
entanglement detection. In that case, one uses the steering inequality as an en-
tanglement witness to separate the space of correlations into steering correlations
and their complement. Violating the inequality determines that the shared state
can produce steering correlations and is therefore entangled. For example, similar
to the works of [137, 138], assuming Bob measures local observables X′B and Y
′
B,
one could consider the inequality:




This inequality holds, whenever there is a local hidden state model for Bob’s
system. If this is not the case, then the state is steerable. In our case, we do
not simply require a violation of this inequality, we require a (close to) maximal
violation. The maximum value that the left-hand side of 4.5 can take is 2 and this
is both the algebraic maximum as well as the maximum achievable in quantum
mechanics. When this quantity is close to its maximum, we say that the steering
inequality is being saturated and we write that as:
| 〈ψ|XAX′B + YAY′B |ψ〉 | ≥ 2− ε (4.6)
for some ε ≥ 0.
Before giving the self-testing result, let us clarify the game that we wish Alice
and Bob to play. A referee will instruct Alice and Bob to either both measure
the X observable on their local systems or to both measure the Y observable,
and report their outcomes. They win the game if their outcomes match in both
cases4. Assume that the referee chooses between the two situations with equal
probability. In that case, the steering inequality 4.5 expresses the fact that any
local strategy of Alice and Bob can succeed with probability at most 1/
√
2. On
the other hand, it is clear that if Alice and Bob share a Bell state and perform
the instructed measurements, then their winning probability is 1. What our self-
testing result shows is that the converse is also true, in a robust sense. In other
words, if Alice and Bob win with probability close to 1, then, up to an isometry,
their shared state is close to a Bell pair and Bob’s observables are close to the
ideal X and Y observables. Thus, our self-testing result is the following:
Theorem 9. Suppose Alice measures the observables XA, YA and that Bob mea-
sures the observables X′B and Y
′
B with eigenvalues ±1, on the state |ψ〉, such
that
| 〈ψ| (XAX′B + YAY′B) |ψ〉 | ≥ 2− ε (4.7)
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Then the conditions of Theorem 8 are satisfied with γ1 =
√
2ε
and γ2 = 4
√
ε.
Proof sketch. The proof entails expanding the left-hand side of inequality 4.7
and using the properties of the observables, to arrive at the bounds (4.1-4.3)
from the previous theorem. More specifically, we see that the correlation of local
observables that we consider:
| 〈ψ| (XAX′B + YAY′B) |ψ〉 | (4.8)
is simply a sum of two expectation values which are upper bounded by unity (be-
cause the observables have ±1 eigenvalues). Hence, to saturate the absolute value
of this quantity, it must be the case that both expectation values are saturated
i.e. lower bounded by 1− ε or upper bounded by −1 + ε. We will only examine
the first case since the second is analogous, so we will drop the absolute value of
4Alternatively, they win the game if their outcomes are opposite in both cases. This is
because we are taking the absolute value of the left-hand side of inequality 4.5, so the outcomes
can either both be correlated or both be anti-correlated.
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the expression and simply consider:
〈ψ|XAX′B + YAY′B |ψ〉 ≥ 2− ε (4.9)
By expressing each expectation as an l2-norm we arrive at conditions 4.1 and 4.2.
To prove condition 4.3 we use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the commu-




B], respectively. The full proof can be found in Sec-
tion 4.4.
Our self-testing result shows that if Alice and Bob saturate the steering in-
equality up to order ε, their shared state is certain to be O(
√
ε)-close to a Bell
pair and Bob’s observables are O(
√
ε)-close to the ideal X, Y observables, up to
the local isometry Φ = IA⊗ΦB. The exact bound for closeness can be computed
by simply inserting the constants γ1 and γ2 from Theorem 9 in the calculation





The same asymptotic bound of O(
√
ε) is achieved in the case of the CHSH
game. One could expect that, unlike the case of non-local correlations, where
both parties are untrusted, in the steering case it should be possible to obtain a
tighter bound for the shared state and Bob’s observables. We prove that this is
not the case and that the O(
√
ε) bound is tight:
Theorem 10. Suppose that Bob’s observables X′B and Y
′
B with eigenvalues ±1,
acting on a state |ψ〉, are such that:
| 〈ψ| (XAX′B + YAY′B) |ψ〉 | ≥ 2− ε (4.10)
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Then, up to constant factors, the bound of Theorem 8 (i.e.
inequality 4.4 with ε = O(
√
ε)) is tight.
Proof sketch. The proof relies on finding a shared state and local observables for
Bob such that inequality 4.7 holds, but the state is Θ(
√
ε)-close to an ideal Bell
state. We provide such a state, which is exactly
√
ε-close to the ideal |Ψ+〉 Bell
state. We also provide observables for Bob, that are
√
ε-close to the ideal observ-
ables, and which, together with the shared state, achieve the desired correlation of
2− ε. The specific state and Bob’s local observables are given in Section 4.5.
An important corollary to the three theorems we have stated, is the following:
Corollary 3. The results of Theorems 8, 9 and 10 hold for any pair of anti-
commuting observables, V and W , having eigenvalues ±1 (instead of X and Y).
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 8 we only made use of the anti-commutation
properties of the X, Y observables on Alice’s side as well as the action of the
two operators on the eigenstates of Y. For general observables, V and W this
translates to using their anti-commutation properties and the action of the two
on the eigenstates of W , for example. Essentially the proof of Theorem 8 only
changes by relabelling XA as VA and YA as WA. On Bob’s side, the situation is






B we again have conditions (4.1-4.3)
for these observables, which are then used to construct the isometry and prove
the result of Theorem 8. Of course, instead of the |Φ+〉 Bell state, we will simply
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have a different Bell state. To be more precise, there exists a unitary U , such
that UXU † = V and UYU † = W , up to an isometry. The Bell state determined
by V and U will be |η〉 = U ⊗ U |Φ+〉.
For Theorem 9, using the same relabelling we have the inequality:
| 〈ψ|VAV ′B +WAW ′B |ψ〉 | ≥ 2− ε (4.11)
Since the proof of Theorem 9, like Theorem 8, relies only on the anti-commutation
properties and the action of the observables on the eigenstates of one of them,
the relabelling does not change the results.
Lastly, for Theorem 10, the
√
ε-close state we consider will be the same as in
Theorem 10 rotated by U ⊗U . This state will be √ε-close to |η〉 and also satisfy
inequality 4.11. Similarly, we will consider Bob’s observables from Theorem 10
and conjugate them by U .
The self-testing result (Theorem 9) assumes ideal expectation values for the
observables of Alice and Bob. Of course, in practice, after performing a finite
number of measurements we merely obtain an estimate of these expectation val-
ues. The closeness of this estimate to the true expectations values can be deter-
mined by modelling the measurement process using independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables and using a Chernoff bound. We do not
give a full derivation of this here, since we will treat the more general case of
non-i.i.d. random variables in the next section (for which the proof can be found
in Section 4.6). Instead, we simply state the result: for a fixed ε > 0, we require
at least (1/ε2)log(1/ε) measurements in order to certify that the closeness of each
shared state is O(
√
ε) to a perfect Bell pair. One can also compute the number
of measurements as a function of the desired trace distance for the Bell states.
If we denote this distance as D = c
√
ε, then the number of measurements must
be at least (2c4/D4)log(c/D). In our case c ≈ 12.3, so that if we wanted the
trace distance to be, for instance, D = 0.1, we would require at least 2.2 × 109
measurements.
4.1.2 Finite statistics in the non-i.i.d. case
In this subsection, we will consider the case of having a finite number of obser-
vations in our steering scenario, without assuming independence for the random
variables that model the measurement process. The following theorem essentially
states that if Alice and Bob are asked to perform several rounds of measurement,
in sequence, and if we notice a close to maximal steering inequality violation from
their outcomes, then we can conclude that the state shared in a typical round of
measurement is close to a Bell pair. By “typical round” we mean a round that is
chosen uniformly at random. A similar result is obtained in [139], for non-local
rather than steering correlations, and with the additional difference that their
result shows that at least one state (as opposed to a typical state) is close to an
ideal Bell pair.
From now on, we will assume that Alice is the one instructing Bob on what
to measure, rather than having a referee instruct both of them. This is because,
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since Alice is trusted, we might as well have her take on the role of referee as
well. Additionally, to simplify the notation we will be using, we will be denoting
Alice and Bob’s observables as A0, A1 and B0, B1, respectively. The correlator
we will be interested in becomes:
| 〈A0B0 + A1B1〉 | (4.12)
The notation Tr−i(·) indicates that we are tracing out everything apart from the
quantum states that are measured in round i. We also use the notation Tr−R(·),
which generalizes the previous notation for a set, R, of rounds (i.e. tracing out
all states except those which are used in rounds i ∈ R).
Theorem 11. Suppose Alice and Bob are required to perform K rounds of mea-
surement and also that:
• The initial shared state of Alice and Bob, prior to the K rounds of mea-
surement, is denoted σ5.
• Alice chooses a random set of size K/2, consisting of distinct indices from
1 to K and denoted R0 = {i|i ∈R {1, ...K}}, |R0| = K/2. We also denote
R1 = {1, ...K}\R0, to be the complement of R0. R0 will consist of those
rounds in which Alice should measure A0 and Bob B0, while R1 will consist
of those rounds in which Alice should measure A1 and Bob B1.
• We denote ρi = Tr−i(EAB1,i−1(σ)) to be the reduced state of Alice and Bob in







to be the typical state that we are interested in. This is simply the average
of all reduced states, for all rounds. Here, EAB1,i−1 denotes the actions (pro-
jections resulting from measurements) of Alice and Bob on the state σ up
to and excluding round i.
• In round i, let ri = 0 iff i ∈ R0, otherwise ri = 1. Alice measures the
observable Ari on her half of ρi. A0 and A1 are anti-commuting single-qubit
observables having ±1 eigenvalues.
• In round i, Bob is asked to measure Bri. B0 and B1 have ±1 eigenvalues6.
• We denote ai and bi, respectively, as the outcomes of their measurements
in round i. We also denote Ĉi = aibi as their correlation for round i.
5In the ideal setting, in which Bob is honest and prepared the correct state, σ would be a
2K-qubit state consisting of K Bell pairs.
6Note that Bob’s observables B0 and B1 are not assumed to anti-commute. This will be
derived, however, from steering correlations.
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Ĉi as the averaged correla-
tions for the cases where both Alice and Bob are asked to measure the first
observable, or both are asked to measure the second, respectively.
If, for some given ε > 0 and suitably chosen K = Ω((1/ε2)log(1/ε)), it is the case
that Ĉ0 + Ĉ1 ≥ 2 − ε (or, alternatively, Ĉ0 + Ĉ1 ≤ −2 + ε) then there exists a
local isometry Φ = IA ⊗ ΦB and a state ρjunk, on Bob’s system, such that:
TD(Φ(OAB(ρavg)), ÔAB(
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣)ρjunk) ≤ O(√ε) (4.14)
where OAB denotes the action of the I, A0, A1, B0, B1 operators and ÔAB is the
analogous action of the ideal operators (i.e. I,XA,YA,XB,YB), as in Theorem 8.
Proof sketch. To prove this result, we first show that the average observed cor-
relations Ĉ0 and Ĉ1 approximate the ideal quantum correlation for the averaged
state, Tr(A0B0ρavg) and Tr(A1B1ρavg). The averaged state can be thought of
as the state shared by Alice and Bob in each round of measurements, such that
the average correlations of outcomes from this state match those observed in the
real experiment (i.e. Ĉ0 and Ĉ1). Proving this step is done along similar lines
to the approaches of [34, 116]. The measurement process of Alice and Bob is
treated as a stochastic process with bounded increment, i.e. a martingale. The
specific martingale we consider encodes the correlations of their measurement
outcomes. While the individual measurements need not be independent, we can
still prove that this observed correlation is, with high probability, close to the
ideal quantum correlation. To do this, we use the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
for martingales [135,136]. To ensure that the probability is indeed high, we need
to take K = Ω((1/ε2)log(1/ε)). Having an estimate for the ideal quantum cor-
relations then allows us to use Theorem 9 to show the closeness of the averaged
state to an ideal Bell state. The full proof is given in Section 4.6.
As in the i.i.d. case, for a fixed ε > 0, we will require Ω((1/ε2)log(1/ε))
measurements to determine the closeness of a typical state to a perfect Bell pair
up to order O(
√
ε). One could ask whether we can use this result to conclude
that the initial state σ is O(K
√
ε)-close to a tensor product of Bell pairs. The
answer is no. First of all, our result only guarantees that a typical state is close to
a Bell pair, not that the state used in each round is close to a Bell pair. Secondly,
even if that were so, this would not guarantee that the Bell states determined in
each round do not overlap on Bob’s side. In other words, the qubits that Bob
measures in round i could overlap with the qubits in round j, with i 6= j. In
reality this cannot happen, however the result we have proven does not rule out
this possibility. The determination of a tensor product structure of Bell pairs is
done in the next section.
It should be noted that in the proof of Theorem 11, we did not use the fact that
Alice is trusted except when applying the self-testing result (Theorem 9). Thus, a
similar theorem can be proven in the case where both Alice and Bob are untrusted.
In that case, one could simply use the self-testing results of [32,134,140,141] for
the i.i.d. setting, and then obtain a statement about the closeness of a typical
state to the ideal one in the non-i.i.d. setting using our techniques. For example,
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if we were to use Theorem 2 from [134] we could once again establish from the
measurement statistics that a typical state shared by Alice and Bob is close to a
Bell state. This result completes the work of [134] for the non-i.i.d. setting.
It should additionally be noted that throughout this section we not only as-
sumed that Alice’s device is trusted but that it also measures the Pauli operators
exactly. This could seem unreasonable from an experimental perspective, however
note that any (fixed) deviation on Alice’s measurement operator can be incorpo-
rated into ε. In other words, assume Alice’s ideal operator is A and the deviated
one is δA, such that:
TD(A⊗B |ψ〉 , δA⊗B |ψ〉) < δ (4.15)
It is thus the case that the action of Alice’s operators is δ-close to the action of the
ideal operators which produce ε saturation. Hence, δ can be added to ε and viewed
as a contribution to the total variation from maximal correlations. However, if
such a deviation exists we should consider what happens when δ ≤ ε and when
δ > ε, respectively. If δ ≤ ε, then the error on Alice’s device is smaller than
the precision with which we wish to estimate the saturation of the correlations.
Therefore, the saturation can still be considered of order O(ε) and the bounds
on the states follow as in the ideal case. However, if δ > ε then the saturation
cannot be estimated within the desired precision. This means that there will be
an intrinsic limitation on the determined closeness of the shared states, given by
δ.
4.1.3 Rigidity of quantum steering
We now proceed to prove rigidity of quantum steering games. As mentioned, we
will essentially have the same setting as in the non-i.i.d. case of Theorem 11,
except we are interested in determining a tensor product of Bell states for the
state shared by Alice and Bob. We do this by first defining a K-round steering
game. We will then ask Alice and Bob to play N such games, and show that a
state comprising of typical states from each of the K-round games is close to N
Bell pairs.
Definition 24. We say that a game consisting of players Alice and Bob is a
K-round steering game with threshold T ≤ K iff the following conditions are
satisfied:
• Alice and Bob share a joint unknown quantum state |ψ〉.
• The game has K rounds.
• In round i, Alice measures observable Ari, while Bob is instructed to measure
Bri, with ri ∈R {0, 1}7.
7The notation a ∈R S indicates that a was chosen uniformly at random from the set S.
In essence, a is a random variable whose possible values are given by the elements of S, each
occurring with probability 1/|S|. In our case, ri is chosen at random from {0, 1} so that it is
equally likely to be either 0 or 1.
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• Alice’s measurement device is fully trusted to perform the correct measure-
ment, moreover she has a complete characterisation of the device’s Hilbert
space (which is assumed to be 2-dimensional).
• Alice and Bob win round i iff their outcomes are identical.
• Alice and Bob win the game iff they win at least T rounds.
We now define the correlation value of the game.
Definition 25. Let W be the number of rounds that Alice and Bob win in a K-
round steering game. The correlation value for the game is defined as the fraction
W/K.
It is useful to make the following observation: if we assume that Alice and
Bob are measuring the same state, |φ〉, in each round, then the correlation value
of the game would be:
1
2
〈φ|A0B0 + A1B1 |φ〉 (4.16)
In general, however, this might not be the case, since Bob is free to use any state
in each round. Instead, in accordance with Theorem 11, the correlation value of
the game is an estimate for the correlation of the averaged state. We can now
state our rigidity theorem:
Theorem 12. Suppose Alice and Bob play N > 0 K-round steering games, each
having correlation value at least 1 − ε, with ε > 0 and K = Ω(1/ε2log(1/ε)).
Additionally, let σ be the initial state shared between Alice and Bob, R be a set
consisting of N random indices, one from each of the K-round steering games
and ρ = Tr−R(σ) to be the state shared by Alice and Bob in those rounds.











where OAB denotes the action of the I, A0, A1, B0, B1 operators and ÔAB is the
analogous action of the ideal operators (i.e. I,XA,YA,XB,YB), as in Theorem 8.
Proof sketch. First, note that the typical state of each K-round steering game will
be a state of the form of ρavg from Theorem 11, which we know is O(
√
ε)-close
to a Bell state (additionally, Bob’s measurement operators acting on that state
are close to the ideal operators). As mentioned, while we have N such states, we
cannot immediately argue that ρ is close to a tensor product of Bell states, since
the qubits on Bob’s side could overlap (see Figure 4.3). We want to show that
this cannot happen and that his state effectively consists of N halves of EPR
states, in tensor product with some junk state.
There are a number of ways to show this. In the paper which is the basis
for this chapter [33], we proved this result using a technique inspired from RUV.
The idea of that technique is to show that the strategy that Alice and Bob
employ in the N games is close to a strategy in which Bob is performing the
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(a) Ideal case in which Bob’s qubits are not
overlapping. Alice and Bob share a tensor
product of Bell states.
(b) Some of Bob’s qubits are overlap-
ping. Alice and Bob are not sharing
the intended state.
Figure 4.3
ideal measurements, which, in turn, is close to the ideal strategy in which Bob
performs the ideal measurements and the shared state is |Ψ+〉⊗NAB . However, that
technique is unnecessarily complicated for the steering setting, in which we have
a full characterisation of Alice’s system and her operators. We can therefore give
a simpler proof that makes use of this fact.
The proof goes as follows. We know that for each typical state in a K-round
steering game, the shared state of Alice and Bob is close to a Bell pair. Take the
shared state of all selected rounds, ρ. We know that Tr−i(ρ) ≈ |Φ+〉 ⊗ ρjunki ,
for each round i, and for some ρjunki on Bob’s system. Using the fact that
Alice’s Hilbert space is in tensor product form across the different rounds HA =
HA1 ⊗HA2 ⊗ ...⊗HAN allows us to apply a version of the Gentle Measurement
Lemma on her and Bob’s systems. This allows us to show that their shared state
is O(N
√
ε)-close to |Ψ+〉⊗NAB , up to a local isometry on Bob’s system. The proof
is provided in Section 4.7.
Let us also comment on two other alternatives for proving this result. The first
is to use the results on overlapping qubits by Chao et al. [142,143]. For a typical
round, Bob’s measurement operators will be close to Alice’s ideal measurement
operators on the shared state. We also know, since we have a characterisation of
Alice’s system, that her operators anti-commute when acting on the same qubit
and commute with all operators acting on different qubits. Therefore, Bob’s
operators will behave the same way, up to order O(
√
ε). But having a system of
N pairs of such operators (X and Y), characterises a system of N qubits. One can
then show that the state shared by Alice and Bob is O(N
√
ε)-close to a tensor
product of Bell pairs, up to a local isometry on Bob’s system.
The second approach (suggested by Matty Hoban) is the following. Let
ρA1A2B, be the state of Alice and Bob for two chosen rounds, each from a sep-
arate K-round steering game. We know that ρA1B is close to a Bell pair and
we also know that ρA2B is close to a Bell pair. Additionally, we know that
HA1 ⊗HA2 = C4. The idea is to then consider ρA1B to be the Choi state associ-
ated to a channel Θ1 : D(HB)→ D(HA1 ⊗Hjunk1) and ρA2B to be the Choi state
associated to a channel Θ2 : D(HB) → D(HA2 ⊗Hjunk2). Since the Choi states
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are close to Bell pairs, together with some junk states, the channels Θ1 and Θ2
will be close to channels that act as identity on the A1 and A2 systems, while
acting as preparations of fixed states on the junk systems. This would then imply
that the channel associated to ρA1A2B, Θ3 : D(HB) → D(HA1 ⊗ HA2 ⊗ Hjunk3)
would also act as identity on the A1A2 system. But now, if dim(HB) < 4, then
this channel can be used to implement an approximate cloning map (from B to
A1A2). For sufficiently small ε, this would be ruled out by a robust version of
the no-cloning theorem [144]. This would then imply that the state ρA1A2B must
be close to two Bell pairs, together with an additional junk system. One would
then apply this argument inductively to recover the tensor product of N Bell
pairs.
What can one say about the optimality of this closeness bound? In the single-
state case, we were able to show that the bound obtained for our self-testing result
is optimal, up to constant factors. Is this also true for the rigidity result? We
conjecture that the answer is yes. To prove this, we would have to find a state ρ
such that the reduced state in each round is O(
√
ε)-close to a Bell pair, while ρ
itself is O(N
√
ε)-close to a tensor product of N Bell pairs. The natural choice is
to take N approximate Bell states, i.e. a tensor product of N states, such that
each state is O(
√
ε)-close to a Bell pair. However, this is not good enough. One
can show that this state is, in fact, O(
√
Nε)-close to a tensor product of N Bell
states. It would therefore seem that if the state that we are looking for exists, it
would have to be entangled across the N rounds.
Figure 4.4: Obtained trace distance between ρ and a tensor product of N Bell
pairs, for N = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
√
ε ∈ [0.01, 0.1].












where Πi is a projection on a |Ψ+〉 for the state in round i. We solved this SDP for
the cases of N = 1, 2, 3, 4 Bell pairs. Larger values of N required more memory
than was available on our local machine. Nevertheless, the results were clear. In





ε ranging between [0.01, 0.1]. This is ilustrated in Figure 4.4. Moreover, in
each case the state ρ had a particular structure hinting at a general form. We
plotted the density matrices (for fixed
√
ε = 0.1) in each of the three considered
cases (see Figure 4.5). Each block in the image represents an entry of the density
matrix, when expressed in the computational basis. Large entries are yellow to
orange in color, whereas smaller entries are blue. Note the fractal-like pattern
in the density matrix as we increase the number of states. The code for our
SDP solver8 is provided in Appendix A (Listing A.1). Based on these results, we
conjecture that the O(N
√
ε) bound is optimal, up to constant factors.
(a) ρ for N = 2. (b) ρ for N = 3.
(c) ρ for N = 4.
Figure 4.5
Since the closeness of the N -round state to N Bell pairs is of order O(N
√
ε), to
8In our SDP solver we considered the |Φ+〉 Bell state, instead of |Ψ+〉, but this does not
affect the validity of the results.
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obtain a decreasing error, we require ε = O(N−2). We also know from Theorem 11
that given ε, the number of games required is of order K = Ω((1/ε2)log(1/ε)).
Therefore, we must have that K = Ω(N4log(N)). Since each steering game is
comprised of K rounds, we have KN rounds in total, or Ω(N5log(N)) rounds of
steering games. This will be the preparation complexity for the quantum state
used in the FK protocol.
4.1.4 Comparison with other approaches
Before presenting the quantum verification application of our rigidity result, we
briefly compare our approach to similar results. The literature on self-testing has
become quite vast, since the concept was introduced, so we will only mention
results that are very closely related to ours. As mentioned, this paper builds on
the work of self-testing the singlet of McKague et al [134]. While we use similar
techniques to theirs, we assume that Alice is trusted and thus arrived at an
improved bound for the closeness of |ψ〉 to an ideal Bell pair (O(√ε) vs O(ε1/4)).
Of course, there are self-testing results, in the non-local case, achieving the same
bound, such as [31] or [139]. Our optimality result (Theorem 10) applies to these
as well, showing that one cannot improve the asymptotic closeness of this bound.




ε+ε/2, which is smaller
compared to that of [31], approximately 270
√
ε. The result of [139] obtained nu-
merically an even smaller factor of
√
2.2ε by using a semidefinite program. Their
technique could, in principle, be used to improve our approach as well. We also
mention the result of Šupić and Hoban [133], which appeared concurrently with
our own. They also consider the case of self-testing from steering correlations,
obtaining an analytic bound of 13
√
ε and a numeric bound of 1.19
√
ε.
Furthermore, [139] also considers removing the i.i.d. assumption. Their ap-
proach is based on hypothesis testing, however the end result is to show that at
least one state, out of all measured states, was close to a perfect Bell pair. As
previously specified, our Theorem 11 establishes that a typical state, out of all
measured states, was close to a perfect Bell pair. This is necessary in order to
prove the rigidity result and certify the tensor product structure of Bell pairs.
For the rigidity of steering correlations, in the publication that is the basis
for this chapter [33], we employed an approach similar to that of [31], that re-
lied on showing the closeness of measurement strategies. Here, however, we used
the simpler approach of utilizing the Gentle Measurement Lemma and leverag-
ing the tensor product structure of Alice’s system. Our result, as well as other
results for characterising N Bell states, such as [31, 143], are self-testing results
in which ε is polynomial in 1/N . In the terminology introduced in Chapter 2,
these are self-tests with polynomial robustness. A recent result by Natarajan
and Vidick [36] provides a self-test with constant robustness. This was used to
develop entanglement-based verification protocols having quasi-linear communi-
cation complexity [36, 106]. The protocol from [106], of Coladangelo et al., has
a similar structure to our device-independent verification protocol as well as the
one-sided device-independent one (consisting of two stages, one for certifying en-




4.2.1 Verification based on steering correlations
There are two ways in which we can construct our verification protocol. The first
is identical to the device-independent case. Specifically, the verifier will first run
a state tomography sub-protocol in order to check for the correct preparation of
Bell states and then measure a subset of these states, to remotely prepare the
input of the FK protocol, for the server. She would then run that protocol with
the server, thus delegating the quantum computation.
The second approach is to have the verifier randomly choose between a testing
phase, which certifies the tensor product of Bell states and the verified compu-
tation. To be more precise, the verifier will ask the prover to prepare the shared
Bell states and then decide to either check this preparation, or measure her halves
of the shared states so as to remotely prepare the FK state and then run the FK
protocol. It might seem, at first, that this latter approach is not well suited for a
practical implementation, the reason being that if the server has to prepare and
send the shared state, before the verifier makes her choice, then she would have
to store her half of the state for when she chooses how to measure it. Depending
on whether she decides to test the state or run the computation, she would then
measure the qubits appropriately and instruct the server to do the same. But
storing the states would require her to have a quantum memory of the same size
as the number of Bell pairs she wishes the prover to prepare.
Fortunately, this is not the case. The verifier can decide in advance whether
she wants to test the state or run the computation and, irrespective of this, ask the
prover to prepare the tensor product of Bell pairs. She will then request that the
prover send the Bell state halves one at a time for the verifier to measure. Due to
the no-signalling principle, this will not leak any information to the prover about
the verifier’s measurements. Then, depending on her choice, she will instruct
the server to either perform the measurements for the testing phase or for the
computation phase. Thus, in terms of practical requirements, the two approaches
are identical. We will implement the second approach, since it is easier to analyse.
Taking the verifier to be Alice and the prover to be Bob, Alice will test Bob’s
preparation of the shared state by playing multiple steering games with him and
relying on the rigidity result. In the state testing phase, if Alice observes a close to
maximal saturation of the steering correlations, she can conclude that a suitably
chosen subset of the shared states is close to a tensor product of Bell pairs. In
the verified computation stage, she measures her qubits so as to prepare the FK
input and then runs the FK protocol with Bob. All of this is encapsulated in
Protocol 3.
As per Theorems 11 and 12, to remotely prepare N qubits in the prover’s
system, we require him to create Θ(N5log(N)) Bell states. This essentially de-
termines the communication complexity of the protocol. Contrast this, however,
to the communication complexities in the fully device-independent case, which,
as we’ve seen, are on the order of O(N c), c > 8192 for RUV and c > 2048 for our
protocol, respectively. Of course, we should stress two things:
(1) The communication overhead in the device-independent case follows from
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Protocol 3 One-sided device-independent verification protocol
Assumptions: The verifier wishes to delegate a quantum computation C to
the prover, such that |C| = M . As in UBQC and the FK protocol, we
will associate this computation with the graph state |G〉, comprising of
N = cM qubits, for some constant c > 0. The verifier’s measurement
device is trusted and able to perform single qubit measurements of the





Protocol: The verifier fixes a constant δ, representing the trace distance she
wishes for the FK input state, relative to the ideal state. The verifier asks
the prover to prepare kN5log(N) Bell pairs, where k > 0 is a constant
determined by the results of Theorems 11 and 12. She views these as N
blocks of Θ(N4log(N)) states each. She instructs the prover to send her
one qubit from each Bell pair. With probability 1/2 she chooses to perform
one of the following:
State testing
1. For each qubit she receives, the verifier chooses, with probability 1/2,
to measure it with either the X observable or the Y observable. After
all qubits have been measured, she instructs the server to measure the
corresponding qubit of each Bell state using the same observable and
report all outcomes.
2. The verifier views each of the N blocks as a Θ(N4log(N))-round steer-
ing game. She accepts in state testing, iff all games achieve a correla-
tion value of at least 1− δ/kN2.
Verified computation
1. The verifier chooses uniformly at random, one qubit from each of the
N blocks. She measures these qubits so as to remotely prepare the
input state for the FK protocol (i.e. the qubits comprising |G〉, up to
Pauli corrections).
2. She instructs the prover to discard all but the qubits that will be used
for the FK protocol (determined by the previous step) and runs the
FK protocol.
bounds that are not tight. It is entirely possible that if these bounds were
optimized, we would obtain the same asymptotic scaling as in the steering
case.
(2) As mentioned, both the device-independent case as well as the steering
case are based on self-testing results having polynomial (and not constant)
robustness. In fact the robustness of both self-tests are identical. Thus, the
reduced overhead (at least in this non-optimized analysis) in the steering
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case is a direct result of trusting Alice’s device. Of course, there is the
recent Pauli braiding test of Natarajan and Vidick [36], which has constant
robustness, and has been used to develop entanglement-based protocols
having quasi-linear communication complexity [106]. Using that test in our
protocols would, presumably, also lead to a quasi-linear overhead. In those
cases, it would be interesting to see whether the steering case outperforms
the device-independent case in constant factors.
There is another noteworthy difference between the device-independent protocol
and the steering one. Recall that in the device-independent case, since the mea-
surement device was untrusted, it was not sufficient to simply determine a tensor
product structure of Bell pairs between it and the prover. We also had to ensure
that the measurement device was measuring the correct observables. This was
checked by performing an extended CHSH game, requiring the measurement of
9 observables. The reason for 9 observables was because we required the prepa-
ration of states both in the XY-plane as well as the XZ-plane and the extended
CHSH game, which symmetrises all planes, allowed us to do this. In the steering
case, however, since we trust the measurement device of the verifier it is sufficient
to simply check for the correct preparation of Bell states. Having done so, Alice
can simply perform the desired measurements so as to prepare the states used by
FK.
We can now prove the following result for our protocol:
Theorem 13. Protocol 3, for a computation of size N , has completeness 1,
soundness O(
√
δ), for some δ > 0, fixed by the verifier, and communication
complexity Θ(N5/δ4log(N/δ)).
Proof. Let us first discuss the communication complexity. As we saw with The-
orem 12, Alice will play N K-round steering games with Bob. To achieve
closeness δ = kN
√
ε for the tensor product of Bell pairs, it must be that
K = Ω(1/ε2log(1/ε)). Expressing ε as a function of N and δ we have that
ε = Θ(δ2/N2), which leads to K = Θ((N/δ)4log(N/δ)). Doing this N times,
leads to our communication complexity of Θ(N5/δ4log(N/δ)).
For completeness, note that when Bob is honest and performing the instructed
operations, both the state testing phase and the verified computation phase suc-
ceed with probability 1. For the state testing phase, this is because the steering
game has quantum success probability 1. For the verified computation phase it
is because the FK protocol has completeness 1.
In the case of soundness, we know that if the state testing phase succeeds, the
FK input state will be δ-close to the ideal state. As we know from the robustness
of FK, from Chapter 3, if the input state is δ-close to ideal, the soundness bound
changes by at most O(
√
δ)9.
9Technically, the soundness of the FK protocol is (8/9)d, for some constant d, fixed by the
verifier. This means that our soundness is in fact (8/9)d + O(
√
δ). However, in practice the
(8/9)d factor can be made much smaller than
√
δ, hence we are essentially only interested in
the dependence on δ.
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4.2.2 Verification from partially entangled states
We have seen that in both device-independent verification and one-sided device-
independent verification we can characterise the tensor product structure of Bell
pairs, between the verifier and the server, from observed correlations. More pre-
cisely, saturating an inequality involving correlations leads to a bound on the trace
distance between the shared state and perfect Bell pairs, up to a local isometry.
Is it, however, necessary to use Bell states? Could some other entangled state
be useful? We know that for QKD and QRNG, one can use states that are not
maximally entangled (or even close to being maximally entangled) [145–149] and
so it is interesting to examine if this is also the case for verification. Determining
this in full generality is a complicated matter. For entanglement-based proto-
cols, we know that one can indeed use less than maximally entangled states. For
instance, the verification protocol of McKague from [32] requires the provers to
share a triangular cluster state, which is universal for measurement-based quan-
tum computation. The verifier will either perform a self-test to check that the
provers are indeed sharing this state or delegate a computation to them.
In the FK protocol, which is a prepare-and-send protocol, we know that the
verifier needs to prepare 8 states that are evenly spread out around the XY plane
plus the |0〉, |1〉 dummy states. Of course, the preparation of these states can
be turned into a measurement as follows: suppose that the verifier has a trusted






|θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |+θ〉 〈+θ|+ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ |1〉 〈1|
)
(4.19)
This state is an equal mixture of the 10 possible states required in the FK protocol.
The first register of each of these states specifies which state was prepared. Alice
will therefore measure this register and send the qubit of the second register to
Bob. Such states are called classical-quantum (CQ) states [150].
The ability to use CQ states for the FK protocol is conditioned on having a
trusted source to prepare them. However, if the source is not trusted, then the
verifier would need to test the preparation of these states. This is the setting
we will consider. We are assuming an untrusted source (possibly the prover)
that should prepare multiple copies of some bipartite state ρAB. The essential
properties that we require of this state are that:
1. Alice, through local measurement on half of this state, can prepare a desired
set of target states {σa}a on Bob’s side, satisfying
∑
a σa = TrA(ρAB).
2. Alice has a single-qubit measurement device.
3. From Schmidt decomposition, condition 2 (or rather the fact that Alice’s
Hilbert space is two-dimensional) implies that ρAB is equivalent to a two-
qubit state. We will require that Alice be able to prepare at least one pair of
orthogonal states on Bob’s side (such as |0〉 and |1〉), with equal probability.
From condition 1 this is equivalent to TrA(ρAB) = I/2.
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States that satisfy condition 1 are referred to as completely steerable states.
Let us give their definition, from [151]:
Definition 26. A bipartite state, ρAB, shared by Alice and Bob is completely
steerable iff for any positive operators {σa}a, satisfying
∑
a σa = TrA(ρAB), there
exist a POVM {Ea}, such that σa = TrA((Ea ⊗ I)ρAB).
Condition 2 is simply a requirement stemming from practicality. Lastly, condition
3 is added since all existing prepare-and-send protocols require the verifier to
prepare at least one pair of orthogonal states with equal probability [15]. We will
refer to states that satisfy all three of these conditions as totally steerable states.
For these states, we can show the following:
Theorem 14. A bipartite state, ρAB is totally steerable iff ρAB is maximally
entangled.
Proof sketch. If ρAB is a pure state, then we are done since, given that ρAB is
steerable, it must be entangled. But any pure entangled two-qubit state having
ρB = I/2 is maximally entangled. We can show that ρAB is indeed a pure
state. To do this, we consider a purification of this state and impose the listed
constraints on the amplitudes of this purification, expressed in the computational
basis. Solving the system of constraints leads to a density matrix which can easily
be shown to correspond to a pure, maximally entangled state. See Section 4.8 for
the proof.
We leave as an open problem to determine whether maximally entangled states
are required in more general verification settings.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 8
In this section we give a complete proof of Theorem 8 which characterises one-
sided device-independent self-testing. Consider the following isometry:
Φ(|ψ〉) = 1
2
(I + Y′B) |ψ〉 |+y〉+
i
2
X′B(I − Y′B) |ψ〉 |−y〉 (4.20)
An illustration of this isometry is given in Figure 4.2, where the upper part is
Bob’s system and the lower part is Alice’s system. It should be noted that the
control gates act on the target when the control qubit is in the |−y〉 state, and
act as identity when the control qubit is |+y〉. This is in contrast to the standard
convention in which the control is a computational basis state. Here |+y〉 and |−y〉
are the eigenstates of the Pauli Y operator and P = 1√
2
(X + Y). We can clearly
see that Φ = IA ⊗ ΦB, where ΦB is determined by the combination of X′B and
Y′B operators, from expression 4.20, which only act on Bob’s system. We proceed
to show that when conditions (4.1)-(4.3) are satisfied, we obtain condition 4.4.
First, we show that:
||Φ(MAN ′B |ψ〉)−MANBΦ(|ψ〉)|| ≤ 2γ2 (4.21)
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Because MA only acts on Alice’s system, whereas the isometry is local on Bob’s
system, MA trivially commutes to the left so that Φ(MAN
′
B |ψ〉) = MAΦ(N ′B |ψ〉).
Now consider the possible choices for N ′B. If N
′
B = I, the relation holds trivially.








(I + Y′B) |ψ〉 |+y〉 −
i
2
X′B(I − Y′B) |ψ〉 |−y〉 (4.22)





(I + Y′B) |ψ〉 |+y〉 −
i
2
X′B(I − Y′B) |ψ〉 |−y〉 (4.23)
This is because Y |+y〉 = |+y〉 and Y |−y〉 = − |−y〉 and we notice that the two











X′B(I − Y′B)X′B |ψ〉 |−y〉




(I + Y′B) |ψ〉 |−y〉+
1
2
X′B(I − Y′B) |ψ〉 |+y〉 (4.24)
This is because X |+y〉 = i |−y〉 and X |−y〉 = (−i) |+y〉. Using the approxi-
mate anti-commutation of X′B and Y
′
B, as given by condition 4.3, we notice that
commuting X′B to the left in Φ(X
′
B |ψ〉) will lead to the same expression as for
XBΦ(|ψ〉) up to 2γ2 error. Thus:
||Φ(MAN ′B |ψ〉)−MANBΦ(|ψ〉)|| ≤ 2γ2 (4.25)
We therefore, only need to examine the closeness of Φ(|ψ〉) to the ideal Bell state
tensored with some junk state. Start by considering the state:
|φ〉 = 1
2
(|ψ〉 |+y〉+ YA |ψ〉 |+y〉+
+ iXA |ψ〉 |−y〉 − iYAXA |ψ〉 |−y〉) (4.26)
We will show that Φ(|ψ〉) and |φ〉 are close in trace distance. Firstly, from condi-
tions (4.1)-(4.2) using suitable triangle inequalities and the unitarity of operators
XA and YA which do not increase trace distance, it can be shown that:
||(X′BY′B − YAXA) |ψ〉 || ≤ 2γ1 (4.27)
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Expanding the trace distance of Φ(|ψ〉) and |φ〉 we have:
||Φ(|ψ〉)− |φ〉 || = 1
2
||(Y′B − YA) |ψ〉 |+y〉+
+i(X′B − XA) |ψ〉 |−y〉 − i(X′BY′B − YAXA) |ψ〉 |−y〉 ||
And using the above results it follows that:
||Φ(|ψ〉)− |φ〉 || ≤ 2γ1 (4.28)
Let us now rewrite |φ〉. Given that we trust Alice’s side of the |ψ〉 state, we can
express it as follows:
|ψ〉 = a |α〉B |+y〉A + b |β〉B |−y〉A (4.29)
Where |a|2+|b|2 = 1 and the states |α〉 and |β〉 are normalized. Here, the first part
denotes Bob’s system, for which we can make no assumptions, and the second
part is Alice’s qubit. The reason for choosing Pauli-Y eigenstates on Alice’s side
is to simplify the calculation. We could have expanded her system in any basis
since a local unitary on her system does not change the result. Substituting this
into the expression for |φ〉 and labeling the ancillary qubit introduced by this
isometry with Φ we get:
|φ〉 = 1
2








XA(a |−y〉Φ |α〉B |+y〉A + b |−y〉Φ |α〉B |−y〉A)
− 1
2
YAXA(a |−y〉Φ |α〉B |+y〉A + b |−y〉Φ |α〉B |−y〉A)
(4.30)
Using the following identities:
X |+y〉 = i |−y〉 X |−y〉 = −i |+y〉 (4.31)
Y |+y〉 = |+y〉 Y |−y〉 = − |−y〉 (4.32)
We reduce |φ〉 to:
|φ〉 = 1
2




(a |+y〉Φ |α〉B |+y〉A − b |+y〉Φ |α〉B |−y〉A)
− 1
2
(a |−y〉Φ |α〉B |−y〉A − b |−y〉Φ |α〉B |+y〉A)
− 1
2
(a |−y〉Φ |α〉B |−y〉A + b |−y〉Φ |α〉B |+y〉A)
(4.33)
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The terms with b coefficient cancel out and we are left with:
|φ〉 = a |α〉B (|+y〉Φ |+y〉A − |−y〉Φ |−y〉A) (4.34)







We would like to equate this to |junk〉B |Ψ+〉AB, however, the state we have
is unnormalized unless a = 1/
√
2. We therefore compute a bound on |a| to
determine the error introduced by the unnormalized state. Condition 4.1 can be
rewritten as:
1− γ21/2 ≤ 〈ψ|XAX′B |ψ〉 (4.36)
By expanding |ψ〉, applying the operators XA, X′B and using the facts that |a|2 +
|b|2 = 1 and that X′B is hermitian and has ±1 eigenvalues, we obtain:√




1 + γ21/2 (4.37)
Since for small γ1 we know that
√
1− γ21/2 approaches 1− γ21/4 and
√
1 + γ21/2
approaches 1 + γ21/4 we have that the norm of |φ〉 can change from unity by an




|| ≤ 3γ1 + γ21/4 (4.38)
Lastly, together with inequality 4.25 and a triangle inequality, we get:
||Φ(MAN ′B |ψ〉)− |junk〉BMANB
∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
|| ≤ 3γ1 + γ21/4 + 2γ2 (4.39)
4.4 Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9 shows that saturating the correlation of observables on Alice and Bob’s
side, with Alice being trusted, leads to the necessary conditions of Theorem 8
which imply that the shared state is close, up to local isometry, to a Bell state.
Similar to Theorem 8 we start the proof by denoting B0 as X
′
B and B1 as Y
′
B.
Splitting equation 4.7, we have:
〈ψ|XAX′B |ψ〉+ 〈ψ|YAY′B |ψ〉 ≥ 2− ε (4.40)
However, it’s clear that:
− 1 ≤ 〈ψ|XAX′B |ψ〉 ≤ 1 (4.41)
− 1 ≤ 〈ψ|YAY′B |ψ〉 ≤ 1 (4.42)
So, it follows that:
〈ψ|XAX′B |ψ〉 ≥ 1− ε (4.43)
〈ψ|YAY′B |ψ〉 ≥ 1− ε (4.44)
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This allows us to derive conditions 4.1 and 4.2, since:




1− 〈ψ|XAX′B |ψ〉 ≤
√
2ε (4.45)




1− 〈ψ|YAY′B |ψ〉 ≤
√
2ε (4.46)
Hence, in Theorem 8, γ1 =
√






Computing S2 and using the fact that XAYA = iZA we obtain:





Since [XA,YA] = 2iZA, we can alternatively write this as:








The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality together with inequality 4.40 give us:
〈ψ|S2 |ψ〉 ≥ | 〈ψ|S |ψ〉 |2 ≥ (2− ε)2 (4.50)
Substituting S2:






B] |ψ〉 ≥ 4− 4ε+ ε2 ≥ 4− 4ε (4.51)
Hence:
〈ψ| [XA,YA][X′B,Y′B] |ψ〉 ≥ 4− 8ε (4.52)
Expanding the commutators yields:
〈ψ|XAYAX′BY′B |ψ〉 − 〈ψ|XAYAY′BX′B |ψ〉
− 〈ψ|YAXAX′BY′B |ψ〉+ 〈ψ|YAXAY′BX′B |ψ〉 ≥ 4− 8ε
By splitting into terms, as we did with inequality 4.40, we have that:
〈ψ|XAYAX′BY′B |ψ〉 ≥ 1− 8ε (4.53)
〈ψ|YAXAY′BX′B |ψ〉 ≥ 1− 8ε (4.54)
〈ψ|XAYAY′BX′B |ψ〉 ≤ 8ε− 1 (4.55)
〈ψ|YAXAX′BY′B |ψ〉 ≤ 8ε− 1 (4.56)
Now using the fact that XAYA + YAXA = 0, we have:
||(X′BY′B + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 || =
||(X′BY′B + XAYA + YAXA + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 ||
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And using a triangle inequality, we have:
||(X′BY′B + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 || ≤
||(XAYA + X′BY′B) |ψ〉 ||+ ||(YAXA + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 ||
Additionally:
||(XAYA + X′BY′B) |ψ〉 || =√
2 + 〈ψ|XAYAY′BX′B |ψ〉+ 〈ψ|YAXAX′BY′B |ψ〉
And from inequalities 4.55 and 4.56 we get that:
||(XAYA + X′BY′B) |ψ〉 || ≤ 4
√
ε (4.57)
Similarly, using inequalities 4.53 and 4.54, we have:




||(X′BY′B + Y′BX′B) |ψ〉 || ≤ 8
√
ε (4.59)
Thus satisfying condition 4.3, with γ2 = 8
√
ε, and concluding the proof.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 10
Theorems 8 and 9 show that if the correlation of local observables is saturated up
to order O(ε), the shared state is close, up to local isometry, to a Bell state up to
order O(
√
ε). Theorem 10 shows that this bound is tight, up to constant factors.
We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assume the bound of Theorem 8 is not
tight and it is possible to derive an asymptotically better bound for the shared
state of Alice and Bob. In particular, this means that there is no state |ψ〉 which
is O(
√
ε)-close to the |Ψ+〉 state and there are no observables B0 and B1 such
















∣∣Ψ+〉 || = √2− 〈ψ |Ψ+〉 − 〈Ψ+ |ψ〉 (4.61)
Notice that: 〈
ψ












Substituting this into the previous expression, we have:
|| |ψ〉 −
∣∣Ψ+〉 || = O(√ε′) (4.63)
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One can check that B0 = B
†






1 = I and that the two
matrices have eigenvalues ±1. Moreover, we can see that as ε′ → 0 we have that
B0 → X and B1 → Y. Importantly, we have that:
〈ψ|XAB0 |ψ〉 = 〈ψ|YAB1 |ψ〉 = 1− ε′ (4.64)
And therefore:
〈ψ| (XAB0 + YAB1) |ψ〉 = 2− 2ε′ = 2− ε (4.65)
Thus, inequality 4.10 is saturated. This should not be possible under the as-
sumption that the bound on |ψ〉’s closeness to |Ψ+〉 is not tight. Therefore, the
assumption is false and the O(
√
ε) bound is tight for this type of steering inequal-
ity. Note that this result still holds under local isometry since the isometry is, by
definition, distance preserving and so under the local isometry the state is still
O(
√
ε)-close to a Bell pair.
4.6 Proof of Theorem 11
Theorem 11 shows that from the observed outcomes of Alice and Bob, after K
rounds of measurement, we can conclude something about their shared quantum
state in a single, randomly chosen, round, even without assuming independence.
The proof consists of two steps:
1. Firstly, we show that the observed correlations of Alice and Bob, given
fixed measurement settings, provide a good estimate for the true quantum






2. Secondly, we use the previous result to estimate the correlations for the
two measurement settings under consideration. We then use self-testing to
show that if the correlations are close to the maximal value, the averaged
state is close to a Bell state, under a suitable local isometry.
We start by proving the first step:
Lemma 6. Assume Alice and Bob are asked to perform n rounds of measurement
of the two-outcome observables with ±1 eigenvalues, A and B, respectively. We
denote the outcomes of their measurements as {ai} and {bi} and Ĉi = aibi as
their correlation for round i. Additionally, let Hi = {(aj, bj)|j < i} be the history
of their measurement outcomes up to, but not including round i. Finally, letting
121
Ci = E(Ĉi|Hi) be the conditional expectation value of the correlation given the














Proof. The variable Ci represents the true correlation of the outcomes in round
i, as determined by the shared state of Alice and Bob. If the shared state in
round i is ρi then Ci = Tr(AB ρi). As mentioned, while we trust Alice and know
that she is indeed measuring the observable A, we can still assume that Bob is
measuring the observable B in each round. This is because the observable B is
unrestricted (apart from being a two-outcome observable) and can in principle
act on Bob’s ancilla as well. Furthermore, we make no assumption about the
state ρi, since it is prepared by Bob. Another way in which we can express Ci is
using its definition, which leads us to:
Ci = Pr(ai = bi|Hi)− Pr(ai 6= bi|Hi) (4.67)




(Ci − Ĉi) (4.68)
Notice that for any j ≤ n, |Xj+1 − Xj| ≤ 2 (because Ĉi = ±1, −1 ≤ Ci ≤ 1),
E(Xj) ≤ ∞ and:
E(Xj+1 −Xj|Hj+1) = Cj+1 − Cj+1 = 0 (4.69)
Therefore, {Xj} forms a martingale. We can therefore apply the Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality [135], in a manner analogous to [34, 116]. Setting j = n,
we have that for any t > 0:
Pr(|Xn| > t) ≤ exp(−t2/8n) (4.70)























Thus concluding the proof of Lemma 6.
We can now prove the second step, thus proving Theorem 11.
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Proof of Theorem 11. We will treat the case Ĉ0 + Ĉ1 ≥ 2 − ε since for Ĉ0 +
Ĉ1 ≤ −2 + ε the derivation is similar. Additionally, we only consider the case
OAB = I, since the other cases follow from the linearity of the operators. The
previous lemma essentially shows us that the observed average correlation is a
good estimate for the average true correlation. Specifically, it is the case that Ĉb,
b ∈ {0, 1}, is close to the quantum correlation Tr(AbBbρavg). Consider now a state
|ζ〉 which is a purification of ρavg. We can then write the quantum correlation
as 〈ζ|AbBb |ζ〉. Using these results, if our estimate of the true correlation is of
precision (closeness) δ > 0, this leads us to conclude that:
〈ζ|A0B0 |ζ〉+ 〈ζ|A1B1 |ζ〉 ≥ 2− ε− δ (4.73)
with probability 1− exp(−δ2K/16). Let δ = ε so that we have:
〈ζ|A0B0 |ζ〉+ 〈ζ|A1B1 |ζ〉 ≥ 2−O(ε) (4.74)
Using Theorem 9, it follows that there exists a local isometry Φ and a state |junk〉
such that, with probability 1− exp(−ε2K/16), we have:
||Φ(|ζ〉)−
∣∣Ψ+〉 |junk〉 || ≤ O(√ε) (4.75)
This also implies:
TD(Φ(|ζ〉),
∣∣Ψ+〉 |junk〉) ≤ O(√ε) (4.76)
As mentioned, we are only considering the case of I acting on the state |ζ〉. Of
course, the argument proceeds identically, when considering MAN
′
B |ζ〉, as in The-
orem 8, leading to the OAB 6= I cases. It should be noted from the construction
of Φ (in Theorem 8), in the case where the shared state is a purification of some
mixed state (as is the case with |ζ〉 and ρavg), that the isometry does not act
on the quantum states used for purification. Therefore, we can trace out those
states, and since this operation cannot increase trace distance we have that:
TD(Φ(ρavg),
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣⊗ ρjunk) ≤ O(√ε) (4.77)
With probability 1−exp(−ε2K/16). We can incorporate this probability into the
trace distance10, and we have that:
TD(Φ(ρavg),
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣⊗ ρjunk) ≤ O(√ε) + exp(−ε2K/16) (4.78)
Setting K = −(16/ε2)log(√ε) = (8/ε2)log(1/ε) we are left with:
TD(Φ(ρavg),
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣⊗ ρjunk) ≤ O(√ε) (4.79)
10By this we mean that if we know that TD(ρ, σ) ≤ ε with probability 1 − p, this means
that with probability p the trace distance could be anything. In particular, the states can be
orthogonal, in which case their trace distance would be 1. This means that with probability 1,
TD(ρ, σ) ≤ (1− p)ε+ p.
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Analogously, we would get:
TD(Φ(OAB(ρavg)), ÔAB(
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣)⊗ ρjunk) ≤ O(√ε) (4.80)
Concluding the proof of Theorem 11.
4.7 Proof of Theorem 12
The main idea of the proof is to use the Gentle Measurement Lemma (Theorem 6),
as well as its corollary from Chapter 3 (Corollary 1). Throughout the proof we
will suppress the isometry acting on Bob’s system, to reduce the complexity of
our expressions. However, it is to be understood that all the states we write have
the local isometry acting on them. We will also omit the action of OAB, since,
just like the isometry, this can also be included in the proof.
Let us denote the shared state ρ of Alice and Bob, for the selected rounds,
as ρA1A2...ANB ∈ D(HA1 ⊗ ... ⊗ HAN ⊗ HB), where HAi is the Hilbert space for
Alice’s system in round i, and HB is Bob’s Hilbert space. Whenever we remove
one system from that state, it is to be understood that that system has been
traced out. For instance:
TrA1(ρA1A2...ANB) = Tr1(ρA1A2...ANB) = ρA2...ANB (4.81)
We also denote as ΠA1A2...ANB =
⊗N
i=1 |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|AiB a projection onto N Bell
pairs between Alice and Bob.
To start with, we know from the fact that the reduced state in each round
saturates the steering inequality that:
Tr(ΠAiBρAiB) ≥ 1−O(ε) (4.82)
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Note that Tr(ΠAiBρA1A2...ANB) = Tr(ΠAiBρAiB), since the
projector is only acting on the states from the i’th round. Using this and the
Gentle Measurement Lemma gives us that:
TD(ρA1A2...ANB,ΠAiB ⊗ TrAi(ρA1A2...ANB)) ≤
2
√
1− Tr(ΠAiBρA1A2...ANB) ≤ O(
√
ε) (4.83)
where the second inequality follows from Equation 4.82.
Now, consider the quantity we are trying to bound, which we will denote as:
D = TD(ρA1A2...ANB,ΠA1A2...ANB ⊗ ρB) (4.84)





ΠA1A2...AjB ⊗ TrA1...Aj(ρA1A2...ANB)) (4.85)
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But since taking the partial trace cannot increase trace distance, the right hand
side of the inequality will be upper bounded by:
N∑
j=1
TD(ρA1A2...ANB,ΠAiB ⊗ TrAi(ρA1A2...ANB)) (4.86)
which we know, from inequality 4.83, is of order O(
√
ε). It therefore follows that:
TD(ρA1A2...ANB,ΠA1A2...ANB ⊗ ρB) ≤ O(N
√
ε) (4.87)
thus showing that the state shared by Alice and Bob is close to a tensor product
of Bell pairs, tensored with some junk state on Bob’s system.
A few comments are in order. First of all, one could ask how was the fact
that we are attempting to characterise a tensor product of Bell states, rather
than any other pure state, used. It is true that we made use of Equation 4.82,
giving the closeness of the state in round i to a Bell pair, however the proof itself
seems agnostic to which state was used. If we had a closeness relation for some
other pure state, would the same argument allow us to derive a tensor product
for multiple copies of that state? The answer is no. Suppose for instance that
ΠAiB = |00〉. In other words, we could determine that in each round, the state of
Alice and Bob is close to |00〉. While we do have a characterisation of the tensor
product structure of Alice’s system (i.e. HA = HA1 ⊗HA2 ⊗ ...⊗HAN ), no such
characterisation is known for Bob. Thus, it is entirely possible that Bob’s system
is simply a two dimensional Hilbert space HB ∼= C2. In this case, ΠA1A2...ANB
would be a projection on the N + 1-qubit state |0〉A1 |0〉A2 ... |0〉AN |0〉B. Having
this state is consistent with the reduced state in each round being |00〉, but, as
we can see, the joint state of Alice and Bob is not equivalent to N pairs of the
form |00〉.
In our case, however, we are implicitly using the monogamy property of Bell
states. If the state on HA1 ⊗ HB is a Bell pair and the state on HA2 ⊗ HB is
a Bell pair, and HA1 6= HA2 , then necessarily these are two distinct Bell pairs.
Thus, the projector ΠA1A2...ANB is a projection on N distinct Bell states.
A second question one could ask is why can’t one use such a simple argument
to derive the tensor product structure of Bell pairs in the fully device-independent
case, where both Alice and Bob are untrusted. The answer is that in that case no
characterisation is known, a priori, for the Hilbert spaces of Alice and Bob, except
that HAB = HA ⊗HB, from the fact that they are not allowed to communicate.
But this is not sufficient to derive the tensor product structure of Bell states,
using the above argument. Indeed, if one assumes that the HAi spaces are not
distinct and that, for instance HA = C2, then the reduced state of each round
is close to a Bell pair, because it is the same Bell pair for all rounds11. In other
words, one would have that ΠA1A2...ANB = ΠAiB = |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|AB. A more involved
argument is therefore required, as was used in [31].
11To clarify, this cannot happen in practice since once the state is measured it cannot be
reused. However, we are not using the fact that the state is measured in the proof presented
above. We are simply using the fact that the reduced state in each round is close to a Bell
state. As we’ve seen, this is sufficient in the steering case, because we trust Alice’s system.
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4.8 Proof of Theorem 14
To prove the result, let us first state a lemma from [151] concerning completely
steerable states:
Lemma 7. A bipartite state, ρAB is completely steerable iff there exists a purifica-
tion ρABC such that ρBC = ρB⊗ρC, where ρBC = TrA(ρABC), ρB = TrAC(ρABC),
ρC = TrAB(ρABC).
It is clear that a maximally entangled Bell state satisfies the properties of
total steerability. We therefore focus on proving that a totally steerable state is
maximally entangled. We start by considering |ψABC〉 as the 4-qubit purification
of ρAB. All other purifications are equivalent to this one, so this suffices for our





Of course, we have the additional constraint:
15∑
i=0
|ai|2 = 1 (4.89)
By re-expressing the constraints from our description of totally steerable states
together with Lemma 7:
ρBC = ρB ⊗ ρC (4.90)
ρB = I/2 (4.91)
as constraints on the amplitudes of |ψABC〉 we will have a large bilinear system
of equations. From this system we will arrive at the following set of equations:
a2k = f · a2k+2, k ∈ {0, 1, ...6}
a2k+3 = −f ∗ · a2k+1, k ∈ {0, 1, ...6}
a4k+1 = e
iφ1 · a4k+2, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
a4k = e
iφ2 · a4k+3, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
Where the parameters we introduced are f ∈ C and φ1, φ2 ∈ [0, 2π]. Com-




2(|f |2 + 1)

|f |2 f f eiφ1 |f |2
f ∗ 1 eiφ2 −f
f ∗ e−iφ2 1 −f
e−iφ1|f |2 −f ∗ −f ∗ |f |2
 (4.92)
It can be easily checked that Tr(ρ2AB) = 1 and therefore ρAB is a pure state. But
since ρB = I/2, we have that ρAB is a maximally entangled state, i.e. a Bell
state.
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4.9 Chapter summary and outlook
Our results show that, in analogy to the rigidity of non-local correlations via
CHSH games, we can prove a rigidity property of steering correlations. This al-
lows us to establish a tensor product of Bell pairs in a setting in which one party
is trusted and one is not. This setting makes the analysis simpler, than in the
device-independent case, and leads to a reduced overhead in characterising the
tensor product structure of Bell pairs. As we mentioned, however, the analysis
in the device-independent case is not tight, and so it is possible that an opti-
mal analysis would reveal the same bounds. Nevertheless, the simplicity of the
steering case demonstrates the advantage of added trust.
We arrived at the rigidity result by first considering self-testing of a Bell state
and Pauli X and Y observables from steering correlations. We also showed that
the bound derived for the closeness of the states and operators, in this particular
self-test, is optimal, up to constant factors. Of course, self-testing assumes ideal
expectation values for the considered observables and so we had to prove a similar
result in the case where these values are estimated from finite statistics. We
did this in the most general case, where no assumption of independence was
made. Finally, we used this result to derive the rigidity of steering correlations,
characterising a tensor product of Bell pairs and the operators acting on these
states. As mentioned, it is an open problem whether the bound derived for
our rigidity result, of O(N
√
ε), is optimal. Numerical data from solving SDPs
suggests that this is the case, though we leave a more definitive analysis for future
work.
Using the rigidity of steering correlations we constructed a one-sided device-
independent protocol for verifiable delegated quantum computation. The protocol
we obtained is essentially identical to the device-independent analogue, but with
the added distinction of trusting the verifier’s measurement device. This, of
course, lead to a smaller communication complexity. Finally, we have shown that
a certain class of states that would be useful for such one-sided device-independent
verification protocols, are necessarily maximally entangled.
As mentioned, recent results have introduced self-tests that lead to improved
bounds in characterising a tensor product structure of Bell states [36, 106] and
so it would be interesting to see how one could improve on these results by
applying them to the steering setting. One thing to note about these results is
that they require the untrusted parties participating in the self-test to perform
collective measurements of their states, i.e. measuring multi-qubit observables.
However, ideally, we would like one of the two parties (the verifier) to perform only
single-qubit measurements. Hence, another avenue worth exploring is whether
those self-tests, combined with the steering setting, would allow for this, while




Fault tolerant verification of
quantum computation
James T. Kirk: We’d better start solving problems faster than we
pick up new ones.
— Star Trek: The Original Series, Season 2, Episode 18
Both with the device-independent verification protocol of Chapter 3, as well
as with the one-sided device-independent one of Chapter 4, we assumed that all
quantum devices work as expected and are not subject to noise or imperfections1.
This, of course, is not a realistic assumption. Real devices can have their quan-
tum systems being correlated with the external environment leading to a loss of
coherence and the ability to perform quantum computations. This is one of the
major obstacles in the development of large-scale quantum computers. Fortu-
nately, it has been shown that as long as the noise per quantum gate is below
some constant threshold (along with some additional assumptions), it is possible
to detect and correct for errors occurring in the system [152–154]. We would like
to incorporate quantum error correction into our verification protocols, so that
they can operate fault tolerantly in a more realistic environment.
For protocols in which the verifier is fully classical, fault tolerance is not a
concern since one can assume that the provers are performing their quantum
operations on top of a quantum error correcting code. Since provers are assumed
to have universal quantum computing power, we naturally have to assume that
they are capable of fault tolerant quantum computation between themselves. We
emphasise that discussions about fault tolerance only make sense in the setting
in which the verifier possesses a quantum device2.
One could imagine that we can simply take an existing verification protocol,
such as the FK protocol and have it run on top of a quantum error-correcting
1Strictly speaking, in the device-independent case, we assumed nothing about the quantum
devices. Nevertheless, in the honest setting, the measurement device might be subject to noise
that would lead to incorrect results, forcing the verifier to reject most of the time.
2For non-universal provers, achieving fault tolerant verification is also an interesting question
since, depending on the quantum capabilities of the provers, it might not be possible for them to
perform their computation on top of a quantum error-correcting code. In this chapter, however,
we are only interested in the case of a universal prover.
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code. In other words, the verifier would prepare logical qubits, send these qubits
to the prover and then instruct him to proceed, as in the FK protocol, by en-
tangling and measuring these encoded states. However, this approach requires
that the verifier is able to prepare the logical states, in a fault tolerant way. As
is explained in [155], standard constructions for achieving this for a computation
with m qubits and consisting of N gates require the fault tolerant circuit to act on
O(m polylog(mN)) qubits. In other words, one requires O(polylog(mN)) physi-
cal qubits per logical qubit. We would like to avoid the verifier’s quantum device
becoming too powerful, since even being polylogarithmic in the size of the input
to the computation would be too powerful. This is because, for polylogarithmic
size quantum circuits, there is no known general means of classically simulating
them, as a brute force simulation would run in quasipolynomial time. The result
of Gottesman from [155] provides an alternative, namely a construction in which
the number of physical qubits per logical qubit becomes constant in the limit of
N going to infinity. However, this construction requires multiple logical qubits
to be encoded in a single block3 of physical qubits. This is in contrast to a naive
fault tolerant version of the FK protocol in which each block of physical qubits
prepared by the verifier would comprise one logical qubit. It is therefore not clear
if the construction of [155] would be suitable for making a verification protocol
fault tolerant. Furthermore, even if the errors of the verifier’s device can be sup-
pressed, it still needs to be proven that this is not detrimental for the verification
of a quantum computation. In other words, we want to ensure that a malicious
prover cannot exploit these errors in order to successfully trick the verifier into
accepting incorrect results. Thus, the question we aim to answer is: can a verifier
with a constant-size and imperfect quantum device verifiably delegate a quantum
computation to a single prover?
We show that this is indeed possible for a verifier with a single-qubit mea-
surement device. In the terminology of Chapter 1, our protocol will be a receive-
and-measure verification protocol. Our approach is based on the Morimae and
Fitzsimons (MF) post hoc verification protocol, which we introduced in Chap-
ter 2. Recall that in that protocol a prover sends a quantum state to a verifier
and this quantum state should be the ground state of a Hamiltonian. This ground
state encodes the desired quantum computation and can be used to “read off”
the outcome of that computation. If the verifier can indeed certify that this is
the ground state, then the computation is verified. In our fault tolerant protocol
we encode the qubits of this ground state into a logical ground state where each
qubit of the original state is encoded into a larger number of physical qubits via
a quantum error correction code. This logical state is then the ground state of a
logical Hamiltonian described by the quantum computation. In the protocol, the
physical qubits in this logical state are then measured one at a time, and appro-
priate classical corrections are made on the outcomes of these measurements in
post-processing if errors are detected. An honest prover’s probability of success-
ful computation will be boosted by this error correction, but importantly we can
still verify if the logical ground state was indeed prepared by the prover. This is
3By ‘block’ we simply mean a collection of qubits that are processed at the same time and
therefore need to be stored in a quantum memory at the same time.
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shown in Section 5.1. Then, in Section 5.2, we consider a simple example of this
protocol in the honest prover scenario. That is, using the repetition code and the
Steane code [156], we can simulate and characterise the protocol’s behaviour un-
der bit-flip errors and depolarizing noise. The numerical results of our simulation
are presented in Section 5.3.
Let us first comment on approaches that have also addressed the aforemen-
tioned problem of fault tolerant verification. For protocols in which the verifier
has a small quantum device, the question of fault tolerance has been addressed
in [30, 35, 157–159]. In [30, 35, 157, 158] the authors proposed protocols in which
a classical client possessing either a single qubit preparation or measurement de-
vice, susceptible to noise, could verifiably delegate quantum computations to a
prover. All these protocols are blind, meaning that the delegated computation is
kept secret from the prover. We will return to this issue in detail in Section 5.4.
The requirement of blindness introduces new difficulties when considering fault
tolerant computation. To circumvent these difficulties, the aforementioned ap-
proaches considered extra (potentially unrealistic) assumptions about the noise,
which rule out the possibility of the prover utilising the noise to deceive the ver-
ifier. A discussion of the general difficulty in realizing a verifiable, blind, fault
tolerant protocol is provided in [159].
Recall from Chapter 2, that in the MF protocol, for a particular decision





where the ai’s are real coefficients and the Si’s are XZ-terms. When the answer
to the decision problem is “yes”, the ground state of the Hamiltonian will have
energy below some value, b, and when the answer is “no”, it will have energy
above a. Importantly, it must be the case that a − b > 1/poly(n), where n is
the number of input bits to the decision problem (and also, the number of qubits
on which H acts). The prover is required to prepare the ground state and send
it to the verifier, who will use the single-qubit measurement device to measure
one of the local terms of H, thus estimating the energy of that state. This
inverse-polynomial gap between the acceptance and rejection cases, ensures that
the verifier can distinguish between these two cases. Indeed, with a polynomial
number of repetitions of the protocol, the verifier can boost the gap to a constant
value.
What happens if we add noise to the verifier’s measurement device? It is
straightforward to show that a constant rate of noise on that device will lead to
the failure of the protocol for sufficiently large computations. This is because
the gap between acceptance and rejection is inverse polynomial in the size of
the input. As a result of noisy devices, the acceptance threshold is shifted to
a − c, and the rejection threshold is shifted to b + c, where c is some positive
constant that depends on the noise rate of the devices. We can see that as long
as c < (a− b)/2, the verifier can still distinguish reliably between acceptance and
rejection. However, it is clear that for a sufficiently long input, we will have that
c ≥ (a − b)/2. At this point, the protocol no longer satisfies the correctness nor
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the soundness criteria. In fact, this is common to all other verification protocols
in the single-prover setting [15]. To address this issue we now give a fault tolerant
version of the MF protocol that works in the presence of quantum devices subject
to local noise having a constant error-rate.
5.1 The fault tolerant protocol
Our construction is simple: we ask the prover to encode the history state in a CSS
(Calderbank-Shor-Steane) error-correcting code [1] and send it to the verifier. The
verifier will then perform a transversal measurement of the X and Z operators.
Transversality results in the logical operators being expressed as tensor products








where X̃ and Z̃ are the logical (or encoded) X and Z operators. In effect, the
original Hamiltonian is replaced with an encoded Hamiltonian by substituting
each XZ-term with its corresponding logical form. The idea of encoding the
history state in a CSS code is briefly mentioned in the independent work of [160],
and CSS codes are also considered in [158], though not for post hoc verification.
CSS codes are transversal and this ensures that the verifier needs to perform
only single-qubit measurements. We also require an additional property, that is
possessed by CSS codes, namely that the outcomes for the transversal measure-
ments (of the X and Z operators) are encoded in a classical error-correcting code.
This is because the verifier will not perform any quantum correction on the state
sent by the prover. Instead, this state will be measured and the measurement
outcomes are classically post-processed.
To clarify, consider the following simple example. Assume that the CSS code
is a repetition code in which ˜|0〉 = |0〉⊗m and ˜|1〉 = |1〉⊗m, for some odd m > 1.
This code can correct bm
2
c bit-flip errors. If the verifier wishes to measure the
Z observable on an encoded state, they will instead measure the single-qubit Zi
observables, with i ranging from 1 to m. The m-bit outcome corresponds to the
outcome of Z encoded in a classical repetition code. Thus, the verifier will simply
take the majority bit as the outcome of Z.
For our protocol, the verifier will measure a local term of the encoded Hamilto-
nian, in a transversal way, and perform the classical post-processing of the results
in order to extract the corrected measurement outcome. With this corrected out-
come, the acceptance condition is the same as in the “unencoded” case (i.e. if
the outcome for the measurement of term S̃i is −sgn(ai)).
To guarantee that this construction works, we show the following:
(1) The encoded Hamiltonian preserves the a − b promise gap of the original
Hamiltonian. This is equivalent to showing that the encoded ground state
of the original Hamiltonian is a ground state of the encoded Hamiltonian
having the same energy.
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(2) A polylogarithmic number of concatenations of the CSS code is sufficient
to maintain an inverse polynomial acceptance-rejection gap in the presence
of noise.
Having these properties guarantees that the fault tolerant post hoc protocol is
both correct and sound, even in the presence of noisy devices. Before stating this
as a theorem we first need to describe the noise model we are considering. The
verifier makes X and Z measurements, but with probability εm the measurement
outcome is erroneous. The probability of error is assumed to be independent
between uses of the measurement devices, i.e. there are no correlated errors. To
be a bit more precise, for ideal measurement operator Mx for outcome x, we apply
a unital map E to Mx, where with probability 1− εm, Mx is unchanged, and with
probability εm, Mx is changed to something else. Alternatively, if we measure
an n-qubit state ρ one qubit at a time, the noisy measurement is equivalent to
transforming ρ to (E†)⊗n(ρ), and then making an ideal measurement on each
qubit individually, where E† is the channel that is dual to E . This error model
of the measurement device is exactly how errors are traditionally modelled in
quantum computation, where they are identically and independently distributed
on the qubits. We can now state the result:
Theorem 15. The post hoc protocol of Morimae and Fitzsimons can be made
fault tolerant by encoding the XZ-Hamiltonian of the protocol in a CSS code and
having the verifier perform the X and Z measurements in a transversal fashion.
Proof. Let X̃ and Z̃ be the logical X and Z operators in the chosen CSS code.
We have that {X̃, Z̃} = 0 and we will assume that these operators act on m > 0
qubits. Since these are operators for an error correcting code, there exists an
encoding unitary, denoted E, such that:
E(X⊗ I⊗m−1)E† = X̃ (5.3)
E(Z⊗ I⊗m−1)E† = Z̃ (5.4)
Now let H =
∑
i aiSi be an XZ-Hamiltonian acting on n > 0 qubits, and let
H ′ = H ⊗ In(m−1). Clearly, H and H ′ have the same eigenvalues. But note that
using Equations 5.3 and 5.4 we have that:
E⊗nSi ⊗ In(m−1)E⊗n = S̃i (5.5)
where S̃i is obtained by replacing X, Z and I by X̃, Z̃ and I
⊗m, respectively. This
then implies that:
E⊗nH ′E⊗n = H̃ (5.6)
where H̃ =
∑
i aiS̃i is the encoded XZ-Hamiltonian. Thus, since H̃ and H
′ are
unitarily related, they will also have the same eigenvalues. Moreover, if |ψ̃〉 =
E⊗n |ψ〉 |anc〉 is the encoded version of some n-qubit state |ψ〉, for a suitably
chosen ancilla state |anc〉, it is clear that for any such |ψ〉 we have that:
〈ψ|H |ψ〉 = 〈ψ̃| H̃ |ψ̃〉 (5.7)
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Therefore, if |ψ〉 is a ground state of H, |ψ̃〉 will be a ground state of H̃.
This proves property (1), since it shows that the encoded Hamiltonian will
have the same promise gap as the original Hamiltonian.
We now move on to property (2). As mentioned, when measuring an n-qubit
state ρ one qubit at a time, the noisy measurement is equivalent to transforming
ρ to (E†)⊗n(ρ), followed by an ideal measurement on each qubit. Thus, if each
qubit in the Hamiltonian is encoded in a block of qubits, then due to the error-
correcting code, the probability of obtaining an incorrect outcome (after classical
post-processing) has been suppressed from εm on the original qubit to at most
αε2m on the whole block, for some constant α (determined by the code). Here we
have implicitly used the fact that the measurement outcome for the logical qubit
in one block is obtained through classical error correction (post-processing) of the




m of there being an error upon measuring an encoded qubit.
The verifier will make two logical qubit measurements, so to achieve a final




m ≤ η2 . Provided that εm is below the threshold probability pth = α−1
of the code, then if each block consists of b qubits with k levels of concatenation,







which is O(polylog( 2
η
)). So if the total number of qubits in the ground state of
the original Hamiltonian is n, after k levels of encoding in blocks of size b, the
total number of qubits in the encoded ground state is O(n polylog( 2
η
)).
If the probability of acceptance (rejecting) in the original protocol (without
noisy measurements) is pacc (prej) and we have that pacc − prej ≤ 1poly(n) . Now
with noisy measurements, we have that the new probability of acceptance (with
error correction) is p̃acc ≥ pacc − η and p̃rej ≤ prej + η. Therefore, to maintain a
polynomial gap between acceptance and rejection we must have that η is suffi-
ciently smaller than an inverse polynomial, which only incurs a polylogarithmic
overhead. Note that only a polynomial overhead is required if we wish for η to
be exponentially small.
The idea of encoding the proof state in an error-correcting code while main-
taining a single-qubit measurement device for the verifier has also been consid-
ered, in the context of general QMA problems, in [161]. In that case, however,
the proof state is a graph state that is used by the verifier to perform a fault
tolerant measurement-based quantum computation. The verifier is also required
to test that this state corresponds to the correct graph state and this is achieved
through a stabilizer test.
In our case, by restricting to BQP computations, we simply require the ver-
ifier to measure the history state associated to the quantum computation. By
showing that the encoded Hamiltonian has the same promise gap as the original
Hamiltonian it is therefore sufficient to request that the prover encode the history
state in a CSS code.
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5.2 Example
Let us consider a toy example of our protocol in the case of an honest prover, for
which we will give numerical results when using the repetition code and the Steane
code, respectively. To start with, we should consider a quantum computation
for which we want to construct a history state. Given that the Steane code
will encode one logical qubit as 7 physical qubits, this computation needs to be
small enough so that we are able to perform multiple runs of the protocol, in a
reasonable amount of time. For this reason, using:
D(φ) = cos(φ)Z + sin(φ)X (5.9)
we will choose the following one-qubit computation:
|x〉 X D(π/8)
Figure 5.1: Example computation.
Note that D(π/8) is universal for (real) single-qubit quantum computations4.
The computation has two time steps, hence T = 2. Consider the case x = 0. The
input state starts out as |0〉, it is then flipped to |1〉 and upon application of the
D(π/8) gate it becomes sin(π/8) |0〉− cos(π/8) |1〉. If we designate output |1〉 as
acceptance, then this circuit will accept x = 0 with probability cos(π/8)2. The




(|0〉 |00〉+ |1〉 |10〉+ (sin(π/8) |0〉 − cos(π/8) |1〉) |11〉) (5.10)
where we have separated the computation register from the clock register. For




(|1〉 |00〉+ |0〉 |10〉+ (cos(π/8) |0〉+ sin(π/8) |1〉) |11〉) (5.11)
We now need to consider an XZ-Hamiltonian such that the ground state is
close to |ψx=0〉. Since the 2-local construction is fairly involved and we are only
interested in a simple example, we will instead consider a 3-local Hamiltonian.
This, of course, does not change the protocol in any way and the verifier will still
perform single-qubit X and Z measurements. Following the works of [162, 163],
the Hamiltonian will have the following form:
H = Hin +Hclock +Hprop +Hout (5.12)
where:
• Hin penalizes terms in which the input is not of the correct form, at the
start of the computation (T = 0).
4Additionally, {CNOT,D(π/8)} is universal for general quantum computations.
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• Hclock penalizes terms in which the clock register is not of the correct form,
throughout the computation.
• Hprop penalizes terms that do not correspond to the chosen computation.
• Hout penalizes terms for which the output of the computation register is
not |1〉 (i.e. non-accepting computations).
In our case, we have:
Hin = (I − |x〉 〈x|)⊗ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ I (5.13)
Hclock = I ⊗ |01〉 〈01| (5.14)









(I ⊗ I ⊗ |1〉 〈1| −D(π/8)⊗ I ⊗X + I ⊗ |10〉 〈10|) (5.17)
and finally:
Hout = |0〉 〈0| ⊗ I ⊗ |1〉 〈1| (5.18)
It should be noted that |ψx〉 is the ground state of Hin +Hclock +Hprop, but not
the ground state of H. It is the Hout term that singles out |ψx=0〉 and makes the
ground state of H be close, in trace distance, to the history state for the x = 0
case. This is because in that case, the output of the computation will be |1〉, with
high probability.






























The protocol proceeds as follows. The verifier will inform the prover that they
wish to perform the computation from Figure 5.1, for input x = 0. The prover
reports that the computation accepts (with high probability) and prepares the
history state |ψx=0〉, encoded in a CSS code. This state is sent qubit by qubit to
the verifier. The verifier, will choose one of the terms from Equation 5.19, with
its corresponding probability, and perform the transversal measurement of the





i |ai| ≈ 4.8. The verifier measures the X and Z operators, performs
classical post-processing on their results and combines them so as to recover the




For the x = 1 case, the situation is similar. In this case, the prover will
inform the verifier that the computation rejects (with high probability) and so
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the verifier will change the Hout term of the Hamiltonian to:
Hout = |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I ⊗ |1〉 〈1| (5.20)
and otherwise proceed as in the x = 1 case.
5.3 Numerical results
To simulate the above protocol, we considered two error-correcting codes: the
repetition code and the Steane code. In both instances, we wanted to compare
how the verifier’s probability of acceptance changes as we increase the amount
of noise applied to the history state. Before showing the results, we should first
ask: what is the probability of acceptance, for x = 0, when there is no noise in









and in our case 〈ψx=0|H |ψx=0〉 ≈ 0.0488. We therefore find that pacc ≈ 0.4949.
The first case we considered is the repetition code, with 3 physical qubits per
logical state. This code can only correct for X errors. We therefore considered
the noise channel:
F(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ pXρX (5.22)
acting independently on each individual qubit. The results are shown in Subfig-
ure 5.2a.
Probability of bit-flip error































(a) Comparison between encoded and
unencoded states for the 3-qubit repe-
tition code.
Probability of bit-flip error































(b) Comparison between encoded and
unencoded states for the 5-qubit repe-
tition code.
Figure 5.2: Results for repetition code.
As we can see, the point where the encoded state yields the same acceptance
probability as the unencoded state is p = 0.5. The acceptance probabilities for
the unencoded state were determined by applying the channel F to each qubit in
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The same is true for the encoded state, except that logical Z operators are replaced
with:
ZM = M0 −M1 (5.24)
where:
M0 = |000〉 〈000|+ |001〉 〈001|+ |010〉 〈010|+ |100〉 〈100| (5.25)
M1 = |111〉 〈111|+ |110〉 〈110|+ |101〉 〈101|+ |011〉 〈011| (5.26)
Essentially, the +1 eigenspace of ZM is spanned by states containing a majority
of |0〉 and the −1 eigenspace is spanned by states containing a majority of |1〉.
Measuring ZM is the same as performing a transversal Z measurement and taking
the majority outcome.
If we increase the size of the encoded state to 5 qubits, we obtain the results
from Subfigure 5.2b. As expected, the noise threshold increases and is around
p ≈ 0.72.
We now consider the Steane code, which can detect and correct for arbitrary
errors on a single qubit, while encoding one logical state in 7 physical qubits.
This means that the encoded state will be comprised of 21 qubits. For this case,
we will assume that each qubit is subject to depolarizing noise, characterised by
the channel:
D(ρ) = (1− 3p/4)ρ+ p/4(XρX + YρY + ZρZ) (5.27)
Due to the large number of entries for the density matrix of the encoded
state, we were unable to directly apply the channel D. Instead, for each qubit in
|ψ̃x=0〉, we chose to either leave it unchanged, with probability (1−3p/4) or, with
probability p/4, apply either X, Y or Z. This process is repeated multiple times,
and in each case the probability of acceptance is computed using Equation 5.23.
The overall probability of acceptance is then estimated by taking the average over
all of these runs. The results are shown in Subigure 5.3a.
We considered 12 data points, spread equally in the interval [0, 1], and for
each we performed 1000 repetitions of applying noise in order to estimate pacc.
The error bars represent confidence intervals for the computed values, assuming
a confidence of 95%. Additionally, the orange curve represents the best fit in-
terpolation of the given samples, when assuming a Gaussian model. As we can
see, the threshold point appears to be between 0.1 and 0.2. By considering 12
samples in the range between 0.05 and 0.15, and 4000 repetitions per sample, in
Subfigure 5.3b, we find that the threshold point is between 0.12 and 0.13.
The simulations were performed in MATLAB, on the Eddie Mark 3 cluster
of The University of Edinburgh. The code for our simulations is available on
Github [164].
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Probability of depolarization error
































Data points Steane code
(a) Comparison between encoded and
unencoded states for Steane’s code.
Probability of depolarization error




























Data points Steane code
(b) Threshold for the Steane code for
the considered computation.
Figure 5.3: Results for the Steane code.
5.4 Chapter summary and outlook
We have given a simple construction for a fault tolerant quantum verification
protocol. In a nutshell, the construction involves taking the original post hoc
verification protocol of Morimae and Fitzsimons and encoding it in a CSS error-
correcting code. Since the original protocol was not blind, neither is its fault
tolerant counterpart. A major open problem that remains to be addressed is
whether one can achieve fault tolerant verification of blind quantum computation
without resorting to additional assumptions, as in [30, 35, 157]. Specifically, the
protocols from [30,35,157] assumed (either implicitly or explicitly) that the noise
on the verifier’s device is independent of the secret parameters that are used to
achieve blindness. Additionally, the noise, on that device, should be uncorrelated
with the prover’s private system.
Following the discussion in [159], the authors stress that, so far, there is no
protocol that simultaneously achieves all of the following properties:
(1) The verifier has a preparation or measurement device whose size is at most
polylogarithmic in the size of the delegated quantum computation.
(2) The noise rate for each quantum operation is below some constant threshold.
Additionally, the noise on the verifier’s device can depend on whatever
operations the verifier performs and can be correlated with the prover’s
quantum system.
(3) The protocol is unconditionally blind. In other words, throughout the in-
teraction with the verifier, the prover only learns the size of the delegated
quantum computation.
As mentioned, previous approaches achieved conditions 1 and 3 but not 2.
The protocol we proposed achieves conditions 1 (with a constant size device) and
2 but not 3.
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Recently, a protocol has been proposed in which a classical client can delegate
and verify the computations performed by a quantum server [37]. This protocol,
however, relies on certain computational assumptions about whether a quantum
computer can solve a particular problem. Therefore, the verifier would not need
to worry about introducing errors into the prover’s quantum computation, as was
the concern in our work, but this comes at the cost of making these computational
assumptions. Interestingly, the protocol in [37] also uses post hoc verification as
a primitive, except now the prover measures the qubits in the history state and
relays the outcomes to the verifier. The preparation of the history state is slightly
more complex than in our case since it uses cryptographic one-way functions which
introduce some overhead.
Returning to our results, the simulations are encouraging. Given that the ob-
tained thresholds are higher than the error rates observed in current experimental
implementations [165–167], a demonstration of the protocol in the near future is
likely. The major obstacle to such a demonstration would be the production of
these highly entangled history states. The use of CSS codes, however, means that
one can encode these states in codes having even higher noise thresholds than the
Steane code, such as surface codes [168].
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Chapter 6
Limitations of blind quantum
computation
Penguin: You’re blind as a bat. Sightless and helpless.
Batman: You’ve got one right.
— Batman The Animated Series, Season 1, Episode 54
In the previous chapter, we briefly mentioned the difficulty in developing a
verification protocol that is both fault tolerant and blind, while having a verifier
with a single-qubit device. What about the possibility of having such a protocol
with a completely classical client? This is possible, with computational security
(as opposed to information-theoretic security), provided certain quantum-secure
one-way functions exist, as was shown in [37]. In fact, blind quantum com-
puting based on computational security, without verification, has been demon-
strated in [169,170]. However, suppose we are interested in a protocol between a
completely classical client and a quantum server that is information-theoretically
blind. Can such a protocol exist? Essentially, what we are asking is whether it
is possible to have a protocol that achieves the same functionality as UBQC, but
in which the client is completely classical. In this chapter, we give complexity-
theoretic evidence for why the answer is no. In addition to this result, we also
provide a complexity-theoretic upper bound for the types of functions which can
be evaluated by UBQC-type protocols, in which the client has some quantum
capabilities. We show that, under plausible complexity assumptions, this upper
bound prohibits the client from delegating NP-hard functions to the server.
This chapter employs many technical concepts from complexity theory and
so we refer the reader to Subsection 2.2 from Chapter 2 for a refresher on these
topics.
6.1 Main results
Our results are centred around the concept of a generalised encryption scheme
(GES) introduced by Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian [171] which is formally de-
fined in Section 6.2. Roughly speaking, a GES is a protocol between a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time classical client (BPP) and a computationally unbounded
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server for computing on encrypted data. The client sends the server a descrip-
tion of some function f , to be evaluated. Using some polynomial-time algorithm
denoted E, the client encrypts its input x, and sends E(x) to the server. The
server and the client then interact for a number of rounds which is polynomial
in the size of x. Finally, using a polynomial-time decryption algorithm, denoted
D, the client decrypts the server’s responses and obtains f(x) with probability1
1/2 + 1/ poly(|x|). Importantly, throughout the protocol the server learns, at
most, the size of x. Having the server be computationally unbounded means the
scheme requires information-theoretic security.
Abadi et al. gave a complexity theoretic upper bound on the types of functions
that admit such a scheme. They showed that any function f that can be evaluated
using a GES is contained in the class NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. We give a simplified
proof of this fact in Section 6.2. They then observed that if NP-hard functions
could be computed using a GES then that would imply NP ⊂ NP/poly∩coNP/poly
and, in particular, NP ⊂ coNP/poly. Informally, it seems that determining the
truthfulness of this containment is no easier than determining whether P = NP.
However, using a result of Yap [172], the containment implies that the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at the third level. In other words, it seems unlikely that NP-
hard problems would admit a GES.
What about BQP-hard functions? Just like the case of NP-hard functions,
from the Abadi et al. result, we observe that having a GES for BQP-hard functions
leads to BQP ⊂ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. While we would similarly like to argue
that such a containment leads to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, even
BQP = P isn’t known to lead to such a collapse. However, we can still give some
indication as to why the containment seems unlikely.
Suppose that in the GES, the number of rounds of interaction between the
client and the server, is upper bounded by a polynomial of fixed degree, d > 0,
in the size of the input2. In that case, it can be shown that BQP ⊂ NP/O(nd) ∩
coNP/O(nd). For this case, we can prove the following:
Theorem 16. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle Od, such that BQPOd is not
contained in (NP/O(nd))Od.
Essentially, the theorem shows that, given access to some black box function,
represented by the oracle Od, there are problems that can be solved efficiently by
a quantum computer, but which do not admit a generalised encryption scheme
with bounded communication. Since the oracle is parametrised by d, we are in
fact giving a family of oracles. The specific problem we define, to prove this
separation, is a version of Simon’s problem [173].
Simon’s problem is the following: for an input of size n, and given oracle
access to a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, that is promised to be either 1-to-1, or
2-to-1 and periodic3, decide which is the case. Simon provided a polynomial-time
1It should be noted that the 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|) success probability concerns only the case of
decision problems.
2This is a limitation only for the communication between the client and the server. The
client itself, is still assumed to be a BPP machine whose running time can be any polynomial.
3In other words, there exists a period s ∈ {0, 1}n, s 6= 0n, such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n,
x 6= y, it is the case that f(x) = f(y) iff. x = s⊕ y.
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quantum algorithm for solving this problem, thus showing that it belongs to BQP,
relative to the function oracle. For the case in which one should accept when the
function is 2-to-1, the problem can be shown to be outside of NP, relative to the
oracle. Thus, Simon’s problem provides an oracle separation between BQP and
NP.
Note that in Simon’s construction, the oracle function is the same for all
inputs of size n. Such a setup would not be useful in our case, since this problem
can be solved with one bit of advice: for all inputs of size n, the advice bit
simply specifies whether the function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 and periodic. Thus,
in our proof of Theorem 16, for each input, the oracle will provide access to a
different function. The problem we define, relative to this oracle, is again to
decide whether the function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 and periodic. However, we can
show that by considering a sufficiently large domain for these functions, in other
words f : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD , for sufficiently large D4, the problem is not
contained in (NP/O(nd))Od , but is nevertheless, contained in BQP. The proof
uses a diagonalization argument and can be found in Section 6.3.
Unfortunately, the same oracle cannot be used to also separate BQP from
NP/poly. This is because, in our construction, D is a function of d and to prove
a separation with respect to NP/poly, we would have to consider an oracle that
works for all possible values of d. We leave that as an open problem. Note that
having such an oracle would also separate BQP from AM (since AM ⊂ NP/poly),
a problem which has eluded complexity theorists for some time [14].
One can argue that oracle results do not constitute compelling evidence re-
garding the relationship between complexity classes. Indeed, it has been known
for a while that there exist oracles such that PO 6= NPO and oracles such that
PO = NPO. Moreover there are non-relativizing results such as IP = PSPACE
while at the same time there exists an oracle such that IPO 6= PSPACEO. Nev-
ertheless, oracles allow us to study the query complexity of problems in different
models of computation. In fact there are situations in practice where computer
programs are restricted to making black-box calls to functions in order to deter-
mine their properties [174]. Apart from this, oracle results have proven to be
insightful for the development of algorithms and complexity theory. Most no-
tably Simon’s oracle separation between BPP and BQP led to Shor’s algorithm
for factoring and computing the discrete logarithm [3]. For more arguments in
defence of oracles, see Section 1.3 of [14].
To add more weight to our conjecture, that BQP computations do not admit
a GES, we consider the case of having a GES for sampling problems, rather than
decision problems. To be more specific, we will consider a GES for BosonSam-
pling. This would imply that a BPP machine could delegate the task of sampling
bosons from a linear optics network to a quantum computer, while keeping the
description of that network unconditionally hidden and only leaking its size to
the server. To be precise, we will be interested in the case of exact sampling,
rather than approximate sampling. In other words, if a GES for BosonSam-
pling exists, the client can sample exactly from the BosonSampling distribu-
4Specifically, we require D to be large enough so that nD is greater than the size of the
advice string, i.e. O(nd).
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tion mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2, of Chapter 2. Given this assumption, one can
prove the following:
Theorem 17. If BosonSampling admits a GES, then for any matrix X ∈
{−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size 2n−Ω( nlogn), making polynomially-sized
queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing the permanent of X.
Computing the permanent of a matrix is a problem known to be #P-hard.
By Toda’s theorem, this means that if computing the permanent were possible at
any level of the polynomial hierarchy, the hierarchy would collapse at that level.
Moreover, the best known algorithm for computing the permanent, by Björklund,





[175]. Prior to that, the leading algorithm for
computing the permanent was Ryser’s algorithm, developed over 50 years ago,
which requires O(2nn) arithmetic operations [176]. We therefore conjecture that
the circuits of Theorem 17 do not exist and, thus, that there can be no GES for
BosonSampling. The proof of Theorem 17 is provided in Section 6.4.
While having a GES for BQP computations seems unlikely, we know that
giving the client some minimal quantum capabilities removes this limitation. This
is evidenced by the existence of schemes such as UBQC. In the spirit of the Abadi
et al. result, it is natural to consider quantum generalised encryption schemes (or
QGES), in which the client is no longer classical, and investigate the complexity-
theoretic upper bounds of functions which admit such a protocol. For the QGES,
we are still assuming unconditional security and that the encryption scheme leaks
at most the size of the input. However, unlike the GES, the client is now assumed
to be a BQP machine5. Additionally, the client sends one quantum message to
the server at the beginning of the protocol. The rest of the communication is
classical. Lastly, we impose a further restriction, known as offline-ness. Roughly
speaking, an offline protocol is one in which the client does not need to commit to
any particular input (of a given size), after having sent the quantum message to
the server. In other words, the quantum message only depends on the size of the
input. This property is shared by UBQC and all other blind quantum computing
protocols. With these assumptions, we can prove the following:
Theorem 18. If a function, f , admits an offline QGES leaking at most the size
of the input, then f ∈ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly.
Note that the class QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly can be seen as a quantum
analogue of the class NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly, for GES. Again, in the spirit of the
Abadi et al. result, one can ask whether NP-complete functions are contained in
this class. In other words, does giving quantum capabilities to the client increase
the class of functions, that can be securely evaluated, so as to contain NP? We
give indication that the answer is no:
5The client need not be a full-fledged quantum computer and can in fact only posses a single-
qubit preparation device, as in UBQC. However, in proving our results for quantum generalised
encryption schemes it is simpler to assume that the client is a BQP machine. It should be noted
that our results concerning the computational power of the QGES remain valid even when the
client’s power is strictly less than BQP, as in UBQC and related blind protocols.
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This is as close to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy as one can reason-
ably hope to get, given a quantum hypothesis. Hence, while a QGES does (by
definition) allow for delegating BQP computations, it seems to be no more useful
than the regular GES at delegating NP-hard functions.
Quantum computers could, in principle, solve NP-complete problems quadrat-
ically faster than classical computers, thanks to Grover’s algorithm [177]. In fact,
as is mentioned in [178], there are also NP-complete problems for which quantum
computers provide a superpolynomial speedup, at least with respect to the best
known classical algorithms. However, our no-go theorem indicates that clients
cannot exploit such speedups by delegating the computation to the server, even
when allowing some quantum communication, if we also want to keep their inputs
hidden in an information-theoretic sense. Proofs of these results can be found in
Section 6.5.
6.1.1 Related work
The problem of computing on encrypted data was first considered by Rivest,
Adleman and Dertouzos [79], which then led to the development of homomorphic
encryption and eventually to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). In homomor-
phic encryption a client has efficient algorithms for encryption Enc, and decryp-
tion Dec, satisfying the property that Dec(f, x, Eval(f, Enc(x))) = f(x), for any
function f from some set C, and some algorithm Eval. The client will instruct a
server to compute an evaluation of f on the encrypted input Enc(x), using the
Eval procedure. The server must then send this evaluation to the client, who
will decrypt it, resulting in f(x). Of course, the server should not be able to
infer information about x from Enc(x), a condition which is typically expressed
through semantic security [179]. The scheme is therefore secure under suitable
cryptographic assumptions. If the set C contains all polynomial-sized circuits
then the scheme becomes a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The first such
scheme was proposed by Gentry, in [80]. Since then, a number of FHE protocols
have been developed, that rely on more standard cryptographic assumptions and
having more practical requirements [81–83].
While FHE is similar to GES in many respects, there are also significant dif-
ferences. For starters, FHE protocols have only one round of interaction between
the client and the server, whereas GES allows for polynomially many rounds.
Additionally, GES assumes the server is computationally unbounded and hence
requires information-theoretic security. In contrast, FHE relies on computational
security. More precisely FHE schemes have semantic security against polynomial-
time (quantum) algorithms [80].
The problem of quantum computing on encrypted data was introduced by
Childs [75] and Arrighi and Salvail [180]. Further development eventually led
to UBQC [23, 52] and the blind quantum computing scheme of Broadbent [181].
The latter was followed by the construction of the first schemes for quantum fully
homomorphic encryption (QFHE) [182,183].
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In the QFHE schemes of [182,183], the server is a BQP machine and the client
has some quantum capabilities of its own, although it is not able to perform uni-
versal quantum computations. Both the size of the exchanged messages and the
number of operations of the client are polynomial in the size of the input. More
recently, a QFHE scheme has been proposed in which the client is completely clas-
sical [169]. Similar to FHE, these protocols rely on computational assumptions
for security [184] and involve one round of back and forth interaction between
the client and the server. QFHE with information-theoretic security (and a com-
putationally unbounded server) has been considered by Yu et al. in [185], where
it is shown that it is impossible to have such a scheme for arbitrary unitary op-
erations (or even arbitrary reversible classical computations). Newmann and Shi
strengthened this result, by showing that it also impossible to have such a scheme
for delegating polynomial-sized quantum (or classical) circuits [186].
The possibility of a classical client delegating a blind computation to a quan-
tum server was considered by Morimae and Koshiba [187]. They showed that such
a protocol in which the client leaks no information about its input to the server
and there is only one round of interaction between them, leads to BQP ⊆ NP.
As mentioned, this is generally considered to be an unlikely containment. Fur-
thermore, Simon’s problem can be used to show that BQP 6⊆ NP, relative to an
oracle. In this chapter, we considered the more general setting of a GES for BQP
functions, where the number of rounds can be polynomial in the size of the input
and we allow the encryption to leak the size of the input. The question of whether
a GES, as defined in Abadi et al., can exist for quantum computations has been
raised before by Dunjko and Kashefi in [188].
We stress that our results are specifically about the implausibility of a GES
for BQP computations, rather than some other encryption scheme. This is an
important consideration, since relaxing the assumptions of the GES framework
can allow for the secure delegation of BQP problems. Specifically:
• Relaxing the requirement of information-theoretic security. In that case,
as mentioned, the QFHE scheme of Mahadev, or the QFactory protocol of
Cojocaru et al. allow for delegating BQP computations, as they rely on
computational security [169,170].
• Relaxing the requirement that the client leaks at most the size of the input
to the server. If one is allowed to leak more information then, a scheme
of Mantri et al. shows that it is again possible to delegate a quantum
computation to a server while still retaining some privacy [189].
• Relaxing the requirement that the client interacts with only one quantum
server. In this case, the RUV protocol and a number of other schemes
allow a classical client to delegate a blind quantum computation to multiple
servers as long as these servers share entanglement and are not allowed to
communicate during the protocol [31,32,106].
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6.2 Generalised encryption scheme
The basis of most of the results in this chapter is the generalised encryption
scheme or GES. We state its definition from [171]:
Definition 27 (Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES)). A generalised encryp-
tion scheme (GES) is a two party protocol between a classical client C, and an
unbounded server S, characterized by:
• A function6 f : ∆→ Σ, where ∆,Σ ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
• A cleartext input x ∈ Domain(f), for which the client wants to compute
f(x).
• An expected polynomial-time key generation algorithm K which works as fol-
lows: for any x ∈ Domain(f), with probability greater than 1/2+1/poly(|x|)
we have (k, success)← K(x), where k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). If the algorithm does
not return success then we have (k′, fail)← K(x), where k′ ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm E which works as follows: for
any x ∈ Domain(f), k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that
y ← E(x, k, s), where y ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic decryption algorithm D, which works as
follows: for any x ∈ Domain(f), k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we
have that z ← D(s, k, x), where z ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
And satisfying the following properties:
1. There are m rounds of communication, such that m = poly(|x|). Denote
the client’s message in round i as ci and the server’s message as si.
2. On cleartext input x, C runs the key generation algorithm until success to
compute a key (k, success) = K(x). This happens before the communication
between C and S is initiated, and the key k is used throughout the protocol.
3. In round i of the protocol, C computes ci = E(x, k, si−1), where si−1 denotes
the server’s responses up to and including round i − 1, i.e. 〈s0, s1...si−1〉.
We assume that s0 is the empty string. C then sends ci to S.
4. In round i of the protocol, S responds with si, such that si ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
5. At the end of the protocol, C computes z ← D(sm, k, x) and with probability
1/2 + 1/poly(|x|), it is the case that z = f(x).
6Note that f need not be a total function since it is defined on a subset of {0, 1}∗. Whenever
we say that f ∈ C, for some complexity class C, we mean that there exists a total function g ∈ C
such that g(x) = f(x), for all x ∈ Domain(f).
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Let us provide some intuition for this definition. The purpose of a GES is
to allow a client to compute some f(x) which it cannot compute with its own
resources. It does this by interacting with a computationally powerful server for
a number of rounds which is polynomial in the size of the input. Importantly,
the GES allows the client to hide some information about x from the server. We
make this statement more precise through the following definition:
Definition 28. Let X be a random variable denoting the input to a GES (in
other words the input will be some string x chosen with probability Pr(X = x))
and T (X) a random variable denoting the transcript of the protocol for input X
(in other words T (X) is a collection of all messages exchanged between the client
and the server, in the GES, on input X). We say that a GES leaks at most L(X)
iff. X and T (X) are independent given L(X).
Finally, we state the main theorem from [171] and provide a simple proof for it:
Theorem 20 (GES leaking size of input). If a function f admits a GES which
leaks at most the size of the input (i.e. L(X) = |X|), then f ∈ NP/poly ∩
coNP/poly7.
Proof. Suppose that f admits a GES which leaks at most the size of the input. To
show that f ∈ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly we prove that f ∈ NP/poly by constructing
an NP/poly algorithm for f which can also compute the complement of f (thus
also proving containment in coNP/poly). We start by first considering the one
round case. In other words, the protocol works as follows:
1. The client runs K(x) until success to produce an encryption key k.
2. The client computes the encrypted string y ← E(x, k, ‘’) (where the last
entry is the empty string) and sends it to the server.
3. The server sends a response r.
4. The client decrypts his response obtaining z ← D(r, k, x). With probability
greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|) we have that z = f(x).
Given that this is true, consider the following algorithm which takes x as input
and produces f(x) with probability greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|):
• Denoting |x| = n, the algorithm receives as advice some string xn ∈
Domain(f) such that |xn| = n as well as rn, where rn is the server’s re-
sponse when being sent yn ← E(xn, kn, ‘’). Here kn is simply some key
which can be used to encrypt xn. The only reason we include xn as part
of the advice is so that we can check if xn = x. If this is the case then the
algorithm simply decrypts rn obtaining f(x) with high probability. The
next steps assume that xn 6= x.
7Note that from the definition of f , Range(f) is not necessarily {0, 1}, corresponding to
a decision problem, but can be any subset of {0, 1}∗. In this case the correct containment
would be f ∈ FMA/rpoly, where FMA is the relational (or search) version of MA. Since we are
interested in decision problems, this distinction is not important and we can simply assume that
Range(f) = {0, 1}. In Section 6.4, we will however consider a GES for sampling problems. In
that case, the existence of a GES for a particular sampling problem implies that an MA/rpoly
algorithm can sample from the associated distribution.
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• From the assumption that the GES leaks at most the size of the input, there
must be some key k, such that yn ← E(x, k, ‘’). This is because if there
did not exist such a key and the server received yn he would know that the
input could not be x and hence more information would be leaked. More
formally, it would mean that the input and the transcript of the protocol
are not independent, given the length of the input, since certain transcripts
(certain y’s) can only occur for certain inputs. Since |k| = poly(n), the
algorithm can non-deterministically search for k.
• The algorithm now simply computes z ← D(rn, k, x), which by definition
of the GES, will be f(x) with probability greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(n).
We have therefore given an MA/rpoly algorithm for computing f(x). The MA
part comes from the non-deterministic search for k and the fact that the algo-
rithm is probabilistic. The advice is rpoly because the server’s response is drawn
from some probability distribution (which depends only on the length of the
input). However, it is known that MA/rpoly = NP/poly, from [190], therefore
f ∈ NP/poly. For the complement of f 8 the client can simply take the output of
the protocol and flip the bit (alternatively the decryption function could perform
this flip). This implies that f ∈ coNP/poly and so f ∈ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly
(see [171] for more details).
We now need to generalize this to the case where the client and the server
interact for a polynomial number of rounds. Because the protocol is leaking at
most the size of the input, denoted n, any transcript of the protocol will only
depend on n. Therefore we can make the algorithm’s advice to be a complete
transcript of the protocol drawn from the distribution of all possible transcripts
for input of length n. We would then again search non-deterministically for a
key k which would make the input x compatible with this transcript. From the
definition of the GES this again guarantees that we obtain the right outcome
with probability 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|).
Note that if the total communication between the client and the server (i.e.
the size of the transcript) were bounded by nd, for some constant d > 0, the above
argument shows that the functions computable in this setting are contained in
NP/O(nd). This is because, as we have seen, the transcript is given as advice9
and so it will also be bounded in length by O(nd).
It should be mentioned that if the client is a BPP machine and the functions
computable with the GES are contained in NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly then we should
in fact be working with the class BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly. However, it is not very
difficult to show that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. This can be
done using a result of Brassard [191] which shows that PNP∩coNP = NP ∩ coNP,
together with Adleman’s theorem (which states that BPP ⊂ P/poly) [192]:
8As mentioned, these containments are valid whenever f outputs one bit, corresponding
to a decision problem. For general functions having a larger range, the technically correct
containments would be in the relational version of MA/rpoly.
9Strictly speaking, the above argument shows that such functions would be contained in
MA with randomized advice of size nd. However, the proof that MA/rpoly = NP/poly can be
adapted to the setting of O(nd)-size advice.
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Lemma 8. BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Proof. It is clear that NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly ⊆ BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly, so that we
need only show that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. To do this,
we first use Adleman’s theorem [192], that BPP ⊂ P/poly, which we know is
relativizing and have that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ P/polyNP/poly∩coNP/poly. Next, it
is easy to show that P/polyNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ PNP/poly∩coNP/poly. This is because
the advice received by the P/poly machine can just as easily be obtained from the
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly oracle. In other words, for any given input x and advice a
for the P/poly machine, the P machine can simply query the NP/poly∩coNP/poly
oracle with x in order to obtain the same advice a10. It then simulates the P/poly
machine.
We have therefore reduced our problem to showing that PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. This can be done by adapting Brassard’s proof [191] that
PNP∩coNP = NP∩coNP. The essential part of that proof is to show that PNP∩coNP ⊆
NP, while the containment in coNP follows by complementation. The idea is that
for any PNP∩coNP algorithm, A, deciding some language, we can devise an NP
algorithm, NA, which also decides that language.
The NA algorithm will simulate A until it makes a query to the NP ∩ coNP
oracle. At this point NA can non-deterministically guess the response to this
query. To do so, note that if some language L ∈ NP ∩ coNP then it is the
case that L ∈ NP and Lc ∈ NP, where Lc is the complement of L. In other
words, there exist non-deterministic algorithms NL and NLc for deciding L and
Lc, respectively. Assuming A’s query is for the language L, NA will simulate NL,
and for each non-deterministic branch of this simulation it will then also simulate
NLc . Since L and L
c are complementary, it cannot happen that both the NL and
the NLc parts of the branches are accepting. We will therefore have branches
in which both NL and NLc were rejecting and branches in which either NL was
accepting or NLc was accepting. These latter branches determine the answer to
the query for the NP ∩ coNP oracle. The NA algorithm will continue simulating
A on these branches and reject on all others.
We can see that the above reasoning would also work if the oracle was
NP/poly∩ coNP/poly and the algorithm NA were an NP/poly algorithm receiving
some advice string whose length is polynomial in the size of the input. Our mod-
ified NA can continue to simulate the oracle queries if we assume that the advice
it receives is the concatenation of advices received by the NP/poly∩coNP/poly or-
acle for all queries. Since the number of queries is polynomial, the concatenation
will also be polynomially bounded and hence constitutes a valid advice string
for an NP/poly algorithm. Therefore PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly and through
complementation PNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly.
Because BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly ⊆ PNP/poly∩coNP/poly, our result follows immedi-
ately.
10The fact that the oracle responds with a single bit (acceptance or rejection) is not a problem,
since the P machine can query the oracle for each bit of a.
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6.3 GES for BQP
In order to prove Theorem 16 we will construct an oracle using a version of
the complement of Simon’s problem [173]. Recall that Simon’s problem is the
following: given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n (for some n ∈ N) which is
promised to be either 1-to-1 or have Simon’s property (f is 2-to-1 and there ex-
ists some s ∈ {0, 1}n, s 6= 0n, such that for x 6= y, f(x) = f(y) iff x = s ⊕ y),
decide which is the case. In particular, for Simon’s problem, the deciding al-
gorithm should accept if the function has Simon’s property and reject if is a
1-to-1 function. The complement of this problem simply flips these two condi-
tions. If one is not given an explicit description of f but restricts access to this
function through an oracle then Simon’s problem can be used to separate BPP
from BQP. To be precise, the oracle is some function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
such that for n ∈ N, if we consider O restricted to the domain {0, 1}n, denoted
On : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, On is either a 1-to-1 function or a function satisfying Si-
mon’s property. A language which is then contained in BQPO but not in BPPO is
L(O) = {0n|On is a function with Simon’s property} as shown in [173]. In fact,
as we’ve mentioned before, the complement of this language11 can be used to
separate BQPO and NPO [14]. Lemma 9, which we prove below, is essentially a
proof of this fact for a slightly different version of the oracle.
In our case, we would ideally like to separate NP/polyO and BQPO. The
intuition is the following: instead of considering a function On for each input
length n, we consider a function Ox, for each input string x ∈ {0, 1}n. In other
words, for a fixed input length, n, there will be 2n functions which need to be
decided. But the NPO machine receives only a polynomial amount of advice,
which is the same for all of these 2n functions. Therefore this advice should be
insufficient to help the NPO machine in deciding all of these inputs. Formalizing
this intuition for any polynomial is problematic, as will become clear later (see
the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 10). For this reason, we will fix the
degree of the polynomial and prove that BQPO 6⊆ NP/O(nd). To do this, let us
first prove the separation between BQPO and NPO, for our specific oracle.
Lemma 9. There exists an oracle O, based on the complement of Simon’s prob-
lem, such that BQPO 6⊆ NPO.
Proof. The separation of BQP and NP with respect to an oracle has been shown
a number of times before, [12,13,193], including with the complement of Simon’s
problem. However, we prove this lemma for our particular version of Simon’s
problem where instead of assigning a function to each input length, we assign
different functions to different inputs.
We proceed by defining an oracle O and a language which we refer to as the
complement of Simon’s problem or coSimon(O), such that coSimon(O) ∈ BQPO
and coSimon(O) 6∈ NPO. We start with the latter as it also clarifies what the
11Note that Simon’s problem is a promise problem, so when speaking about the complement
of L(O) we are in fact referring to Lc(O) = {0n|On is a 1-to-1 function}.
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oracle should do:
coSimon(O) = {〈1n, i〉 |i ∈ {0, 1}n and f(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x) is a 1-to-1 function}
(6.1)
Strictly speaking, the problem we are defining is a promise problem, so the set
defined above is the set of yes instances to the problem, whereas the set of no
instances is not the complement but the set:
{〈1n, i〉 |i ∈ {0, 1}n and f(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x) is a Simon function} (6.2)
Here, by “Simon function” we mean a function having Simon’s property.
It is clear from this definition that the oracle O is the one providing the
functions for which we want test whether they are 1-to-1 or have Simon’s prop-
erty. Of course, the whole point is to restrict access to the descriptions of those
functions and force the algorithm solving the problem to perform queries to the
oracle. It is also clear that for any such O, coSimon(O) will be contained in
BQPO since we can just run Simon’s algorithm on the given input and flip ac-
ceptance and rejection. As is standard in quantum query complexity, we assume
that the behaviour of the quantum oracle is to perform the unitary operation
|1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |y〉 →O |1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |O(1n, i, x)⊕ y〉.
The oracle O can be viewed as some function taking as input the tuple (n, i, x)
and outputting fi(x), where fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a function which is either
bijective or has Simon’s property. Essentially n, which is given in unary, specifies
the domain size of our functions, i is an index for a particular function and x is the
value on which we evaluate fi. These last two elements of the tuple are specified
in binary and the oracle should be defined for all n ∈ N and all i, x ∈ {0, 1}n.
We will denote the set of functions used by the oracle for domain size n as Fn,
in other words:
Fn = {fi|i ∈ {0, 1}n and fi is defined as fi(x) ≡ O(1n, i, x)} (6.3)
Next, we construct a so-called adversarial oracle O. This just means defining
the family of sets {Fn}n∈N, in such a way that every non-deterministic Turing
machine using the oracle O fails to decide correctly coSimon(O). The proof will
use a diagonalization argument.
Since the set of non-deterministic Turing machines is countable we consider
the k’th machine, Mk, and check its behaviour when n = k+n0, for some n0 ≥ 0
which we define later on. Suppose we take some index i ∈ {0, 1}n, and tentatively
make the i’th function in Fk a 1-to-1 function. By simulating the behaviour of
Mk on this input we can check to see whether it accepts or rejects. If it rejects,
then we are done, since Mk will incorrectly decide this input. Conversely, if
Mk accepts, then by definition there exists a polynomial-sized path, in the non-
deterministic computation tree of the machine, which leads to acceptance. We
denote this path as π, and denote the length of π as l = poly(n). Mk can make
at most l queries to O on this path which we can represent as a list of tuples:
[(x1, fi(x1)), (x2, fi(x2))...(xl, fi(xl))], where x1, ...xl are the queried variables. An
example of such a path is shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Computation tree with queries
We now simply consider a Simon function f ′ that matched fi on the queried
values, i.e. f ′(x1) = fi(x1), ...f
′(xl) = fi(xl). How do we know such a function
exists? The number of possible bit masks s such that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) is 2n − 1
(since 0n is excluded). By having f ′ match fi on the l queried values it must
be that f ′ produces different outputs for each of these values. Therefore for any
i, j ≤ l, i 6= j it must be that s 6= xi ⊕ xj. This means that there are l(l − 1)/2
values of s which are restricted. But l = poly(n) and since s can take on 2n − 1
possible values, if n is sufficiently large so that 2n − 1 > l(l − 1)/2, then we
can simply choose an s which is not restricted. We therefore pick n0 to be large
enough so that 2n − 1 > l(l − 1)/2 and then take s to be some mask from the
available 2n − 1 − l(l − 1)/2. We thus have a Simon function which produces
the same responses to the queries on path π as the 1-to-1 function fi. If we now
just take fi to be f
′, then π will still be an accepting path and therefore Mk will
decide incorrectly on the input 〈1n, i〉.
Through this construction, all non-deterministic Turing machines will have
some input on which they decide coSimon(O) incorrectly, thus coSimon(O) 6∈
NPO concluding the proof.
Next, we prove:
Lemma 10. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle O, such that BQPO 6⊂
(P/O(nd))O.
Proof. To begin with, the class P/O(nd) is the class of problems solved by a
deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine M , which receives an advice of
length O(nd), when the input is of size O(n) (in our case the input size is 2n since
we defined n as being the length of inputs to the 1-to-1 and Simon functions).
In contrast to the previous case, instead of having the ability to non-
deterministically choose one of exponentially many paths, a polynomial-time
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Turing machine M receives some non-uniform information to help it in decid-
ing coSimon(O). Each advice determines a new behaviour for M which can even
involve a different sequence of queries to the oracle. What we want to show is
that irrespective of what advice M might receive, it still cannot always correctly
decide coSimon(O). To do this, we consider functions over a larger domain than
just n-bit strings. In other words, for each d we choose D > d such that the set
Fn contains 2n functions of the form f : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD . The oracle, which
we now denote as Od, still receives queries of the form (1
n, i, x), where |i| = n,
but now |x| = nD.
First we need to argue that the problem can still be decided in BQPOd . This
is indeed the case, since expanding the domains of the functions simply changes
the running time of the quantum algorithm from O(n) to O(nD). But since
D is just a fixed constant, the algorithm still runs in polynomial time, hence
coSimon(Od) ∈ BQPOd .
The harder part is showing coSimon(Od) 6∈ P/O(nd). As before, we will
prove this by diagonalization by considering the set of all (deterministic) Turing
machines and showing that no matter which advice the k’th machine receives it
cannot correctly decide coSimon(Od). Care must be taken, as each advice induces
a different behaviour and one must consider the oracle so that all possible advice
strings lead to failure. This is in contrast with the previous case where we were
only interested in the behaviour of one accepting path of the non-deterministic
computation tree.
Suppose we take the k’th deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine, Mk,
and examine what happens for an input of length n = k + n0, where n0 will be
chosen later (as before). Since the advice is a binary string of length O(nd) there
are 2O(n
d) possible advice strings. Whichever one Mk uses it will be the same for
all 2n inputs of length n.
Let us now consider the first index of length n, namely 0n and assign a 1-to-1
function f : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD to this index. We can inspect the behaviour of
Mk for f and for each possible advice string. If for more than half of the advice
strings Mk rejects, then we keep f at index 0
n. This means that half of all advice
strings have been eliminated (there is at least one input on which those strings
lead to Mk deciding incorrectly). If, however more than half of all advice strings
make Mk accept f , we will attempt to turn f into a Simon function while keeping
acceptance for those advice strings. This will again lead to the elimination of (at
least) half of all advice strings.
For each advice aj, where 1 ≤ j ≤ 2O(nd), Mk will make a sequence of poly-
nomially many queries to f . Denote that sequence of queries together with the
responses as:
σj = [(x1j, f(x1j)); (x2j, f(x2j)); ...(xlj, f(xlj))]
where l = poly(n). We now consider a Simon function f ′ : {0, 1}nD → {0, 1}nD
such that for all j in which Mk with advice aj and queries σj accepts and for all
t ≤ l, we have that f ′(xtj) = f(xtj). In other words f ′ will give identical responses
to the queries which make Mk accept. Since t ranges from 1 to l = poly(n) and
j ranges from 1 to 2O(n
d), the maximum number of variables which are queried
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is of order 2O(n
d). But unlike in the previous lemma, this number is exponential
in the size of the input, so how can we be sure that such a Simon function even
exists? The trick is that we can choose the domain size through D and make it
large enough to accommodate for a Simon function with this property.
As before, because f is bijective, no two queried variables will produce the
same answer. Therefore, there cannot be a bit mask s (|s| = nD) relating any pair
of the 2O(n
d) queries. These will be the restricted values of s. The total number
of such values is also of order 2O(n
d), however the total number of possible values
is 2O(n
D). Thus, if we simply choose D such that 2O(n
D) > 2O(n
d) then we can find
a Simon function f ′ which matches the responses of f on the 2O(n
d) queries.
Hence, for this case if we use f ′ as the function for index 0n we will eliminate
half of the possible advice strings. Thus, no matter how Mk behaves we are able
to eliminate half of all possible advice strings with our first input of length 2n.
Clearly this process can be repeated for the next index and so on until the last
index. We are effectively halving the number of potentially useful advice strings
with each index. Since we are doing this 2n times, to eliminate all possible advice
strings we just need to ensure that 2O(n
d)/22
n




this, simply choose n0 (recall that n = k+n0) large enough so that the inequality
holds.
We therefore have that for all k, and for all possible advice strings, there
will always be an input to coSimon(Od) which is decided incorrectly, hence
coSimon(Od) 6∈ P/O(nd).
Note that the same proof would not work for P/poly. A crucial element in our
proof was the fact that we can make D (which determines the size of the domain
of each function) to be much larger than d (which determines the length of the
advice). But this is only possible because d is fixed from the very beginning. If the
advice length could be any arbitrary polynomial then no matter what constant
value of D we decided upon for our oracle, there would always be some d > D and
hence some polynomial length of the advice string for which the proof does not
work. A possible “fix” would be to make D part of the input in some form, so that
it too can increase. So if, say, D was included in the input as a g(n) unary string,
where g is some monotonically increasing function, then for sufficiently large n,
g(n) > d. But we immediately notice the problem with this approach. While it
is true that in this case the problem cannot be decided in P/polyO it would also
no longer be decidable in BQPO either. This is because the query complexity of
the quantum algorithm becomes O(ng(n)) which is no longer polynomial unless g
is the constant function. Hence, proving separation from P/poly seems to require
some non-trivial modification of this proof or a totally different technique.
Finally, we can prove Theorem 16 by combining the previous two results.
Proof of Theorem 16. The oracle Od will be defined in the exact same way as for
the P/O(nd) case. The same reasoning as before applies here. Take the k’th non-
deterministic Turing machine and examine its behaviour for some input 〈1n, i〉,
where n = k + n0 and n0 is chosen as before. For each index, we tentatively pick
a 1-to-1 function and examine what the machine does for each advice of length
O(nd). If more than half of the advice strings lead to rejection then we keep the
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bijective function and proceed to the next index. Otherwise we replace it with
a Simon function. In this case, for each advice in which the machine accepts,
there will be some polynomial-sized path leading to acceptance. We will pick one
accepting path for each advice on which the machine accepts and ensure that the
Simon function produces the same responses to the queries on those paths. This
reduces the problem to the previous case. We know that for sufficiently large D
such a function exists and therefore each index will render half of the possible
advice strings useless. By also choosing n0 large enough we can make sure that
all advice strings are eliminated and thus that the problem is incorrectly decided
by all non-deterministic Turing machines irrespective of the advice (of length
O(nd)). Thus coSimon(Od) 6∈ NP/O(nd), concluding the proof.
The advantage of this proof technique is that the NP/O(nd) case reduces to
the P/O(nd) case. We therefore conjecture that if there is some modification of
our proof allowing it to work for P/poly it would also work for NP/poly. Of course,
this technique relies on the crucial aspect of knowing an asymptotic bound for
the polynomial which determines the length of the advice. This allows us to
always choose a larger polynomial for the size of the domain of the functions to
be queried.
6.4 GES for BosonSampling
To prove Theorem 17, we first need to show a number of results concerning
permanents of matrices12. The purpose of these results is to eventually show
that having an oracle for estimating the squared permanent of a matrix taking
values in {−1, 0, 1}, yields a polynomial-time algorithm, with random access to
nO(n) bits of advice, for exactly computing the permanent. This result together
with the assumption that a GES allows the client to sample exactly from the
BosonSampling distribution and a result of Björklund, from [175], will allow
us to prove Theorem 17.
Let us first introduce some helpful notation: for a matrix, A, we will denote
Ai,j as the matrix obtained by deleting row i and column j from A.
Lemma 11. Let X = (xi,j) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n. There exists a matrix Z = (zi,j) ∈
{−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2) such that:
• zn+2,n+2 = 0
• Per(Z) = −Per(X)
• Per(Zn+2,n+2) = Per(X1,1)






where Sn is the symmetric group of all permutations of the elements 1 up to n.
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Proof. Let Z be the following matrix:
Z =

xn,n xn,n−1 . . . xn,1 0 0






x1,n x1,n−1 . . . x1,1 1 −1
0 0 . . . 1 0 1
0 0 . . . −1 −1 0

We can see that zn+2,n+2 = 0. It is also not difficult to see that Per(Z
n+2,n+2) =
Per(X1,1), through a Laplace expansion. We now perform a Laplace expansion
along the last row of Z, to compute its permanent:
Per(Z) = −(Per(Zn+2,n+1) + Per(Zn+2,n)) (6.4)
But Per(Zn+2,n) = Per(X1,1) and Per(Zn+2,n+1) = Per(X) − Per(X1,1) hence
Per(Z) = −Per(X).
Lemma 12. Let X = (xij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, Z = (zij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m, m ≥ 2,
such that zm,m = 0 and W = (wij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(m+n−1)×(m+n−1) defined as follows:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 . . . z1,m 0 . . . 0






zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n






0 0 . . . xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

Then, it is the case that:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Zm,m)Per(X) (6.5)
Proof. We will prove this by induction over m. For the m = 2 case we have:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 0 . . . 0
z2,1 x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n





0 xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

By doing a Laplace expansion along the first row of W , we get:









So Per(Z) = z1,2z2,1 and Per(Z
2,2) = z1,1, therefore:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Z2,2)Per(X) (6.7)
We now assume the relation is true for m− 1 and prove it for m. To do this, we







The reason for separating the terms this way, is because W 1,i, with i < m, is of









Where Z(1,m),(i,m) is obtained from Z by deleting rows 1 and m and columns i
and m. Taking common factors we get:















(1,m),(i,m)) = Per(Zm,m) (6.11)
since it is a Laplace expansion along the first row of Zm,m. This leads to:








The matrix W 1,m is of the same form as W :
W 1,m =







zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m−1 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . zm,m−1 x1,2 . . . x1,n






0 0 . . . 0 xn,2 . . . xn,n

We can see this by taking:
ZW 1,m =





zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m−1
zm,1 zm,2 . . . 0
 XW 1,m =

zm,m−1 x1,2 . . . x1,n




0 xn,2 . . . xn,n

Together with the induction hypothesis this gives us:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(ZW 1,m)Per(X
1,1
W 1,m) + Per(Z
m−1,m−1
W 1,m )Per(XW 1,m) (6.13)
Now note that Per(XW 1,m) = zm,m−1Per(X
1,1
W 1,m) and Per(X
1,1
W 1,m) = Per(X
1,1),
hence:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(X1,1)(Per(ZW 1,m) + zm,m−1Per(Z
m−1,m−1
W 1,m )) (6.14)
But the term in parenthesis is Per(Z1,m) so:
Per(W 1,m) = Per(X1,1)Per(Z1,m) (6.15)
By substituting this into Equation 6.12, we get:

















1,i) = Per(Z) (6.18)
Thus:
Per(W ) = Per(Z)Per(X1,1) + Per(Zm,m)Per(X) (6.19)
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This concludes the proof.
Using the above lemmas, we can now show the following:
Theorem 21. Let O be an oracle that, given a matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, outputs
a number O(X) such that:
Per(X)2
g
≤ O(X) ≤ gPer(X)2 (6.20)
where g ∈ [1, poly(n)]. Then, for any X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n there exists a polynomial
time algorithm for computing Per(X), which has random access to nO(n) bits of
advice and making poly(n) queries to O.
Proof. The theorem shows that having an oracle for computing a multiplicative
approximation for the squared permanent of a matrix, implies the existence of
a polynomial time algorithm, with nO(n) bits of advice, that can compute the
permanent exactly.
The proof of this theorem is inspired from a similar result of Aaronson and
Arkhipov (see Theorem 4.3 from [71]). In that case, the oracle was outputting
a multiplicative approximation of the squared permanent of an arbitrary real
matrix. In our case, however, the matrices are restricted to entries from {−1, 0, 1},
which means that we cannot directly use that result.
We prove the theorem by induction. For the case of n = 1 the algorithm
simply outputs X. Suppose now that we have an algorithm for computing the
permanents of (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrices with entries from {−1, 0, 1}. We will
use this algorithm to compute the permanent of X. Firstly, if O(X) = 0, then
Per(X) = 0 and we are done. Additionally, we are going to use the oracle to
check if any of the (n− 1)× (n− 1) minors of X are non-zero. If all of them are
zero, then Per(X) = 0 again and we are done. So let’s assume that Per(X) 6= 0
and Per(X1,1) 6= 013.
We know from Lemma 12, that if we take a matrix Z = (zij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×m,
m ≥ 2, such that zm,m = 0 and then construct:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 . . . z1,m 0 . . . 0






zm−1,1 zm−1,2 . . . zm−1,m 0 . . . 0
zm,1 zm,2 . . . x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n






0 0 . . . xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,n

we have that:
Per(W ) = Per(Zm,m)Per(X) + Per(Z)Per(X1,1) (6.21)
13The permanent is invariant under permutations of rows and columns. Thus, if X has a
non-zero minor, we can simply permute the columns of X, so that X1,1 is that minor.
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If Per(W ) = 0 and Per(Zm,m) 6= 0, then:
Per(X) = −Per(X1,1) Per(Z)
Per(Zm,m)
(6.22)
From Lemma 11, we know that for any n×nmatrixX, there exists an (n+2)×(n+
2) matrix Z, such that zn+2,n+2 = 0, Per(Z) = −Per(X) and Per(Zn+2,n+2) =
Per(X1,1). If one used such a Z in the construction of W , then it is immediate
that Per(W ) = 0 and that Per(Zn+2,n+2) 6= 0. The algorithm will search for such
a Z, construct the corresponding W and use the oracle to test if Per(W ) = 0.
If the permanent of W is zero, then one can compute the permanent of X using
Equation 6.22.
But how do we search for Z and, furthermore, how do we compute
Per(Z)/Per(Zn+2,n+2)? This is where the advice enters the picture. Note that
since Z ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2), we have that:
− (n+ 2)! ≤ Per(Z) ≤ (n+ 2)! (6.23)
hence, there are at most nO(n) possible values for the permanents of Z matri-
ces. Similarly, there are at most nO(n) possible values for the permanents of the
Zn+2,n+2 minors of Z matrices.
The advice, to our algorithm, will consist of tuples (Zi, P er(Z
n+2,n+2
i ), fi =
Per(Zi)/Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i )), comprising of a matrix Zi together with the permanent
of its top left (n+1)×(n+1) minor and the ratio between that matrix’s permanent
and the permanent of its top left minor, with i ≤ ncn, for some constant c >
0. Here Zi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(n+2)×(n+2), with the bottom right entry being 0 and
Per(Zn+2,n+2i ) 6= 0. The matrices in the tuples are such that all possible values for
the fraction fi = Per(Zi)/Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i ) are covered. From the above discussion,
it’s clear that there will be at most nO(n) such tuples. Furthermore, the tuples
are sorted in ascending order with respect to those fractions.
For a given matrix X, our algorithm should search through this advice in
order to find a matrix Zi such that O(Wi) = 0, where Wi is constructed from X
and Zi as in Lemma 12. When such a matrix is found, we have that:
Per(X) = −Per(X1,1)fi (6.24)
But fi is given in the advice tuple and Per(X
1,1) is computed recursively by our
algorithm, hence we have computed the permanent of X.
To find the matrix Zi we will perform a binary search over the advice. Suppose
that i ranges from 1 to l = nO(n). Additionally, let αi = Per(Z
n+2,n+2
i ), so that:
Per(Wi) = αi(Per(X) + fiPer(X
1,1)) (6.25)
This means that computing
√
O(Wi)/|αi| gives us a multiplicative approximation
for |Per(X) + fiPer(X1,1)|. Because the fi values are sorted in ascending order,
this means that the function:
h(i) = Per(X) + fiPer(X
1,1) (6.26)
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is monotonically increasing as a function of i and furthermore that there is a
unique value i such that h(i) = 0. In our case, however, we have a multiplicative
approximation for |h(i)|, which we denote as t(i) =
√
O(Wi)/|αi|. This function
will be monotonically decreasing between 1 and i and increasing between i and
l. We look for i using binary search as follows: compute t(v) and t(w) for the
middle two points, v and w of the interval [1, l]. If either of them is 0, then we
are done. Otherwise, if t(v) < t(w), then search the interval [2, v], otherwise the
interval [w, l]. Repeat this recursively until the minimum is found.
Given that the advice is of length nO(n), the algorithm will query it (and
consequently O as well) at most O(n log n) times. Additionally, the construction
of each Wi takes time O(n
2) and since this is done at most O(n log n) times, the
complexity of this step is O(n3 log n). Finally, the algorithm performs recursive
calls to itself (in order to compute Per(X1,1)) and if we add up the running time
of each step we find that the total runtime will be O(n4 log n).
Theorem 22. If BosonSampling can be solved by a BPP/rpoly algorithm, then
for any matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size 2n−Ω( nlogn), making
polynomially-sized queries to an NP oracle, for computing Per(X).
Proof. The starting point for our proof is a result by Björklund [175]. He showed
that, for k ≤ n, the permanent of an n×n matrix, X, can be expressed as a linear
combination of poly(n)2n−k permanents of k×k matrices. It should be noted that
these matrices are not necessarily minors of the original matrix. Nevertheless,
each k × k matrix can be computed efficiently given the input matrix, X.
Our task will be to compute all of these poly(n)2n−k permanents and then
perform the linear combination so as to arrive at the permanent of X. We will
use the result of Theorem 21 together with the fact that BosonSampling can
be solved using a BPP/rpoly algorithm, to show that the permanent of a k × k
matrix can be computed in polynomial time, using random access to kO(k) bits of
advice and polynomially-sized queries to an NP oracle. Crucially, the kO(k)-sized
advice will be the same for all k × k matrices. This means that all permanents
can be computed in poly(n)2n−k time with access to kO(k) bits of advice. The
explicit value of k, as a function of n, will be chosen later.
Consider a k× k matrix, M , and a value ε > 0, to be chosen later. We embed
εM , a scaled version of M , as a submatrix of a BosonSampling matrix AM . In
other words, AM ∈ Cm×k, with m = O(k5) (see [71] for more details). We then
have that the probability of detecting one photon in each output mode, a state
which we denote as |1〉, is:
p = Per(εM)2 = ε2k · Per(M)2 (6.27)
Since Per(M) ≤ k!, to ensure that p ≤ 1, it suffices to set ε = 1/k.
If a BPP/rpoly machine can simulate the output distribution of a BosonSam-
pling instance, AM , that means that:∑
y
qyPr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) = p (6.28)
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where A is a BPP algorithm and y is the rpoly advice string, of size polynomial
in k, drawn from the distribution Dk = {qy}y. Note that Dk only depends on k.
If we can estimate p up to multiplicative error in polynomial time (potentially
with the help of an NP oracle and kO(k) bits of advice) then we will effectively be
simulating the oracle O from Theorem 21.
To do this, first note that if Per(M) 6= 0, the smallest possible value of p is
1/kO(k). We will therefore consider our advice string to consist of kO(k) samples
from Dk, along with their associated probabilities14. Denote the set of these




qyPr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) (6.29)
as a multiplicative estimate for p. But A is a BPP algorithm, which means that
we can view it as a polynomial-time function, fA(AM , y, r) which receives as input
(apart from AM and y) a random string r ∈ {0, 1}l(k), for some polynomial l. The
function will output either 1, corresponding to the cases where A outputs |1〉, or
0, corresponding to the cases where A produces some other output. We therefore
have that:





fA(AM , y, r) (6.30)








qyfA(AM , y, r) (6.31)
Computing pest exactly would require summing exponentially many terms.
However notice that pest is a sum of exponentially many positive numbers, each of
which can be evaluated in polynomial time (given access to the kO(k) advice). For
this reason, we can use Stockmeyer’s approximate counting method to compute a
multiplicative estimate of pest [72]. This will, of course, also yield a multiplicative
estimate for p itself.
We have thus given an algorithm for computing a multiplicative estimate of
a k × k matrix M that works in time polynomial in k, performs queries to an
NP oracle and has random access to kO(k) bits of advice. This algorithm can now
be viewed as an implementation of the oracle O from Theorem 21. Using that
theorem, leads to a polynomial-time algorithm, with access to an NP oracle and
kO(k)-size advice, for computing Per(M) exactly. However, since the advice is the
same for all k× k matrices, by repeating this procedure for all poly(n)2n−k k× k
matrices and combining the results we obtain an algorithm for computing Per(X)
that runs in time poly(n)2n−k, uses kO(k) bits of advice and makes polynomially-
sized queries to an NP oracle.
14The fact that the advice has size kO(k) will ensure that, if p is non-zero, then a y such that
Pr(A(AM , y) outputs |1〉) > 0 is overwhelmingly likely to be sampled when we generate the
advice.
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The last step is to convert this algorithm into a circuit. Since the algorithm
has a running time of poly(n)2n−k, by choosing k = c n/ log n, for some suitable
constant c > 0, we will have circuits of size at most 2n−Ω(
n
log(n)). These circuits,
must also operate on the kO(k) bits of advice. Note that kO(k)  2n−Ω( nlog(n)).
To reproduce the random access to these bits, we will assume that the gates
have unbounded fan-in. The advice bits are therefore hardcoded into the circuit
and “fed” into each part of the algorithm that makes use of them. Since only
polynomially-many bits of the advice are used at any given point, this can only
increase the size of our circuit by a polynomial factor. This concludes the proof.
With the above result, the proof of Theorem 17 is immediate:
Proof of Theorem 17. We notice that the result of Theorem 22 relativises. In
particular, this means that if BosonSampling can be solved by a BPPNP/rpoly
algorithm, then for any matrix X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, there exist circuits of size
2n−Ω(
n
logn), making polynomially-sized queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing
Per(X). If we assume that there exists a GES for BosonSampling, this means
that there is an MA/rpoly algorithm for BosonSampling. But since MA/rpoly ⊆
BPPNP/rpoly, the result of Theorem 17 follows.
6.5 Quantum GES
6.5.1 An upper bound for QGES functions
Motivated by the existence of UBQC, and blind quantum computation in general,
we would like to know which functions admit a quantum GES or QGES. In a
sense, this section is dedicated to ‘quantizing’ the Abadi et al. result. First of all,
we need to define the QGES15:
Definition 29 (Quantum Generalised Encryption Scheme (QGES)). A quantum
generalised encryption scheme (QGES) is a two party protocol between a quantum
client C, and an unbounded server S, characterized by:
• A function f : ∆→ Σ, where ∆,Σ ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
• A cleartext input x ∈ Domain(f), for which the client wants to compute
f(x).
• An expected polynomial-time key generation algorithm K which works as fol-
lows: for any x ∈ Domain(f), with probability greater than 1/2+1/poly(|x|)
we have (k, success)← K(x), where k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|). If the algorithm does
not return success then we have (k′, fail)← K(x), where k′ ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
15Our definition of the QGES considers a single quantum message from the client to the
server. One could argue that a truly quantum GES would allow for the entire interaction
between client and server to be quantum. However, since we are interested in protocols that
minimise the amount of quantum interaction between the client and the server, our definition
of QGES restricts this interaction to a single quantum message.
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• A quantum polynomial-time algorithm QE, that takes as input classical bit
strings and produces as output a quantum state, which works as follows: for
any x ∈ Domain(f), k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that |y〉 ← QE(x, k), where
|y〉 ∈ H and dim(H) = 2poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm E which works as follows: for
any x ∈ Domain(f), k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we have that
w ← E(x, k, s), where w ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
• A polynomial-time deterministic decryption algorithm D, which works as
follows: for any x ∈ Domain(f), k ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) and s ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) we
have that z ← D(s, k, x), where z ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
And satisfying the following properties:
1. There are m rounds of communication, such that m = poly(|x|). Denote
the client’s message in round i as ci and the server’s message as si.
2. On cleartext input x, C runs the key generation algorithm until success to
compute a key (k, success) = K(x). This happens before the communication
between C and S is initiated, and the key k is used throughout the protocol.
C then runs QE(x, k) to obtain a quantum encryption of the input, |y〉 and
sends it to S16.
3. In round i of the protocol, C computes ci = E(x, k, si−1), where si−1 denotes
the server’s responses up to and including round i − 1, i.e. 〈s0, s1...si−1〉.
We assume that s0 is the empty string. C then sends ci to S.
4. In round i of the protocol, S responds with si, such that si ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|).
5. At the end of the protocol, C computes z ← D(sm, k, x) and with probability
1/2 + 1/poly(|x|), it must be that z = f(x).
The definition of QGES is similar to both that of the GES and that of UBQC.
In fact, it is easy to see the following:
Lemma 13. UBQC is a QGES for f ∈ BQP leaking at most the size of the input
x.
Proof. To show that UBQC is a type of QGES we only need to give implementa-
tions for the algorithms K, QE, E and D which are consistent with UBQC and
the properties of a QGES leaking at most the size of the input.
• Key generation, K. This is the step in which the client chooses the random
angles for the |+θ〉 states that it will send to the server as well as the bits
for randomly flipping the measurement outcomes. Thus, K simply takes as
input x and produces M = poly(|x|) random angles 〈θ1, θ2, ...θM〉 drawn at
random from the set {0, π/4, 2π/4, ...7π/4} and random bits 〈r1, r2...rM〉.
Thus the classical key is k = {〈θ1, θ2, ...θM〉, 〈r1, r2...rM〉}.
16It should be noted that it makes no difference for our definition if the client sends the whole
state |y〉 to the server or part of it. The state received by the prover will be mixed and the only
important property we require is that the client has a purification of this state.
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• Quantum encryption, QE. In this step the client uses to key to prepare
the qubits that it will send to the server. In other words QE(x, k) →
|+θ1〉 |+θ2〉 ... |+θM 〉.
• Computation, E. In round i, the output of E will be the angles ∆i =
〈δi,1, δi,2...δi,k〉 which the server should use to measure the qubits in layer
i. These are computed based on x, k and the result of the server’s pre-
vious responses. Concretely, for a particular qubit j, E will compute
δj = (−1)sjφj + θj + r′jπ, where φj is the computation angle (in part deter-
mined by x), θj is the randomization of the measurement and is contained
in the key k, and r′j is the randomization of the measurement outcomes
(computed by xor’ing previous measurement outcomes and the random pa-
rameter rj, contained in k).
• Decryption, D. The decryption procedure involves combining the measure-
ment outcomes with the secret parameters in order to extract the output
of the computation.
Since this is a BQP computation, the probability of obtaining the correct outcome
will be at least 2/3 > 1/2 + 1/poly(|x|). This shows that UBQC is a QGES.
Additionally, since we already know that UBQC leaks at most the size of x to
the server, this particular QGES leaks the same information.
UBQC is in fact an instance of a more particular type of QGES as it has the
property of being an offline protocol. What this means is that the client can
send a quantum state to the server, representing an encryption of the input, and
decide afterwards which input it intends to use. Essentially the client is free to
change its mind about the input and not commit to a particular input when the
protocol commences. More formally, we define offliness as follows:
Definition 30 (Offline QGES). Let x1, x2 ∈ Domain(f) be two different inputs
for f (x1 6= x2) and let |y〉 ← QE(x1, k) be a quantum encryption of x1 with some
compatible key k. A QGES is offline if there exists a polynomial-sized quantum
circuit which the client can apply locally on her system after having sent |y〉 to
the server, such that the state of her system and that of the servers are compatible
with her having chosen as input x2.
One might ask whether this property is not immediately satisfied by a QGES
leaking only the size of the input. Indeed, in the classical case, any encrypted
string sent by the client to the server must be compatible with all possible inputs
of the same size. In other words, there exists an efficient update procedure that
the client can perform in order to switch from one input to another. Thus, a GES
leaking only the size of the input is implicitly offline in this view.
But the situation is different in the quantum case. The condition that the
QGES leaks only the size of the input to the server is equivalent to saying that
the density matrix corresponding to the quantum encryption, which the server
receives, is the same for all inputs of the same size. Since the density matrix is the
same, that means that there exists a unitary (acting on the client’s system) which
can map one purification of this state, corresponding to one input, to another,
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corresponding to a different input. This unitary must be verifiable in the sense
that the client can check (using a quantum SWAP test) whether the unitary maps
to the correct purification. In the classical case, this is sufficient to ensure that the
procedure is efficient, since the mapping is just flipping the bits of one encryption
key into another. In the quantum case, however, this unitary need not have a
polynomial-sized quantum circuit representation.
Offliness simply imposes that such a circuit exist. UBQC trivially satisfies
this property, since, no matter which input the client wants to use, it will always
send random |+θ〉 states to the server. In other words, the procedure QE(x, k)
does not depend explicitly on x, only on |x|. Because we know that functions
which admit a GES are contained in the class NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly, it is natural
to ask what kind of containment we can find for functions which admit an offline
QGES such as UBQC. This leads us to Theorem 18, which we now prove:
Proof of Theorem 18. For an input x for which the client wants to compute






|kxi 〉K |yxi 〉E (6.32)
Where KC(x) is the set of encryption keys which are compatible with x (i.e.
could have resulted from the key generation algorithm acting on x, K(x)) and
|yxi 〉E ← QE(x, kxi ) is the quantum encryption of x using the key kxi . The indices
K and E specify whether the kets are quantum registers in the key register or the
encrypted state register, respectively. Essentially |ψx〉 is the equal superposition
of all keys and encryptions of the string x. If we trace out the key register, K,
the resulting density matrix is the mixed state of possible encrypted states which






|yxi 〉 〈yxi | (6.33)
The assumption that the protocol only leaks the size of the input x to the server
implies that for any two inputs x1, x2 it is the case that ρx1 = ρx2 . In fact,
something stronger is true. Recall that the definition of blindness says that the
quantum state of the server’s system as well as the distribution of his classical
messages are independent of x, given the size of x. Therefore, we should consider
a state comprising of his system and his response after receiving the quantum






|kxi 〉K UERS |yxi 〉E |0〉
⊗t
R |anc〉S (6.34)
Here, UERS is the unitary performed by the server in order to produce his re-
sponse, which will be stored in the response register, initially set to |0〉⊗tR , where
t = poly(|x|). This unitary will of course involve the encrypted state provided
by the client and the server’s private ancilla, denoted as |anc〉S (but will not in-
volve the key register). Note that in the actual protocol, the key register and the
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encrypted state register are not necessarily entangled. For example, in UBQC
they are only classically correlated. However, since we are considering the most
general case, we take the state to be entangled. Essentially the client’s system
can be thought of as a purification system for the encrypted quantum state sent
to the server. Additionally, it should be mentioned that the server’s response is
a classical bit string. Hence, the state in the response register, obtained through
the application of the unitary UERS, will be a probabilistic mixture over compu-
tational basis states. This, however, makes no difference in our proof and we can
just as well assume that his response is a general quantum state.
If we again trace out the register K we obtain some state σx = TrK(|φx〉 〈φx|).
This state encodes the distribution of possible messages exchanged by the client
and the server in one round of interaction, as well as the server’s private system.
Since ρx1 = ρx2 , it is also the case that σx1 = σx2 . This is exactly the blindness


















|kx2i 〉K UERS |yx2i 〉E |0〉
⊗t
R |anc〉S (6.36)
there exists a local unitary, VK , acting only on the key register which can map
|φx1〉 to |φx2〉, for any two inputs x1 and x2. In fact, let us examine the states of








|kx1i 〉K |yx1i 〉E |0〉
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|kx2i 〉K |yx2i 〉E |0〉
⊗t




These states are also related by VK . This can be inferred from the following
relations. First, we know that:
(VK ⊗ IERS) |φx1〉 = |φx2〉 (6.39)
And also that:
(IK ⊗ UERS) |χx1〉 = |φx1〉 (IK ⊗ UERS) |χx2〉 = |φx2〉 (6.40)
Therefore:
(IK ⊗ U †ERS)(VK ⊗ IERS)(IK ⊗ UERS) |χx1〉 = |χx2〉 (6.41)
But (IK ⊗U †ERS) and VK ⊗ IERS commute because they act on different systems
and therefore (IK ⊗ U †ERS) and (IK ⊗ UERS) will cancel out, leaving:
(VK ⊗ IERS) |χx1〉 = |χx2〉 (6.42)
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But because the protocol is offline, we know that VK must be a polynomial-sized
quantum circuit. Note that even if we trace out the server’s ancilla from the states
|φx1〉 and |φx2〉, the resulting states are still related by VK on the key register.
This allows us to define a QCMA/qpoly algorithm computing any function which


















which are simply superpositions over the valid keys for two different inputs x and






















which include the encrypted states and the server’s response. Lastly, we trace
out the server’s ancilla from both these states resulting in:
ωx = TrS(|φx〉 〈φx|) (6.47)
ωx′ = TrS(|φx′〉 〈φx′|) (6.48)
From the above argument the two states |κx〉 and |κx′〉 and the two states ωx and
ωx′ are related through the same polynomial-sized quantum circuit VK acting
only on the key register.
We can now present the algorithm. Let us first consider the one round case.
The algorithm would work as follows:
1. The input to the algorithm is some string x for which we want to compute
f(x).
2. The algorithm receives as advice the string x′ which is simply some string of
169
the same length as x. Additionally, it receives the state ωx′ . It is clear that
both of these only depend on |x| and have a length which is polynomial in
|x| hence constituting a valid advice.
3. From the definition of the key generating function, the algorithm can effi-
ciently produce the states |κx〉 and |κx′〉.
4. The classical witness is a description of the quantum circuit V †K .
5. The algorithm tests that V †K maps |κx′〉 to |κx〉. This can be done through
a quantum SWAP test.
6. Use V †K to map ωx′ to ωx.
7. By measuring the response register of ωx, the algorithm obtains the response
that the server would have produced in an interaction with the client in the
QGES protocol. Applying the decryption algorithm to this response will
yield the correct result f(x) with high probability.
The probability of success of the algorithm can be boosted by providing polyno-
mially many copies of ωx′ as advice and performing multiple SWAP tests. Addi-
tionally this algorithm can be made to compute the complement of f(x) as well
which would gives us a coQCMA/qpoly containment.
For the general case of polynomially many rounds, the only difference is that
the state ωx′ would also be entangled with a superposition of all possible tran-
scripts of the protocol. Since we know that transcripts are polynomially bounded
in length this is still a valid advice state. The application of V †K would map this
state to one containing the transcripts for input x. When the state is measured
the algorithm will obtain a sample transcript of the interaction between the client
and the server. This is then used together with the decryption algorithm to pro-
duce f(x). By the definition of the QGES we know that the possible transcripts
are such that the correct f(x) is obtained with high probability.
Note that depending on how we define the offline property of the protocol
we can get containments in different classes. For example, in this proof we have
assumed that while there is a polynomial-sized circuit allowing the client to map
from one input to another the client might not be able to arrive at this circuit in
polynomial time for any possible pair of inputs. This is why the description of the
circuit is given as a witness (since the client can always test the validity of this
circuit). However, if we additionally assumed that V †K can always be obtained
efficiently by the client, then we would no longer need the witness and we would
have that f ∈ BQP/qpoly.
Of course, just like with Theorem 20, one can ask whether the class of interest
should in fact be BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly since the BQP client is using the
QGES as an oracle. But just as BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly = NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly it is
the case that:
Lemma 14. BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly = QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly
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Proof. This proof is similar to the one showing that BPPNP/poly∩coNP/poly =
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly. Just like in that case, the inclusion QCMA/qpoly ∩
coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly is immediate and we need only
show that BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ QCMA/qpoly. The containment in
coQCMA/qpoly follows by complementation.
Consider a quantum algorithm QA for deciding problems in
BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly. We will show that this algorithm can be simu-
lated by a QCMA/qpoly algorithm, denoted NQA. Since BQP, QCMA and
coQCMA have bounded error in deciding problems, we can assume, from
standard amplification techniques, that this error is of order 2−poly(n), where n
is the size of the input. We will also assume that for all quantum algorithms
measurements are postponed until the end of the circuit.
We will treat the case without advice first, and then explain how to deal with
the quantum advice at the end. To start with, NQA will simulate QA until it
makes a query to the oracle. In the standard definition of oracles the oracle is just
a classical function that solves a decision problem. However, when dealing with
quantum algorithms such as QA it is also possible to speak of quantum oracles,
where the oracle can be viewed as some unitary operation (technically a sequence
of unitary operations for each possible input length, see [194] for more details)
which QA can query even in superposition. Our result will cover this more general
case of quantum oracles. We would therefore like the NQA algorithm to be able
to simulate this quantum oracle.
Firstly, just like in the classical case we have that if some language L ∈
QCMA ∩ coQCMA then L ∈ QCMA and Lc ∈ coQCMA, where Lc is the com-
plement of L. This means that there exist polynomial-sized quantum circuits
QL and QLc which take some input x along with classical witnesses w1 and w2,
respectively, and decide correctly, when the output is measured, with probability
at least, 1− 2−poly(|x|). In other words, QL receives as input |x〉 |w1〉 |0m〉 and QLc
receives as input |x〉 |w2〉 |0m〉, respectively, where m = poly(|x|). If we were to
run both QL and QLc on x, because L and L
c are complementary, the output
qubits, when measured, will also be complementary with high probability.
Assume that QL and QLc are circuits which act on t = poly(|x|) qubits. We
define a new quantum circuit called SimQuery which operates on 2t+ 1 qubits.
SimQuery applies QL to the first t qubits and QLc to the next t qubits. It then
applies a Pauli X to the output qubit of QLc and a CCNOT operation from the
output qubits of QL and QLc onto the the 2t+1’th qubit. It then applies X again




Lc on the first 2m qubits. An
illustration of this circuit (acting on the |00...0〉 input) is given in Figure 6.2.
The CCNOT operation flips its target qubit if the control qubits are in the
state |11〉. The effect of the first Pauli X is to flip the outcome when the control
qubits are in the state |10〉. Roughly speaking, SimQuery will flip the final qubit
if QL accepts and QLc rejects. The reason for then applying the two circuits
in reverse is to ‘uncompute’ their result and only leave the 2t + 1 qubit flipped
whenever QL accepts and QLc rejects.
We can now explain how NQA can use SimQuery to simulate a query of QA.
Suppose QA queries the oracle for some input x testing to see if it is in L, for some














· · · · · ·
|0〉 X • X
|0〉
Figure 6.2: Quantum circuit for SimQuery acting on the |00...0〉 input.
if x ∈ L and |x〉 |0〉 → |x〉 |0〉, with high probability, if x 6∈ L. NQA will then
run SimQuery with input |x〉 |w1〉 |0m〉 |x〉 |w2〉 |0m〉 |0〉, where w1 and w2 are the
witnesses from before and m = poly(|x|). The effect of this will be to flip the final
qubit if x ∈ L and leave it unchanged if x 6∈ L, with high probability. This is
true because of the complementarity of QL and QLc (when one accepts the other
rejects and viceversa, except with small probability).
This procedure will simulate the query that QA performs. NQA then uses the
last qubit from SimQuery as the query response qubit and continues to do this
for all other queries of QA and otherwise simulate QA exactly. Note that each
simulated query has some small probability of not matching the actual query of
QA when a measurement is performed. However, as mentioned, this probability
is exponentially small. Since there are polynomially many queries in total, by a
union bound, the probability that at least one simulated query behaves incorrectly
will still be exponentially small.
Adding quantum advice to this picture does not change much. Just like in
the classical case, we can assume that NQA receives as advice a concatenation
of all advice states used by the oracle of QA. The quantum circuits QL, QLc
and SimQuery are then extended with polynomially many qubits to act on this
advice as well.
It is therefore the case that BQPQCMA/qpoly∩coQCMA/qpoly ⊆ QCMA/qpoly ∩
coQCMA/qpoly and our result follows directly.
Note that in the QGES, the client need not be a fully BQP-capable machine (and
indeed, for UBQC the only quantum capabilities of the client are to prepare single
qubits).
What happens if we drop the “offline” requirement for this scheme? As men-
tioned, that would imply that the mapping from one purification of the encrypted
quantum state to another can in principle be any unitary operation so long as the
client can check that the correct mapping was performed (with high probability).
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Having such a weak restriction on this unitary makes it very difficult to impose
an upper bound on the types of computations that are allowed by such a scheme.
Indeed, the offliness condition plays a crucial role in our proof of Theorem 18.
At the same time, it is arguably a very natural condition to have in any realistic
protocol. We therefore leave the online case as an open problem.
6.5.2 QGES and NP-hard functions
Theorem 18 can be viewed as a quantum version of Theorem 20 which, as men-
tioned, was used by Abadi et al. to show that there can be no GES for NP-hard
functions unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. As we have stated before, for
quantum computers, the possibility of delegating NP-complete problems makes,
arguably, even more sense since Grover’s algorithm offers a quadratic speed-up in
solving such problems [177]. Alas, we show that even with a QGES, delegating
such problems seems unlikely.
Since we have shown that functions which admit an offline QGES are con-
tained in QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly, and since if NP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly ∩
coQCMA/qpoly then coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly, to prove Theorem
19, it suffices to show that if coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly then, informally speaking,
the polynomial hierarchy “comes about as close to collapsing as one could rea-





. Here a PromiseQMA oracle means an oracle for some
PromiseQMA-complete promise problem (ΠYES,ΠNO), whose responses can be ar-
bitrary on inputs x /∈ ΠYES ∪ ΠNO that violate the promise. We don’t even
demand that the oracle’s responses, on promise-violating inputs, be consistent
from one query to the next. On the other hand, it does need to be possible
to query the PromiseQMA oracle on some promise-violating inputs, without such
queries causing the entire algorithm to abort.
The starting point for all such collapse results, of course, is the Karp-Lipton
Theorem [195], which says that if NP ⊂ P/poly then ΠP2 ⊆ ΣP2 , and hence the
polynomial hierarchy collapses to the second level. An easy extension of the
Karp-Lipton theorem, proved by Yap [172], which we now reprove for complete-
ness, shows that if coNP ⊂ NP/poly, then PH collapses to the third level.
Proposition 1. If coNP ⊂ NP/poly, then ΠP3 ⊆ ΣP3 .
Proof. Abusing notation, here and later in this section we’ll use Φ, Ψ, etc. to
refer not only to SAT17 instances but to strings encoding those instances. Also,
if (say) Φ (x, y, z) is a SAT instance taking multiple strings as input, then by
Φ (x, y), we’ll mean the instance obtained from Φ by fixing the variables in x and
y, and leaving only the variables in z as free variables.
A ΠP3 sentence has the form
S = “∀x∃y∀z Φ (x, y, z) ”
17SAT stands for boolean satisfiability and a SAT instance, in our context, simply refers to
a boolean formula. The problem of deciding whether a given boolean formula admits and
assignment of variables that evaluates to true (i.e. a satisfying assignment) is NP-complete.
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where x, y, z are strings of some given polynomial size, and Φ is a polynomial-time
computable predicate (without loss of generality, a SAT instance). Under the
stated hypothesis, we need to show how to decide S in ΣP3 .
Let C be the assumed NP/poly algorithm for coNP, and let a be its advice.
Then by hypothesis, for all SAT instances Ψ, if Ψ is unsatisfiable then there exists
a witness w such that C (Ψ, w, a) accepts, while if Ψ is satisfiable then C (Ψ, w, a)
rejects for all w.
Our ΣP3 rewriting of S is now as follows:
There exists an advice string a, such that
(1) (Completeness of C) For all SAT instances Ψ, either there exists a z
that satisfies Ψ, or else there exists a w such that C (Ψ, w, a) accepts.
(2) (Soundness of C) For all SAT instances Ψ, all satisfying assignments z
for Ψ, and all w, the procedure C (Ψ, w, a) rejects.
(3) (Truth of S) For all x, there exists a y as well as a witness w such that
C (qΦ (x, y) , w, a) accepts. (In other words, there is no z that makes
Φ (x, y, z) false.)
Proposition 1 is what we seek to imitate in the quantum setting, getting
whatever leverage we can from the weaker assumption coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly.
Note that, had we assumed (say) coNP ⊂ QCMA/poly, it would be rou-
tine to mimic the usual Karp-Lipton argument, merely substituting the class
PromiseQCMA for NP at appropriate points in the proof of Proposition 1. This




. However, the fundamental
difficulty we face is that our hypothesized nonuniform algorithm uses quantum
advice states. And while a PromiseQMA machine can simply guess a quantum
advice state σ, it can’t then pass σ to an oracle, at least not with conventional
oracle calls. (To allow the passing of quantum states to oracles, we would need
quantum oracles, as studied for example by Aaronson and Kuperberg [194].)
To get around this difficulty, we’ll rely essentially on a 2010 result of Aaronson
and Drucker [196, 197], characterizing the power of quantum advice. These au-
thors proved that BQP/qpoly is contained in QMA/poly—and even more strongly,
Theorem 23. BQP/qpoly = YQP/poly.
Here YQP, known as Yoda quantum polynomial-time, is the class of problems
solvable by a polynomial-time quantum algorithm with help from a polynomial-
size untrusted quantum advice state that depends only on the input length n. In
other words, Theorem 23 says that we can simulate trusted quantum advice by
trusted classical advice combined with untrusted quantum advice, by using the
classical advice to verify the quantum advice for ourselves.
By using Theorem 23, to replace a quantification over quantum advice states
by a quantification over classical advice strings, Aaronson and Drucker were able
to show the following:
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Theorem 24. If NP ⊂ BQP/qpoly, ΠP2 ⊆ QMAPromiseQMA.
By adapting our argument from later in this section, one can actually improve
Theorem 24, to show that if NP ⊂ BQP/qpoly then ΠP2 ⊆ NPPromiseQMA. In any
case, we now seek a common generalization of the proofs of Proposition 1 and
Theorem 24, to get a collapse from the assumption coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly.
As Aaronson and Drucker [197] pointed out, a simple extension of their proof
of Theorem 23 gives QCMA/qpoly ⊆ QMA/poly, and even the following.
Theorem 25. QCMA/qpoly = YQ · QCMA/poly.
Here the YQ· operator simply adds untrusted quantum advice to whatever
(quantum) complexity class it acts on. Thus YQ · BQP = YQP, while for com-
pleteness:
Definition 31. YQ · QCMA is the class of languages L for which there exist
polynomial-time quantum algorithms C and V , such that for all input lengths n:
• There exists a polynomial-size quantum advice state σn such that V (0n, σn)
accepts with probability at least 0.99. If V (0n, σ) accepts with probability
at least 0.98, then we call the advice state σ “valid” for input length n.
• For all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n ∩L and all valid σ, there exists a polynomial-size
classical witness w such that C (x,w, σ) accepts with probability at least 2/3
.
• For all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n \ L, all classical witnesses w, and all valid σ, we
have that C (x,w, σ) accepts with probability at most 1/3.
In what follows, we’ll need one additional observation about the proof of The-
orem 25. Namely, in our YQ · QCMA/poly simulation of QCMA/qpoly, without
loss of generality we can choose the classical advice string a = an in such a way
that there’s essentially just one valid quantum advice state compatible with a.
Or more precisely: we can ensure that, for all ρ1, ρ2 such that V (0
n, a, ρ1) and
V (0n, a, ρ2) both accept with probability at least 0.98, and all x and w, we have
(say)




This is because Theorem 25, like Theorem 23, is proven via the method of
“majority-certificates,” in which given a polynomial-time quantum algorithm Q,
one verifies that an unknown quantum state ρ leads to approximately the desired
values of Pr [Q (x, ρ) accepts] for each of exponentially many different inputs x,
via a measurement of ρ that takes only polynomial time. We note that this works
only because of special structure in ρ—but for any state σ, there exists another
state ρ that has the requisite special structure, as well as a modified quantum
algorithm Q′, such that
Pr [Q′ (x, ρ) accepts] ≈ Pr [Q (x, σ) accepts]
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for all x.
We’re finally ready to prove Theorem 19.
Proof of Theorem 19. Essentially, we are going to show that if coNP ⊂




. A ΠP3 sentence has the form
S = “∀x∃y∀z Φ (x, y, z) ”
where x, y, z are strings of some given polynomial size, and Φ is a polynomial-
time computable predicate. Under the stated hypothesis, we need to show how
to decide S in NPNP
PromiseQMA
.
By Theorem 25, the hypothesis coNP ⊂ QCMA/qpoly is equivalent to
coNP ⊂ YQ · QCMA/poly. In other words: we can assume that there exists a
polynomial-time quantum algorithm C (Φ, w, a, σ), which takes as input a SAT
instance Φ, a classical witness w, a classical advice string a, and a quantum advice
state σ. Assuming a and σ are the correct YQ · QCMA/poly advice, C checks
whether w is a witness to Φ’s unsatisfiability. This is a sound and complete proof
system for coNP, in the sense that, again assuming the correctness of a and σ,
(i) for every unsatisfiable Φ, there exists a w such that C (Φ, w, a, σ) accepts
with probability at least 2/3,
(ii) for no satisfiable Φ does there exist a w such that C (Φ, w, a, σ) accepts with
probability more than 1/3.
Moreover, as discussed above, there exists an a such that the state σ is essen-
tially unique, in the sense that
Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ1) accepts] ≈ Pr [C (Ψ, w, a, ρ2) accepts]
for all valid ρ1, ρ2.
Our job is to rewrite S as an NPNP
PromiseQMA
sentence. Our rewriting will be as
follows:
There exists a classical advice string a such that
(1) for all valid quantum advice states ρ1, ρ2, all SAT instances Ψ, and all
assignments w, we have




(In words: the classical advice string a uniquely determines the behavior of
C, once we find a valid quantum advice state σ that’s compatible with a.)
(2) For all SAT instances Ψ, there exists a valid quantum advice state σ, as
well as either an assignment z that satisfies Ψ, or else a classical witness w
such that C (Ψ, w, a, σ) accepts with probability at least 2/3.
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(In words: the advice a leads to a complete procedure for deciding the class
coNP, and specifically the UNSAT problem, in YQ · QCMA/poly. That is,
once we find a valid advice state σ, the quantum algorithm C then accepts
every SAT instance Ψ that has no satisfying assignment.)
(3) For all valid quantum advice states σ, all SAT instances Ψ, all z, and all
w, if z satisfies Ψ then C (Ψ, w, a, σ) rejects with probability at least 2/3.
(In words: a leads to a sound procedure for deciding UNSAT. That is,
once we find a valid σ that’s compatible with a, the quantum algorithm C
accepts no SAT instance Ψ that has a satisfying assignment.)
(4) For all x, there exists a valid quantum advice state σ, as well as a y and a
classical witness w, such that C (qΦ (x, y) , w, a, σ) accepts with probability
at least 2/3.
(In words: C verifies that for all x, there exists a y such that qΦ (x, y) is
unsatisfiable. In other words, C verifies that for all x, there exists a y such
that for all z, we have Φ (x, y, z). In other words, C verifies the truth of
the ΠP3 -sentence S.)
As a point of clarification, whenever we quantify over quantum states (such
as σ), we can actually take a tensor product of a polynomial number of copies of
the states, as needed. Of course, we can’t rule out the possibility that we’ll get
a state that’s entangled across all the registers. Fortunately, though, we don’t
use the witness state registers in such a way that it ever matters whether they’re
entangled or not.
As a second point of clarification, in forming the statement above, whenever we
have a condition that involves a quantum algorithm (say, V or C) accepting with
probability at least 2/3, it’s implied that if the condition fails, then the algorithm
accepts with probability at most 1/3. This makes verifying the condition a
quantum polynomial-time operation. Likewise, for part (1), it can be guaranteed
that there exists an a such that, for all ρ1, ρ2 consistent with a and all Ψ and w,
the difference between the two acceptance probabilities is at most (say) 1/20. In
such a case, one can verify in quantum polynomial time that the difference is at
most 1/10.
With these clarifications, it’s not hard to see that we’ve given an NPNP
PromiseQMA
procedure. The NP at the bottom guesses the classical advice string a. The
NP in the middle guesses Ψ for part (2) and x for part (4), and is not needed for
parts (1) and (3). Finally, the PromiseQMA on top guesses the quantum advice
state σ (or ρ1, ρ2 for part (1)), as well as Ψ, w, y, and z as needed. Crucially,
quantum states are only ever guessed in the topmost, PromiseQMA quantifier:
once guessed, they never need to be passed on to another quantifier, which is
impossible with conventional oracle calls.
But why does the procedure we’ve given correctly decide the ΠP3 -sentence S?
Well, firstly, if a is a correct trusted advice string, then part (4) of the procedure
just directly expresses S, using the assumed YQ · QCMA/poly algorithm for coNP
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to eliminate one of the three quantifiers in the usual manner of Karp-Lipton
theorems.
That leaves the problem of verifying that a is a correct trusted advice string.
Parts (2) and (3) of the procedure verify the latter, by quantifying over all possible
SAT instances Ψ of the appropriate polynomial size, and checking that for each
one, either Ψ has a satisfying assignment or else there’s a witness w that causes C
to accept Φ, but not both. (In other words, C decides coNP in YQ · QCMA/poly.)
Now, for parts (2) and (4), we additionally needed an existential quantifier
over the untrusted quantum advice state σ, which is then verified using the trusted
classical advice string a. The reason is that, in parts (2) and (4), the third
and final quantifier needed, over the classical strings y, z, or w, happens to
be existential—so that third quantifier simply must do “double duty” by also
guessing the state σ. As mentioned before, passing a quantum state from an
earlier quantifier to a later one is impossible with conventional oracle calls.
However, this need to quantify existentially over σ opens up a problem.
Namely, what if the existential quantifiers, in parts (2) or (4), can be satisfied
by different advice states σ—states that are all compatible with a, but that lead
to different behaviors of C on some inputs? For example, perhaps there exists
an a such that some σ’s compatible with a give rise to a complete verification
procedure for UNSAT, while other σ’s compatible with a give rise to a sound
verification procedure for UNSAT, but the same σ never gives rise to both. If so,
then the σ that we find in part (4) need not give rise to a correct YQ · QCMA/poly
algorithm for coNP.
Fortunately, we can fix this problem using part (1). In part (1), we enforced
that every state σ compatible with a must give rise to essentially the same be-
havior on every input. Thus, from that point forward, it doesn’t even matter
whether we find σ via a universal quantifier or an existential one: every σ that
passes verification will give rise to the same behavior, and parts (2), (3), and (4)
are all talking about the same YQ · QCMA/poly procedure that correctly decides
coNP.
Note that in the definition of offline QGES we merely assumed that there
exists some efficient quantum circuit which the client could apply to map one
input to another. However, we never explicitly stated that the client could come
up with this circuit in polynomial time. If we also added this condition then we
would find that f ∈ BQP/qpoly (which is of course contained in QCMA/qpoly ∩
coQCMA/qpoly). In this case, using a result of Aaronson and Drucker which
is a quantum version of the Karp-Lipton theorem [196], it follows that having
such a QGES for NP-hard functions leads to ΠP2 ⊆ QMAPromiseQMA. Our proof of
Theorem 19 uses similar techniques and in fact strengthens the result of Aaronson
and Drucker from NP ⊂ BQP/qpoly implies ΠP2 ⊂ QMAPromiseQMA, to NP ⊂
BQP/qpoly implies ΠP2 ⊆ NPPromiseQMA.
6.6 Chapter summary and outlook
We have seen that the existence of a classical client blind quantum computing
protocol is contingent on the inclusion BQP ⊂ NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly, in the case
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of decision problems, and the existence of circuits of size 2n−Ω(
n
logn), making
polynomial-size queries to an NPNP oracle, for computing the permanent of an
n×n matrix. Both of these seem unlikely. Provided that such a protocol cannot
exist, what does this mean for the prospect of verifying quantum computations
with a classical client? As we have already mentioned, such a protocol has been
proposed, however it requires computational assumptions18 stemming from the
use of cryptographic primitives [37]. In fact, other than the Morimae and Fitzsi-
mons post hoc protocol and a number of other protocols that are also based on
the post hoc approach [28,35,36], all verification protocols employ cryptographic
methods to hide some information from the server [15]. Our result suggests that
if we demand information-theoretic security and wish to verify quantum compu-
tations with a classical client, we must reveal more information to the server than
just the size of the computation. This leads to two options:
1. There does not exist a verification protocol for quantum computation, hav-
ing a classical client, a single server that is restricted to performing BQP
computations and unconditional soundness. One might ask why we would
require unconditional soundness if the server is restricted to BQP. The rea-
son is that for protocols that base their security on the hardness of some
computational task, in practice, the chosen instances of that task can be
solved within a time frame of at most several decades. While this can be
good enough for most applications, it might not be adequate for users that
wish to have retrospective security (i.e. their secrets are never revealed at
any point in the future).
2. It is possible to verify quantum computations even when the server knows
the computation. While this option might seem questionable given our
preference for using blind protocols throughout the thesis, it is not with-
out precedent. The proof that IP = PSPACE is an example of such an
option [66]. The proof shows that there is an interactive protocol for any
computation that can be performed in polynomial space. Of course, the pro-
tocol requires the server to perform PSPACE-complete computations and so
it cannot be used in practice for the verification of BQP. However, the exis-
tence of this protocol serves as a proof of principle. It is possible for a com-
putationally limited client to delegate and verify computations performed
by a powerful server, while revealing both the input and the computation
to that server.
It will be interesting to see which of these options turns out to be true.
Apart from examining the case of a GES for BQP computations, we also in-
vestigated the computational limitations of a QGES. We saw that the addition
of quantum communication makes the QGES more powerful than its classical
counterpart allowing for the delegation of BQP computations, as in UBQC. In-
terestingly, however, the QGES seems no more powerful than a GES at delegat-
18More specifically, the protocol assumes that a certain problem, know as Learning With
Errors (LWE) [38], is not in BQP [37]. If this assumption is true, it allows for the existence of
one-way functions that are secure against BQP adversaries. These functions are then used, in
the protocol of [37], to verify BQP computations.
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ing NP-hard functions. The latter result is essentially a quantized version of the
Abadi et. al no-go theorem.
As open problems we mention the following:
• Is it possible to strengthen our result from Theorem 16 to provide an oracle
separation between BQP and NP/poly? Perhaps by basing the oracle on
something other than Simon’s problem, such as recursive Fourier sampling
[12].
• We showed that functions which admit an offline QGES are contained in
QCMA/qpoly ∩ coQCMA/qpoly. What upper bound, if any, can be placed
on functions which admit an online QGES?
• What if we consider a QGES in which the client’s quantum message is
logarithmic or poly-logarithmic in the size of the input (while the classi-
cal communication is still polynomial)? Can such a scheme allow for the
evaluation of arbitrary BQP functions? Of course, this question only makes
sense if we assume that the client is not able to perform BQP computa-
tions itself. Suppose that we restrict it so that it can process at most
a logarithmic amount of quantum information, apart from its ability to
perform polynomial-time classical computations. In that case, by adapt-
ing the proof of Theorem 18, we would find that the class of problems
solvable by this QGES should be contained in MABQL/qlog, where BQL de-
notes the class of problems that can be solved on a quantum computer
with logarithmic space and qlog denotes logarithmic-size quantum advice.
The question then becomes: is BQP ⊂ MABQL/qlog? It can be shown that
BQL/qlog ⊆ P/poly19, hence MABQL/qlog ⊆ MAP/poly ⊆ NP/poly. Since we
conjectured that BQP 6⊂ NP/poly, we find that such a QGES is unlikely, at
least for the case of a logarithmic amount of quantum communication. For
poly-logarithmic-size quantum communication, however, it is not clear if
the corresponding oracle class is contained in P/poly and thus the problem
remains open.
• Related to the previous question: what is the minimal amount of quan-
tum communication that the client needs to send to the server in order to
delegate BQP functions (provided BPP 6= BQP)?
19This follows from a simple argument: the BQL machine can be simulated in classical poly-
nomial time and the logarithmic-size quantum advice can be encoded as a list of polynomially-




Col. O’Neill: I suppose now is the time for me to say something
profound. [pause] Nothing comes to mind.
— Stargate SG-1, Season 1, Episode 2
The realisation of the first quantum computers capable of outperforming clas-
sical computers at non-trivial tasks is fast approaching. All signs indicate that
their development will follow a similar trajectory to that of classical computers.
In other words, the first generation of quantum computers will likely be com-
prised of large servers that are maintained and operated by specialists working
either in academia, industry or a combination of both. However, unlike with the
first super-computers, the Internet opens up the possibility for users, all around
the world, to interface with these devices and delegate problems to them. This
has already been the case with the devices of IBM and Rigetti [16,17], and more
powerful machines are soon to follow [167, 198]. But how will these computa-
tionally restricted users be able to verify the results produced by the quantum
servers? That is what the field of quantum verification aims to answer. More-
over, as mentioned before and as is outlined in [21], the field also aims to answer
the more foundational question of: how do we verify the predictions of quantum
mechanics in the large complexity regime?
We have seen that there are a number of protocols addressing the question
of verification, which we have classified as either prepare-and-send, receive-and-
measure or entanglement-based. In this thesis, we explored the robustness of
quantum verification and this has taken us through all of these approaches. We
started by looking at the prepare-and-send protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi
and showed that it is robust with respect to deviations in the prepared quantum
states. We then showed that having this property allows it to be turned into an
entanglement-based device-independent protocol, using the rigidity of non-local
correlations as proven by Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani. Investigating robustness
with respect to varying trust assumptions then allowed us to show that a one-
sided device-independent protocol can be developed using steering correlations,
instead of non-local correlations. This required us to prove a similar rigidity
result for steering correlations. The added trust allowed for a simpler and more
efficient derivation of this than in the non-local case. We also showed that some
of the derived bounds are optimal. Of course, having robustness to noise or to
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different trust assumptions does not mean that these protocols would function
correctly in the presence of a realistic noise channel, as we would encounter in a
practical setting. To address this, we turned to the receive-and-measure protocol
of Morimae and Fitzsimons and gave a simple construction for making it fault
tolerant. Our simulations of this protocol seem encouraging for the prospect
of implementing a version of it in practice, once scalable quantum computing
becomes a reality. Finally, we noted that most verification protocols rely on blind
quantum computation and addressed the question of whether blind quantum
computation with a classical client is possible, provided that the protocol is secure
in an information-theoretic sense. We gave complexity theoretic evidence that
the answer is no. We then also showed that blind quantum computing protocols,
like UBQC, are unlikely to allow the client to delegate NP-hard problems to the
quantum server.
What can we conclude from all this? First of all, the results of Chapters 3, 4
and 5 suggest that we should be optimistic about the prospect of verification
protocols being used alongside other quantum protocols, such as QKD. In other
words, provided that all the hurdles in realising scalable quantum computers will
be overcome, it seems that performing these verification protocols would not add
a significant technological overhead. We have also examined some foundational
aspects concerning quantum correlations and how they can be used for achiev-
ing verification. Specifically, using correlations to characterise quantum states
through self-testing was an integral part of both the device-independent and the
one-sided device-independent approaches. This leads us to conclude that improve-
ments in the way one performs self-testing can directly impact the performance
of a verification protocol. The recent approaches of Natarajan and Vidick [36]
and Coladangelo et al. [106] demonstrate this fact, by showing that self-tests
achieving constant robustness can lead to verification protocols with quasi-linear
overhead.
Conversely, the results of Chapter 6 seem to suggest that we should be pes-
simistic regarding the possibility of classical client quantum verification, with un-
conditional soundness. It should be stressed, however, that those results specif-
ically concern blind protocols. There is, so far, no evidence to suggest that a
non-blind version of such a protocol cannot exist. Indeed, we speculate that
an interactive-proof system for BQP computations, in which the prover is re-
stricted to BQP, might be developed by taking inspiration from the proof that
IP = PSPACE [66]. An exploration of this approach is discussed in [199]. What
we can conclude from Chapter 6 is that, very likely, protocols that aim to be both
blind and have information-theoretic security, must either allow the client some
quantum capabilities, or allow for the possibility of multiple, entangled servers.
What is the outlook for quantum verification? All of the verification ap-
proaches discussed in this thesis assumed a setting of unconditional soundness.
However, as we have previously mentioned, there are also a number of protocols
that achieve either blind quantum computation or verification by using compu-
tational assumptions about post-quantum security, specifically the assumption
that the Learning With Errors problem is not contained in BQP [37, 169, 170].
Additionally, there are protocols for quantum fully homomorphic encryption that
also make use of such assumptions [182,183,200]. It is therefore apparent that a
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new direction has emerged in the field of delegated quantum computations, one
that leverages cryptographic assumptions in order to solve information process-
ing tasks. It is also apparent, given its success, that this program will continue,
improving on existing schemes and also developing protocols for other tasks, such
as producing certifiable randomness [201].
Returning to protocols having unconditional soundness, future research into
this field will involve addressing many of the open questions that were mentioned
at the end of each chapter. Let us briefly restate some of the more important ones.
First of all, as mentioned before, arguably the most significant open problem of the
field is whether one can perform quantum verification with a purely classical client
and unconditional soundness. Another open problem, is whether it is possible to
have a blind and fault tolerant verification protocol in which the verifier possesses
a noisy single-qubit device. As mentioned, in Chapter 5, the question is whether
such a protocol can exist even when assuming that the noise in the verifier’s device
is correlated with the prover’s system. The technical difficulties in achieving this
are discussed in [159]. Finally, we would like to know what is the minimal amount
of quantum communication that should be exchanged between the verifier and the
prover in order to have blind verification and unconditional security. This relates
to the quantum generalised encryption scheme of Chapter 6. Could it be that
a QGES in which the verifier sends a quantum message of size poly-logarithmic
in the size of the input, is sufficient for delegating arbitrary BQP computations?
For the case of a logarithmic-size quantum message, our argument at the end of
Chapter 6, suggests that it is not possible. However, the poly-logarithmic case
is still open and such a protocol would be highly desirable, since minimising the
amount of quantum communication between the verifier and the prover would
lead to more practical protocols.
Verification is an important milestone on the road to scalable quantum com-
puting technology. As we have seen, verification protocols are, or can be made,
robust. Even so, among other issues, questions still remain regarding their opti-
mality, their ability to tolerate certain types of noise or to be used in conjunction
with cryptographic primitives. Addressing all these questions will be a key chal-






Below is the Matlab code (using the cvx package [202]) for solving the SDP
specified in Chapter 4 (Subsection 4.1.3), for the case of N = 3 Bell pairs.
1 b e l l p = 1/ s q r t (2 ) ∗ [ 1 ; 0 ; 0 ; 1 ] ;
2 r h o b e l l = b e l l p ∗ be l lp ’ ;
3 numPairs = 3 ;
4 n = 4ˆnumPairs ;
5
6 rho AB = 1 ;
7 p r o j e c t o r s = c e l l (1 , numPairs ) ;
8 f o r i = 1 : numPairs
9 rho AB = kron ( rho AB , r h o b e l l ) ;
10 p r o j e c t o r s { i } = kron ( kron ( eye (4ˆ( i −1) ) , r h o b e l l ) , eye (4ˆ(
numPairs−i ) ) ) ;
11 end
12
13 numTrials = 10 ;
14 t r a c e d i s t a n c e s = c e l l (1 , numTrials ) ;
15 f o r i = 1 : numTrials
16 sq reps = 0.01 ∗ i ;
17 cvx beg in sdp
18 v a r i a b l e rho (n , n)
19 v a r i a b l e p
20 dual v a r i a b l e s w y z t u
21 p == ( t ra c e ( rho ∗ rho AB ) )
22 minimize p
23 s u b j e c t to
24 w : rho == h e r m i t i a n s e m i d e f i n i t e (n) ;
25 y : t r a c e ( rho ) == 1 ;
26 z : t r a c e ( p r o j e c t o r s {1} ∗ rho ) >= 1 − sq reps ;
27 t : t r a c e ( p r o j e c t o r s {2} ∗ rho ) >= 1 − sq reps ;
28 u : t r a c e ( p r o j e c t o r s {3} ∗ rho ) >= 1 − sq reps ;
29 cvx end
30 t r a c e d i s t a n c e s { i } = norm( rho − rho AB ) ;
31 end




[1] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quan-
tum Information: 10th Anniversary Edition. Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY, USA, 10th edition, 2011.
[2] Richard P Feynman, Robert B Leighton, and Matthew Sands. The Feyn-
man Lectures on Physics, Vol. III: The New Millennium Edition: Quantum
Mechanics. The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Basic Books, 2011.
[3] Peter W. Shor. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and
discrete logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM Review, 41(2):303–332,
1999.
[4] Richard P Feynman. Simulating physics with computers. International
journal of theoretical physics, 21(6-7):467–488, 1982.
[5] Seth Lloyd. Universal quantum simulators. Science, pages 1073–1078, 1996.
[6] Ivan Kassal, Stephen P Jordan, Peter J Love, Masoud Mohseni, and Alán
Aspuru-Guzik. Polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the simulation of
chemical dynamics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, pages
pnas–0808245105, 2008.
[7] Hexadecimal sudoku. https://blog.digilentinc.com/
number-systems/.
[8] Andrew Wiles. Modular elliptic curves and Fermat’s last theorem. Annals
of mathematics, 141(3):443–551, 1995.
[9] Wikipedia article on regular expressions. https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Regular_expression.
[10] Mikhail J Atallah. Algorithms and theory of computation handbook. CRC
press, 1998.
[11] Complexity Zoo. https://complexityzoo.uwaterloo.ca/Complexity_
Zoo.
[12] Ethan Bernstein and Umesh Vazirani. Quantum complexity theory. SIAM
J. Comput., 26(5):1411–1473, October 1997.
187
[13] J. Watrous. Succinct quantum proofs for properties of finite groups. In
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, FOCS ’00, pages 537–, Washington, DC, USA, 2000. IEEE Com-
puter Society.
[14] Scott Aaronson. BQP and the polynomial hierarchy. In Proceedings of the
Forty-second ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’10, pages
141–150, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[15] Alexandru Gheorghiu, Theodoros Kapourniotis, and Elham Kashefi. Ver-
ification of quantum computation: An overview of existing approaches.
Theory of computing systems, July 2018. Eprint: arXiv:1709.06984.
[16] IBM quantum experience. http://research.ibm.com/ibm-q/.
[17] Rigetti forest. https://www.rigetti.com/forest.
[18] Scott Aaronson. Could a quantum computer have a subjective experience?
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951.
[19] Scott Aaronson. The Aaronson $25.00 prize. http://www.scottaaronson.
com/blog/?p=284.
[20] Umesh Vazirani. Workshop on the computational worldview and
the sciences. http://users.cms.caltech.edu/~schulman/Workshops/
CS-Lens-2/report-comp-worldview.pdf, 2007.
[21] Dorit Aharonov and Umesh Vazirani. Is quantum mechanics falsifiable? A
computational perspective on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Com-
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